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Abstract 
Corporations hold significant cash balances (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). There are benefits 
to holding cash such as decreasing the risk of financial distress and decreasing the reliance 
on expensive external financing or the fire sale of assets (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson, 1999). The main cost of holding cash is the opportunity cost of lost returns 
that could have been generated if the company invested the cash in positive net present 
value projects (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). In a cross-country analysis on cash holdings of 
45 countries by Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes (2003), Egypt has been found to have 
the highest cash ratio by a large margin. There are three established theories that attempt to 
explain corporate cash holdings, namely the trade-off, pecking order and agency cost of 
free cash flow. Al-Najjar (2013) highlights the importance of further academic enquiry into 
cash holdings in developing economies, particularly from a firm-level corporate 
governance perspective. The recent political and economic instability, the inherent market 
risks and the low shareholder protection in Egypt offer an ideal context for investigating 
the cash holding theories previously examined in developed economies. Therefore, this 
thesis contributes to the existing literature by analysing the determinants of corporate cash 
holdings of firms listed on the Egyptian stock market. Ordinary least squares, two-stage 
least squares and generalized method of moments regression estimators are used on a 
sample of 157 Egyptian listed firms from 2008-2015. The findings confirm strong 
evidence of the trade-off theory, agency theory and partial evidence of the pecking order 
theory. The findings will help managers, boards of directors, investors and policy makers 
understand the reasons behind cash hoarding in Egypt. This research will help improve 
cash management in Egypt and hence will increase shareholder wealth, attract more 
investors to the market and thus contribute to the improvement of the Egyptian economy. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
Introduction 
Corporations usually hold significant portions of their assets in cash (Ferreira and Vilela, 
2004). Managers hold cash mainly for three reasons. The first reason relates to the 
transaction motive, which is the motive to hold cash in order to save transaction costs that 
occur due to external financing or sale of fixed assets (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson, 1999). The second reason is embedded in the precautionary motive, which is 
about accumulating cash in order to decrease the risk of financial distress and hedge 
against unfavourable future changes in cash flows (Opler et al., 1999). The third reason is 
the agency motive, which occurs as a result of managers piling up cash to have higher 
discretionary power by increasing resources under their control (Jensen, 1986). This thesis 
aims to study the reasons why managers hold cash through analysing the determinants of 
corporate cash holdings of firms listed on the Egyptian stock market. 
1.1 Motivation 
 It is important to study cash holdings for several reasons. Firstly, cash represents a major 
portion of corporate wealth (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). Secondly, holding cash has 
many benefits such as being able to provide liquidity for day to day operations and having 
sufficient funds for upcoming investment opportunities. Furthermore, cash holdings 
decrease the risk of financial distress and decrease the cost of capital arising from 
decreased dependence on external financing and fire sale of assets (Ferreira and Vilela, 
2004). Nevertheless, cash holdings come with a cost. The cost of holding cash is the 
opportunity cost of lost returns that could have been achieved if the company invested the 
cash in positive net present value projects (Al-Najjar, 2013). Finally, cash is easily 
accessible by managers, especially when there is low monitoring and high managerial 
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discretion (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007).  Agency problems cause managers with high 
managerial discretion to hold cash for their own private benefits at the expense of 
shareholders‟ benefits (Jensen, 1986). Managers prefer to keep cash to increase resources 
under their control and to make the business safer in order to stay in control for the longest 
possible time. As such, cash can provide an easy opportunity for managerial expropriation 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
1.2 Evolution of Corporate Cash Holdings 
Corporate cash holdings have received increased academic attention in recent years. This is 
mainly because many corporations hold large amounts of cash (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). 
Furthermore, there has been great variation in cash holdings over time (Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith, 2007). Studies found that cash balances have been significantly growing throughout 
the years. Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) found that in 2006, companies in the United States 
held double the amount of cash compared to 1980 figures. Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) 
extend this analysis to other major industrial countries, namely United States (U.S.), 
United Kingdom (U.K.), Canada, Australia, Germany, France and Japan from 1991 to 
2008. The only country that had a decrease in cash holdings is Japan. This was attributed to 
the country‟s strong banking sector. All other countries experienced an increase in 
corporate cash holdings over time predominantly due to precautionary motives. Iskandar-
Datta and Jia (2012) reveal that the increase in risk throughout time has caused companies 
to decrease leverage and increase corporate cash holdings. This means that companies do 
not finance higher cash balances through increased debt. Moreover, after the financial 
crisis of 2008, firms have made liquidity management their top priority (Song and Lee, 
2012). This could be due to precautionary motives that are reinforced by the difficulties 
associated with lack of access to capital markets.  
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1.3 Original Contribution 
The aim of this research is to analyse the determinants of corporate cash holdings of firms 
listed on the Egyptian stock market. This study is the first to investigate the determinants 
of corporate cash holdings in Egypt. In developing countries, there are higher market 
imperfections and higher bankruptcy related costs compared to developed countries (Al-
Najjar, 2013). Previous research has found that firms operating in countries with weak 
shareholder protection hoard more cash than those operating in countries with strong 
shareholder protection due to higher managerial discretion exercised by top management 
(Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes, 2003; Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 2006; Al-
Najjar, 2013). Because of significant market imperfections, economic instability and weak 
shareholder protection, Egypt offers an ideal context for investigating the reasons that 
affect the managerial decisions regarding corporate cash holdings. This research 
investigates a large set of variables in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the 
determinants of corporate cash holdings from both financial and corporate governance 
perspectives. This includes the investigation of variables that are underrepresented in the 
literature on corporate cash holdings such as government ownership, board gender 
diversity and audit quality. Crucially, this study is the first to investigate the effect of 
political stability on corporate cash holdings. 
1.3.1 Theoretical Contribution 
This thesis aims to fill the gap in research through combining firm characteristics with 
firm-level governance variables by measuring their effect on the level of cash holdings of 
companies listed on the Egyptian stock market. Dittmar et al. (2003) conducted a cross 
country analysis on corporate cash holdings. They analysed around 11,000 companies from 
45 different countries and found that the overall median cash ratio is 6.6%. One key 
observation from the study is that Egypt had the highest median cash ratio of 29.57%. This 
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investigation shows that companies in Egypt keep significantly higher amounts of cash and 
highlights the importance of a thorough investigation into the reasons why this is the case. 
The focus of previous research on corporate cash holdings has been mainly on Europe and 
the U.S. such as Bates et al. (2009), Harford, Mansi and Maxwell (2008), Ozkan and 
Ozkan (2004), Ferreira and Vilela (2004) and Drobetz and Gruninger (2007). Recently, 
studies have started to focus more on emerging markets such as Brazil, Russia, India, 
China (Al-Najjar, 2013), Nigeria (Ogundipe, Salawu and Ogundipe, 2012), China (Chen, 
Li, Xiao and Zou, 2014; Kusnadi, Yang and Zhou, 2015), East Asia (Song and Lee, 2012) 
and Iran (Rezaei and Saadati, 2015). Al-Najjar (2013) highlights the importance of 
investigating developing countries due to greater market imperfections and higher 
bankruptcy related costs as compared to developed markets. Nevertheless, there has been 
no research on the determinants of corporate cash holdings in Egypt to date. The recent 
political and economic instability and the inherent market risks in Egypt increase the 
importance of investigating cash holdings because managers may have an incentive to 
hoard cash, specifically due to transaction and precautionary motives mentioned earlier.  
Most of the previously cited studies have focused on the financial determinants of 
corporate cash holdings ignoring the important effect of corporate governance 
determinants. This leaves a gap in the literature particularly given that the impact of the 
agency theory on corporate cash holdings is expected to be higher in developing 
economies due to weaker corporate governance structures, less monitoring and higher 
managerial discretion. The relationship between corporate governance and cash holdings is 
not significant in a strong corporate governance country like the U.S., because investors do 
not discount the value of firms with poor corporate governance, even if they are holding 
relatively high amounts of cash (Kalcheva and Lins, 2007). This indicates that cash 
holdings do not affect firm value in the presence of strong corporate governance (Kalcheva 
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and Lins, 2007). Nevertheless, cash holdings are critical for poorly governed firms 
(Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). Major studies such as Dittmar et al. (2003), Pinkowitz et 
al. (2006) and Al-Najjar (2013) agree that firms in countries with low shareholder 
protection tend to hold significantly more cash than firms in countries with strong 
shareholder protection. This has been explained by the higher discretionary powers 
exercised by top management and inability of investors to rely on appropriate market 
mechanisms to force significant dividend pay-outs. Dittmar et al. (2003) find that the 
agency motive is the primary determinant of corporate cash holdings and highlight the 
importance of this matter in countries with poor investor protection. Investor protection is 
very weak in Egypt as a recent World Bank ranking in 2016 has ranked Egypt 122 out of 
189 economies on the investor protection index. This ranking has improved to 81 in 2018, 
but still investor protection is considered weak in Egypt. Thus, the Egyptian context offers 
an ideal environment for the „stress test‟ of the well-established theories mostly tested in 
developed economies. 
Many studies which use corporate governance variables have mainly focused on country-
level governance rather than firm-level governance. A few studies measuring corporate 
cash holdings in an international context have included Egypt in their analysis among 
many other countries. However, studies that focus on country level governance do not 
capture the major effect of firm-level governance on corporate cash holdings failing to 
show the importance of agency problems (Chen et al., 2014). For example, Dittmar et al. 
(2003) analyse international corporate governance and cash holdings of around 11,000 
companies from 45 countries; Ramirez and Tadesse (2009) investigate cash holdings, 
uncertainty avoidance and the multinationality of firms using a large panel of firms from 
49 countries; Chang and Noorbakhsh (2006) investigate cash holdings using data from 
22,000 firms from 48 countries; and Al-Najjar and Clark (2017) analyse corporate 
governance and cash holdings in the MENA region, all include Egypt. Nevertheless, cross 
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country studies focus on broad corporate governance concepts such as investor protection 
without considering important firm-level agency problems. Therefore, in order to 
investigate the vital impact of the agency theory on cash holdings, it is important to study 
the effect of firm-level corporate governance characteristics on corporate cash holdings in 
Egypt. 
Al-Najjar (2013) highlights the importance of further academic inquiry into cash holdings 
in developing economies focusing on firm-level corporate governance variables such as 
board parameters, audit features and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) characteristics. 
Similarly, a recent study by Rezaei and Saadati (2015) focuses on corporate cash holdings 
in Iran and recommends the use of other variables in future research such as ownership 
structure and board of directors parameters. In addressing these calls, this study contributes 
to the existing literature through combining firm characteristics with corporate governance 
variables and measuring their effect on corporate cash holdings in Egypt. The research is 
designed to combine a comprehensive set of determinants and addresses important 
corporate governance aspects that have been underrepresented in the literature. 
In further analysis, the study extends to the existing literature in two ways. Firstly, this 
study investigates if companies listed on the Egyptian stock market have target cash ratios. 
In this respect, the study analyses the speed of adjustment. In order to get further intuition 
about the speed of adjustment and adjustment costs, the speed of adjustment in Egypt is 
compared to the speed of adjustment found by other studies carried out in different 
contexts. Secondly, the study contributes to the existing literature by analysing the effect of 
political stability on corporate cash holdings in Egypt. When there is low political stability, 
managers may take decisions in favour of hoarding cash for precautionary motives 
disregarding the opportunity cost of forgone returns. Egypt has faced a significant 
deterioration in political stability since the revolution in 2011 (Euromonitor International, 
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2014). To the best of the researcher‟s knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the 
effect of political stability on corporate cash holdings. In addition to this, a subsample 
analysis is performed in order to analyse the differences in the determinants of corporate 
cash holdings in Egypt before and after the revolution.    
1.3.2 Practical Implications 
Corporate cash holdings have been receiving increased attention in recent years from 
academics and practitioners internationally. The New York Times has recently reported 
that companies in the U.S. hold $1.9 trillion in cash collectively (Davidson, 2016). One 
example is Google having $80 billion cash in bank accounts and short term investments 
(Davidson, 2016). These significant amounts of cash are idle funds that could be invested 
to generate future profits. Therefore, academics and practitioners such as boards of 
directors, managers, investors and policy makers need to know why companies hoard such 
significant cash balances. Research has shown that companies in Egypt keep a significant 
portion of their assets in cash. This research will help explain the reasons behind cash 
hoarding in Egyptian listed companies. 
The agency cost of free cash flow theory states that managers favour to accumulate cash 
for their own wealth maximization even if it is not in the best interest of the shareholders 
(Jensen, 1986). In countries where there are weak corporate governance structures, there is 
less monitoring, higher managerial discretion and thus managers are able to keep high 
levels of cash. Entrenched managers may be able to increase resources under their control 
for their own private benefits and at the expense of shareholders. Analysing the effect of 
corporate governance on cash holdings in this thesis will help highlight the important 
corporate governance variables that may affect the cash holding decisions. This will help 
policy makers in improving and enforcing the code of corporate governance that will lead 
to appropriate corporate governance structures. This will in turn increase monitoring and 
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decrease managerial discretion. Managers will be forced to invest excess cash in positive 
net present value projects or distribute cash to shareholders as dividends. When investors 
are able to rely on effective corporate governance mechanisms, shareholder rights will be 
stronger and corporate wealth should increase. If investors understand this, they will be 
more willing to invest in the market, causing an overall positive effect on the Egyptian 
economy. Raised awareness of corporate governance in Egypt will attract more investors 
to the market due to increased compliance and higher transparency (Elsaman and 
Alshorbagy, 2011).  Additionally, it is important to understand the effect of political 
stability on cash holdings because political stability directly affects investor and consumer 
confidence particularly in emerging market economies (Euromonitor International, 2014). 
More specifically, Egypt has been found to have the highest deterioration in political 
stability out of 25 major emerging markets since the revolution in 2011 (Euromonitor 
International, 2014). Understanding how political stability affects managerial decisions 
regarding cash can help investors and consumers gain back confidence in Egyptian listed 
firms and the economy as a whole. This research is the first to investigate cash holdings in 
Egypt attempting to improve cash management in order to increase shareholder wealth, 
attract more investors to the market and thus improve the Egyptian economy.  
In order to gain an understanding of the Egyptian economy, the next section focuses on 
contextualizing and highlighting the importance of corporate cash holdings in Egypt from 
different aspects. The section starts by an overview of the Egyptian economy and stock 
market discussing its development throughout the period under analysis. Then a review of 
corporate governance in Egypt is presented including a brief discussion on the Egyptian 
code of corporate governance.  
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1.4 The Egyptian Context 
Egypt is one of the oldest civilizations in the world and one of the most influential 
countries in the Arab world (Oxford Business Group, 2013). It has recently faced years of 
political and economic uncertainty (Oxford Business Group, 2013). Egypt has been trying 
to re-establish economic stability after the revolution that started on the 25
th
 of January 
2011. It is claimed that Egypt is now one of the seven most vulnerable economies in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region (Farid, 2014). One of the causes behind the 
revolution was the unequal distribution of wealth brought about by the immense 
concentration of financial resources in the hands of the Egyptian elite (Elsaman and 
Alshorbagy, 2011). The ensuing economic and political instability caused by the revolution 
considerably decreases investor confidence in the Egyptian market. 
The above highlights the importance of such a significant economy and how it has been 
affected by economic and political instability in the recent years. Such instability could 
affect managerial decisions of firms operating in Egypt. More specifically, political and 
economic instability can cause managers to accumulate cash in order to protect against 
future risks and cash shortages. Furthermore, managers could be reluctant to undertake 
major investments under such risky circumstances and choose to retain high cash levels for 
precautionary motives. Dittmar et al. (2003) find that firms in Egypt keep relatively high 
cash balances. The alternative emphasis of previous academic studies along with recent 
developments, thus suggest that Egypt offers a valuable perspective on corporate cash 
holding decisions.  
1.4.1 The Egyptian Stock Market  
During the global financial crisis of 2008, Egypt was not as strongly affected as other 
economies. The Egyptian stock exchange (EGX) reported that 90% of listed companies 
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actually achieved profits in the third quarter of 2008 (The Egyptian Exchange Annual 
Report, 2008). In 2009, there was an improvement in the Egyptian economy exceeding 
expectations for the year. This improvement was reflected in the stock market through high 
trading records, regulatory development, improvement of information dissemination, 
technological developments and more (The Egyptian Exchange Annual Report, 2009). In 
2010, the Egyptian Economy continued to grow. According to World Bank indicators, the 
GDP of Egypt increased from 4.7% in 2009 to 5.1% in 2010, which is a healthy percentage 
considering the period in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (Global economic 
Prospects, 2011). The Egyptian stock exchange also reported that the improvement of 
tourism would create more jobs in Egypt and induce development (The Egyptian Exchange 
Annual Report, 2010). 
In 2011, Egypt witnessed a significant decline in economic growth due to the Egyptian 
revolution which started on the 25
th
 of January 2011. Political tension and economic 
instability caused the Egyptian economy to deteriorate widely due to many aspects such as 
a huge drop in foreign direct investments and state budget deficit. The Egyptian stock 
market reported a market loss of 21% in January 2011 followed by 30% loss after the 
revolution (The Egyptian Exchange Annual Report, 2011). In 2012, the political events 
continued to affect the Egyptian economy. Economic growth rates were still very low, 
negatively affecting the state budget deficit. There was also a significant decline in Egypt‟s 
international reserves and reduction in the value of the Egyptian pound. Nevertheless, in 
2012 the Egyptian stock market reported that trading volumes and market capitalization 
increased moderately compared to 2011 (The Egyptian Exchange Annual Report, 2012). 
During 2013 and 2014, the Egyptian stock market continued to improve despite the 
challenges. The year 2014 is considered the best year for the Egyptian stock exchange 
since the revolution and 2015 is considered second best. The Egyptian Stock Exchange 
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helped Egyptian companies to expand and create more jobs through providing financing 
opportunities (The Egyptian Exchange Annual Report, 2015). The following table 
summarizes the Egyptian stock market development in the recent years.  
Table 1.1: The Egyptian Stock Exchange 
Listed Companies (Main Market) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Number of Listed Companies 212 213  213  212  214  221 
Number of Traded Companies  211  204  204  206  206  217 
Number of Traded Companies as a % of Number of Listed 
Companies 
99  96  96  97  96  97 
Average Company Size (LE million) 2,302  1,378  1,763  2,013  2,337  1,945 
Market Capitalization End of Year (LE billion)  488  294  376  427  500  430 
Market Capitalization as a % of GDP  40  19  24  21  25  22 
Source: The Egyptian Exchange Annual Report 2015 
As seen in table 1.1, the number of firms listed on the Egyptian stock market range from 
212 to 221 in the most recent year and the number of traded firms is between 204 and 217. 
Even though there are some multinational firms listed on the Egyptian stock market, most 
firms are domestic. For a large economy like Egypt, the fact that the number of listed firms 
is only 221 in 2015 is a relatively small number. This indicates that the number of private 
companies in Egypt is relatively high. Nevertheless, research in Egypt is limited to listed 
firms because of the unavailability of data on private firms. Gao et al. (2013) state that 
most research on corporate cash holdings have focused on public firms due to the 
unavailability of data on private firms in most contexts. The firms listed on the Egyptian 
stock market comprise of 17 different sectors. The sectors are classified according to the 
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Egyptian exchange official website (http://www.egx.com.eg/English/ListedStocks.aspx). 
The 17 sectors are: 
 Basic resources 
 Chemicals 
 Construction and materials 
 Food and beverage 
 Healthcare and pharmaceuticals 
 Industrial goods and services and automobiles 
 Media 
 Oil and gas 
 Personal and household products 
 Real estate 
 Retail 
 Technology 
 Telecommunications 
 Travel and leisure 
 Utilities 
 Banking 
 Financial services excluding banks 
The companies listed on the Egyptian stock market are mainly large companies as seen 
from table 1.1 with average company sizes ranging from 1,378 to 2,337 million Egyptian 
pounds (Almost 77 to 130 million U.S. dollars). Even though there is the Nilex exchange 
which is the market for small and medium enterprises, the trading on Nilex in 2015 is only 
0.6 billion Egyptian pounds compared to 248 billion Egyptian pounds on the main market 
(The Egyptian Exchange Annual Report, 2015). Therefore, generally the focus is on the 
main Egyptian stock market. The main indices of the Egyptian stock market are the EGX 
30, EGX 70, EGX 100 alongside to EGX 20 and EGX 50.  
After presenting a general overview of the Egyptian economy and stock market in the 
recent years, the following sections discuss specific issues which relate to the Egyptian 
stock market that may have an impact of corporate cash holdings. 
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1.4.1.1 Listing Requirements 
The listing requirements for the Egyptian stock exchange are set by the Egyptian Financial 
Regulatory Authority and were last updated in November 2016. The specific part of listing 
requirements directly related to this research is article 18. Article 18 states that companies 
must disclose ownership structure and board of directors in details in a disclosure report 
including the names of the directors, their job titles and whether they are executives or 
non-executives (Egyptian Financial Regulatory Authority, 2011). This information is only 
disclosed compulsory and regularly by Egyptian companies after 2011. This is critical 
information to this research because studying the effect of corporate governance on 
corporate cash holdings relies heavily on the fact that such data is consistently and reliably 
available in Egypt in the time period covered by this study. 
1.4.1.2 Dividends and Capital Gains 
The Egyptian stock exchange reported that the dividend yield by the end of 2015 was only 
7.7%. Even though 7.7% may be high in some developed economies, it is relatively low in 
Egypt when compared to other safe investments such as deposit interest rates which 
reached almost 7% in 2015 (World Bank indicators). Also, the dividend yield of 7.7% is a 
relatively low return figure compared to the high inflation rates in Egypt. This is an 
indication that investors in Egypt mainly target capital gains rather than dividends. It is 
also important to note that after the devaluation of the Egyptian pound in 2016 certificates 
of deposits reached an interest rate of 20%. However, 2016 is not included in the period of 
this study so it will not be affecting the analysis of the results.  
Sakr, Abdel Gawad and Soliman (2016) conduct a research regarding dividend policies on 
a sample of the 50 most active Egyptian companies from 2006 to 2011. They find that the 
average pay-out ratio of Egyptian firms is only 22%. They also find that most firms in the 
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sample do not pay dividends at all. This confirms the fact that investors in Egypt target 
returns from capital gains more than dividend income. Dividends are directly related to 
corporate cash holdings through the trade-off theory as discussed later in chapter 2, section 
2.2. According to the trade-off theory, firms that pay dividend hold lower levels of cash 
due to their ability to cut off dividends and raise cash when needed. According to the trade-
off theory, since most companies in Egypt do not pay dividends, they would be expected to 
hold higher cash balances because they do not have the advantage of cutting off dividends 
and raising cash by doing so.  
1.4.1.3 Taxation on Stock Market Returns  
Taxation on capital gains was introduced to Egypt in 2014 but has been delayed several 
times and still has not come into effect (Global Tax Alert by Ernst and Young, 2015). The 
tax rule states that holders of listed shares will be subject to a 10% tax on capital gains 
resulting from the sale of listed Egyptian stocks. However, the capital gains resulting from 
the sale of non-listed stocks is subject to the regular tax rate of 22.5% for corporate and 
individual stockholders (Doing Business in Egypt Report- a tax and legal guide by 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2016). The taxation on capital gains of listed stocks is yet to be 
enforced in Egypt. Thus, the Egyptian tax system clearly encourages wealth generation 
through capital gains. As mentioned earlier, most Egyptian investors seek to make profits 
from capital gains rather than dividend income. 
Dividend distributions in the Egyptian stock market are subject to a tax rate of 10% 
(Global Tax Alert, Ernst and Young, 2015). Although participations representing more 
than 25% of voting stocks are subject to only a 5% tax rate if the holding period is longer 
than two years (Doing Business in Egypt Report- a tax and legal guide by Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers, 2016). Since the tax system encourages capital gains and most investors seek 
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capital gains rather than dividends, dividend payments in the Egyptian stock market are 
relatively weak and many companies choose not to pay dividends at all.  
1.4.1.4 Ownership Structure of Firms Listed on the Egyptian Stock Market 
There has been a considerable level of research focusing on ownership structure in 
Egyptian listed companies in recent years. Omran et al. (2008) use a sample of 81 firms in 
Egypt and compare them to a sample from Jordan, Oman and Tunisia. They find that 
Egypt is the country with the highest government ownership with an average of 34%. They 
also find that the average ownership by local individuals is 18%, local private institutions 
35%, local others 1% and finally foreign ownership of 12%. They also measure ownership 
concentration by the top three block holders and find that Egypt has the highest ownership 
concentration at 58%. Abdelsalam et al. (2008) conduct a research on board composition, 
ownership structure and dividend policy. When analysing ownership structure in Egypt, 
Abdelsalam et al. (2008) agree to a high governmental ownership ratio of 29.97%. They 
also find that the managerial ownership ratio is 6.51%, individuals‟ block ownership ratio 
is 2.27% and institutional ownership (non-governmental) is 19.43%.  
Soliman, Bahaa El Din and Sakr (2012) use 42 of the most active companies listed on the 
Egyptian stock market from 2007-2009 to analyse ownership structure and corporate social 
responsibility. They find that the average managerial ownership is 24.81%, institutional 
ownership 52.43% and foreign ownership 24.31%. Wahba (2014) also uses a sample of the 
50 most active Egyptian firms to find that the mean managerial ownership is 8.522%, 
institutional ownership is 24.497%, private ownership is 48.076% and state ownership is 
10.937%. 
Most studies that analysed the ownership structure of Egyptian listed companies have only 
used the most active firms listed on the stock market which may lead to survivorship bias. 
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Survivorship bias may occur due to the fact that these studies only choose firms that meet a 
certain criteria and neglect others that do not. Nevertheless, as seen from the high 
percentages of ownership concentration, most studies have showed that institutional 
ownership is relatively high in Egypt. Khlif, Samaha and Azzam (2015) ensure the fact that 
most listed companies are still concentrated and many of them in family hands. They state 
that free float is very low in the Egyptian stock market. Khlif et al. (2015) highlight that 
ownership concentration rise corporate governance challenges, especially in terms of 
minority shareholder protection. This leads to the next section presenting an overview on 
corporate governance in Egypt.  
1.4.2 Corporate Governance in Egypt  
Corporate governance structures and regulations in Egypt have been under continuous 
improvement to ensure good disclosure practices and enhance investor protection. Such 
improvements include amendments to existing stock market listing requirements to 
improve corporate governance structures of listed companies as well as implementation of 
a new online disclosure system (The Egyptian Exchange Annual Report, 2015). 
Nevertheless, corporate governance and investor protection still remain weak in Egypt 
compared to other countries. The World Bank claims that in emerging economies, 
corporate governance can be very important for a variety of reasons. These reasons include 
decreasing market vulnerability to financial crises, reducing transaction costs and the cost 
of capital, and increasing capital market development. However, poor corporate 
governance structures decrease investor confidence and decrease foreign direct 
investments (Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes, 2009). Elsaman and 
Alshorbagy (2011) highlight the importance of corporate governance awareness in Egypt. 
They suggest that an increased investor awareness of corporate governance will increase 
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compliance and lead to higher transparency. This will then entice more investors to the 
market.  
In countries with poor minority shareholder protection, controlling shareholders can easily 
take advantage to their own private benefit (Pinkowitz et al., 2006). The Doing Business 
Report (2016) states that Egypt has a score of 4.5 out of 10 in the index measuring investor 
protection. As mentioned earlier, Egypt is ranked number 122 out of 189 economies on the 
strength of minority investor protection index in 2016 and number 81 in 2018. This 
ranking shows that Egypt remains a country of relatively poor investor protection. Ferreira 
and Vilela (2004) state that in countries with poor shareholder protection managers will 
have incentives to increase cash balances to have greater control over corporate resources. 
Dittmar et al. (2003) and Al-Najjar (2013) find that firms operating in countries with poor 
shareholder protection hold more cash than those operating in countries with strong 
shareholder protection. This highlights the importance of investigating the case of Egypt 
with respect to corporate cash holdings specifically from the agency perspective. The 
Following section presents a brief discussion on the code of corporate governance in 
Egypt. 
1.4.2.1 The Code of Corporate Governance in Egypt  
The code of corporate governance in Egypt is issued by the Ministry of Finance. The latest 
code was adopted in February 2011 (European Corporate Governance Institute, 2011). The 
code does not have a legal status, but like in many countries is rather a code of conduct 
written for the organizations in order to protect stakeholders in general and shareholders in 
particular. The code is specifically intended for companies listed on the Egyptian stock 
exchange and companies that finance most of their operations through the banking and 
financial sectors. However, the code is transferable to any other type of business set up. 
The code states that if any corporation is not able to comply with one of the standards it 
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should disclose the reason. All companies listed on the Egyptian stock exchange are 
required to disclose their compliance with the code of corporate governance in their annual 
report and their official websites.  
Companies must disclose detailed financial statements, independent auditor‟s report and 
any other relevant financial information to its stakeholders. Companies are also required to 
disclose non-financial information such as Board of Directors (BOD) formation, ownership 
structures, corporate governance compliance, safety standards and corporate social 
responsibility strategies. Corporate governance in Egypt has been developing in recent 
years. An example of such development is the involuntary disclose of board data after 
2011. Nevertheless, corporate governance still requires improvement in Egypt, especially 
its practical enforcement.  
Having presented some background on the Egyptian context, the next section covers a brief 
summary of the research methodology used in this study. The sections after then present 
the research questions and research objectives. The research questions are formulated to 
contribute to the understanding of cash holding decisions through hypotheses testing (later 
discussed in chapter 2, section 2.8 and chapter 3, section 3.8). Finally, the specific research 
objectives are set in order to help test the research hypotheses. 
1.5 Methodology 
This study is conducted from a philosophical stance of objectivism. A quantitative research 
approach is adopted. The data collected comprises of all firms listed on the Egyptian stock 
market. The final sample includes a panel data set of 157 companies from 2008-2015. The 
data consists of financial data and corporate governance data extracted from Bloomberg. 
Observations with missing values were completed and cross referenced from Thomson 
Reuters EIKON. Additional corporate governance data was obtained from Egypt for 
19 
 
Information Dissemination and macro-economic variables were downloaded from the 
World Bank database. Multivariate regression analysis is used to analyse the effect of 
financial and corporate governance variables on corporate cash holdings. In order to 
analyse the determinants of corporate cash holdings, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and 
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regression estimators are used. Ordinary least squares 
regression is tested and corrected for model specification, multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Two-stage least squares regression is used in order 
to address endogeneity. Finally, in order to measure the speed of adjustment of firms 
towards their target cash ratios, Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) regression is 
used. 
1.6 Research Questions  
The overall aim of this thesis is to analyse the determinants of corporate cash holdings of 
firms listed on the Egyptian stock market. The aim is achieved by testing the research 
hypotheses which determine if the established theories adequately explain managerial 
decisions regarding cash. This thesis fills the gap in research through combining firm 
characteristics with firm-level governance variables and measuring their effect on the level 
of cash holdings of companies listed on the Egyptian stock market. In order to contribute to 
the understanding of corporate cash holdings in Egypt, the following research questions are 
formulated: 
1- What are the financial determinants of corporate cash holdings of firms listed on 
the Egyptian stock market? 
2- What are the corporate governance determinants of corporate cash holdings of 
firms listed on the Egyptian stock market? 
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1.7 Research Objectives 
In order to address the research questions the following objectives are formulated: 
1- Highlighting the importance of corporate cash holdings and providing a 
background on the Egyptian context 
2- Reviewing the literature on corporate cash holdings from a financial perspective 
3- Reviewing the literature on corporate cash holdings from a corporate governance 
perspective 
4- Selecting an appropriate data collection technique and the best possible multivariate 
regression estimator 
5- Analysing empirical findings in comparison with previous literature and providing 
recommendations for companies, managers, investors and policy makers 
6- Providing conclusions, highlighting the contribution of findings, presenting 
research limitations and recommending areas of future research  
1.8 Thesis Structure 
Based on the research objectives, the thesis structure consists of the following six chapters: 
Chapter1: Introduction  
This chapter provides a background on corporate cash holding and why it is an important 
area of research. It overviews the basic managerial decisions regarding cash. The chapter 
explains how the original contribution addresses the gap in the literature. More 
specifically, it highlights the theoretical contribution of the research and the important 
practical implications. The chapter highlights the importance of investigating into the 
determinants of corporate cash holdings in the Egyptian context. Thereby, the chapter 
provides an overview of the Egyptian economy focusing on the Egyptian stock market and 
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corporate governance in Egypt. Finally, it states the overall aim and individual objectives 
to be met and presents the research questions.   
Chapter 2: Literature Review Part 1: The Financial Determinants of Corporate Cash 
Holdings 
This chapter aims to focus on reviewing previous studies and showing how firm 
characteristics can be very important in cash determination. It explains the theoretical 
framework as a base for empirical analysis. More specifically, it describes the factors 
determining cash holding decisions under each established theory. Based on these theories, 
the hypotheses for firm characteristics are formulated. Furthermore, a review of studies 
linking cash holdings to political and economic factors is presented. 
Chapter 3: Literature Review Part 2: Corporate Governance and Corporate Cash 
Holdings 
This chapter starts by an introduction on the agency theory and its manifestations. Then it 
describes how the agency theory and managerial discretion can affect cash holding 
decisions. It reviews previous research on country level and firm level corporate 
governance and how they can have a significant impact on cash decisions. Based on the 
agency theory, the hypotheses for corporate governance characteristics are formulated. 
Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
This chapter starts by presenting the philosophical stance of the research. It describes the 
research strategies and methodological approaches used in support of major studies in the 
field. The research model is generated with detailed description of all variables and their 
calculations. The chapter also provides detailed review of different regression estimators, 
highlighting the most appropriate detailed procedure carried out for analysis. Finally, it 
clarifies the data type, collection procedures and limitations of the data.  
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Chapter 5: Findings and Discussion 
This chapter covers the research findings along with its detailed analysis. It shows 
interpretations of the results of the empirical analysis including comparison of the findings 
with previous research. 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This chapter concludes the thesis, summarizing the research methods and results. It also 
presents how the research objectives are achieved and how the research gap is filled. The 
theoretical and practical contributions are highlighted in terms of the research findings. 
Finally, it provides recommendations for future research in corporate finance. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review Part 1: The Financial Determinants of 
Corporate Cash Holdings  
Introduction  
Cash and cash equivalents usually constitute an important component of a firm‟s assets 
(Kusnadi, 2011). Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) examine cash because firms hold large 
amounts of it. Cash represents a major portion of corporate wealth and is easily accessible 
by managers. It is also important to analyse corporate cash holdings because of associated 
costs such as the opportunity cost of not investing in positive Net Present Value (NPV) 
projects (Al-Najjar, 2013).  Song and Lee (2012) state that after the financial crisis of 2007 
- 2009, firms have made liquidity management their top priority. Here, one of the solutions 
is for firms to hoard cash due to the increased cost and difficulty of raising funds in 
financial markets.  
Dittmar et al. (2003) analysed corporate cash holdings of around 11,000 companies from 
45 countries, the overall median of the cash to net assets ratio is 6.6%. As far as this work 
is concerned, one key observation is that Egypt has the highest median of 29.57%. This 
highlights the importance of investigating why companies in Egypt are keeping a high 
portion of their assets in cash.  
Since cash may constitute a significant part of any firm‟s assets, it is important to analyse 
the factors that affect the managerial decision on spending or retaining it. Managers have 
four main motives to holding cash, namely the transaction motive, precautionary motive, 
agency motive and tax motive. Based on these four motives, there are three main theories 
that determine corporate cash holdings. These theories are the trade-off, pecking order and 
agency cost of free cash flow theories. Each of these theories includes firm specific 
characteristics that add to the understanding of why managers keep cash in companies. The 
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following section presents the four motives to holding cash in order to later explain the 
theories and understand the financial determinants of corporate cash holdings under each 
theory. The motives and theories are summarized later in diagram 2.1. 
2.1 Cash Holding Motives 
All in all, there are four motives for holding cash: the transaction motive, precautionary 
motive, agency motive and tax motive. The transaction motive is the motive to hold cash in 
order to minimize transaction costs associated with financing from external sources (Opler 
et al., 1999). The precautionary motive is the motive to hold cash as means of protection 
from future risks (Opler et al., 1999). The agency motive is the motive for managers to 
hold cash in order to increase resources under their control and their discretionary power 
(Jensen, 1986). Finally, the tax motive is the motive for multinational firms to hold more 
cash as they are otherwise required to pay higher taxes due to repatriation of foreign 
earnings (Foley, Hartzell, Titman and Twite, 2007). This section continues with a more 
detailed discussion of these motives. 
1- The Transaction Motive 
The transaction motive states that firms that hold more cash face lower transaction costs as 
they do not need to raise funds from external sources or sell existing fixed assets (Opler et 
al., 1999). Firms that accumulate cash do not need to finance their projects by having to 
rely on expensive capital markets. If companies have sufficient cash reserves to finance 
their investments, then they can save on transaction costs that come with buying and 
selling financial and real assets.  
2- The Precautionary Motive 
The precautionary motive states that companies will hold more cash to hedge the firm 
against risks associated with unfavourable future changes in respective cash flows (Opler 
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et al., 1999). They find that firms with riskier cash flows hold more cash due to 
precautionary motives. Firms that have significant cash reserves can protect themselves 
from cash flow volatility which could be brought about by business or market risks. Thus, 
firms with a big enough cash ratio have a lower risk of financial distress and a lower 
probability of bankruptcy.  
3- The Agency Motive 
The agency motive deals with the conflicts between managers and outside investors arising 
from the decision to spend internally generated cash (Jensen, 1986; Ferreira and Vilela, 
2004; Harford et al., 2008). Dittmar et al. (2003) find that managers decide on how much 
cash to keep in a company mainly based on their personal wellbeing, rather than 
shareholders‟ best interest. Managers would prefer to build up cash reserves to increase the 
discretionary power under their control (Jensen, 1986). Moreover, higher cash reserves can 
also be linked to the sense of greater job security for mangers. However, outside investors 
usually prefer surplus cash reserves to be distributed as dividends or invested in positive 
net present value projects that increase shareholder wealth. Miller and Modigliani (1961) 
explain that the rational behaviour assumption is that investors always prefer increased 
wealth either in the form of dividends or higher market values of their shares. 
4- The Tax motive 
The tax motive assumes that multinational firms hold higher levels of cash due to higher 
tax expenses resulting from the repatriation of foreign earnings (Foley et al., 2007). They 
suggest that firms facing higher repatriation taxes hold higher cash reserves abroad. Most 
empirical research has ignored the influence of the tax motive on corporate cash holdings. 
Flipse (2012) finds that European firms primarily hold cash due to precautionary, 
transaction and agency motives but finds no evidence of the tax motives. This justifies the 
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assertion that there may be no relationship between cash holdings and the tax motive. The 
tax motive is beyond the scope of this study because it is a rule based decision whereas the 
focus of this study relates to decisions with managerial discretion. This study is also not 
considering the tax motive because it predominantly applies to multinational firms which 
are not the focus here. From this point onwards, the tax motive will be excluded from the 
discussion.  
Based on the motives to holding cash there are three main theories that attempt to explain 
the determinants of corporate cash holdings. The three considered motives are related to 
the three main theories that underpin corporate cash holding decisions (see diagram 2.1, 
section 2.8). These theories are the trade-off, pecking order and agency cost of free cash 
flow theories.  
The trade-off theory examines the cash holding decision through identifying an optimal 
level of cash by weighing up the benefits and costs of holding cash (Drobetz and 
Grüninger 2007).  In terms of the benefits, holding cash can decrease the risks of financial 
distress (precautionary motive) and decrease the firm‟s reliance on expensive external 
sources or the unfavourable fire sale of assets (transaction motive) (Opler et al., 1999). The 
cost of holding cash is mainly the opportunity cost of forfeited returns that could have been 
generated if the company had invested the cash in a positive net present value project 
(Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). In the presence of market imperfections there is an optimal 
level of cash that maximizes firm value (Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2008). The 
recent political instability and the inherent market risks in Egypt may boost the above 
outlined motives and persuade mangers in favour of making the decision to accumulate 
cash.  
The pecking order theory originally developed by Myers (1984) deals with the hierarchy of 
financing preferences. The theory suggests that firms prefer to finance projects through 
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internally generated funds in the first instance, turning to debt instruments as second choice 
and leaving equity as the least preferred source of finance. Issuing debt is risky and costly 
in a country like Egypt where the yield on treasury bonds is significantly higher than in 
most developed economies.  
―In perfect markets all traders have equal and costless access to information about the 
ruling price and about all other relevant characteristics of shares‖ (Miller and Modigliani, 
1961, p.412).  
In imperfect markets, information asymmetry arises and it becomes more expensive for 
firms to acquire external financing. This is due to the problems related to adverse selection 
(Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2008). Akerlof (1970) present an example of adverse 
selection on insurance companies. As the most popular type of medical insurance in the 
U.S. is group insurance, good health is already a requirement for employment. Thus, the 
people who get medical insurance are the ones who need it least. The same concept can be 
applicable to finance. One of the most important aspects of explaining economic 
institutions uncertainties can be the difficulty of determining good quality from bad quality 
businesses and so trust is a very important issue (Akerlof, 1970). This problem of adverse 
selection may cause difficulties for firms to access required external financing resources. 
The transaction and precautionary motives of holding cash may force managers to rely on 
internal funds if they are having difficulties accessing expensive capital markets. All of the 
above reasons suggest stronger motives for greater corporate cash holdings. 
The Agency cost of free cash flow theory first proposed by Jensen (1986) deals with 
conflicts that may occur between managers and shareholders relating to cash decisions. 
The theory predicts that managers will not pay-out cash to shareholders in the form of 
dividends in order to protect the resources under their control. This arises from the agency 
motive to holding cash. Managers hoard cash in order to increase their power and security 
by removing the all-important monitoring function of capital markets. Jensen (1986) 
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suggests that internal financing reduces monitoring of capital markets that otherwise 
occurs when companies obtain external capital. Jensen (1986) states that as managers 
accumulate more free cash flow, they become more likely to make decisions promoting 
their own private benefits. An example here would be a decision to grow a company 
beyond its optimal size in order to increase resources under their control and increase their 
compensation. Studies like Dittmar et al. (2003) and Al-Najjar (2013) agree that firms in 
countries with low shareholder protection tend to hold more cash because of the higher 
discretionary powers exercised by top management and inability of investors to rely on 
appropriate market mechanisms to force significant dividend pay-outs.  
The following sections explain the trade-off, pecking order and agency cost of free cash 
flow theories in detail. It also discusses key financial determinants of corporate cash 
holdings according to each theory and explains how each determinant adds to the 
understanding of the cash related decisions. Previous studies do not find consistent 
evidence on the relationship between cash holdings and its determinants (Belghitar and 
Khan, 2013). Based on the understanding of the explained theories, an expected 
relationship between each determinant and cash holdings can be anticipated providing 
background to more formal hypotheses development for this study.  
2.2 The Trade-off Theory 
The trade-off theory focuses on optimal cash levels, and does so by analysing marginal 
costs and benefits of holding cash. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) state that the benefits of 
holding cash amount to the lower likelihood of financial distress and reduced cost of 
capital brought about by reduced reliance on external financing and fire sale of assets. The 
main cost of holding cash is the opportunity cost of investing in low risk, low-return liquid 
assets.  
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According to the trade-off theory, when firms accumulate cash they do so in line with an 
incentive to protect against risks of financial distress. The trade-off theory can explain cash 
holdings specifically in emerging markets because of the greater market imperfections and 
higher bankruptcy related costs as compared to developed markets (Al-Najjar, 2013). 
The most commonly selected firm characteristics related to the trade-off theory according 
to major studies such as Opler et al. (1999), Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004), Bates et al. (2009), Al-Najjar (2013) and Guizani (2017) are Dividend Payments, 
Investment Opportunity, Liquid Asset Substitutes, Leverage, Firm Size, Cash Flow, Cash 
Flow Volatility, Debt Maturity and Capital Expenditure. Each of these determinants is 
further discussed with references to previous research that examines corporate cash 
holdings in different contexts. 
2.2.1 Dividend Payments 
Firms that pay dividends are expected to hold less cash as they can raise funds cheaply 
through simply forfeiting or cancelling dividend pay-outs (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). 
Therefore, according to the trade-off theory, the relationship between dividend payments 
and cash holdings is expected to be negative.  
Bates et al. (2009) study the evolution of cash holdings of U.S. firms from 1980 to 2006 
and find that the average cash ratio more than doubles over this period. They report that the 
greatest increase in cash holdings of U.S. firms is mostly in non-dividend-paying firms, 
recently listed firms and firms operating in high volatility industries. This indicates that the 
increase in cash holdings over time can be explained by precautionary motives. The trade-
off theory is supported by the analysis of Bates et al. (2009), which shows a negative 
relationship between dividends and cash holdings. Non-dividend-paying firms have a 
relatively higher need to hoard cash than dividend-paying firms. This is due to their 
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inferior ability to raise funds from cutting off dividends as compared to dividend paying 
firms. Jensen (1986) also finds that firms that do not pay dividends keep more cash.  
Harford et al. (2008) and Gao, Harford and Li (2013) also support the trade-off theory by 
suggesting that firms that pay dividends in the U.S have relatively low cash holdings. Al-
Najjar and Clark (2017) find a negative relationship between dividend payment and cash 
holdings in the MENA region indicating that firms that pay dividends can raise cash when 
needed. Belghitar and Khan (2013) also find a negative relationship between dividends and 
cash holdings in U.K. Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). In a cross country analysis, 
Guney, Ozkan and Ozkan (2007) find a negative relationship between cash holdings and 
dividends. Analysing each country separately they find a negative relationship in the U.S., 
a positive relationship in Germany, and no significant relationship in France, Japan and the 
U.K. Also, Guizani (2017) finds no significant relationship between dividends and cash 
holdings in Saudi Arabia. In another cross-country analysis, Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) 
find a negative relationship between dividends and cash holdings in the U.S., U.K., Canada 
and Australia, but find a positive relationship in France, Japan and Germany.  
In the Russian context, Al-Najjar (2013) finds a negative relationship between the dividend 
pay-out ratio and cash holdings again supporting the assumptions of the trade-off theory. 
However, in the Brazilian context the findings of Al-Najjar (2013) contradict the trade-off 
theory showing a positive relationship between the two variables. This may be because 
dividend paying firms want to keep their reputation as regular dividend payers while in the 
meantime continue to accumulate some cash to possibly improve their financial positions. 
Shah (2011) and Masood and Shah (2014) also find a positive relationship between 
dividend payments and cash holdings in Pakistan. This means that firms save cash to 
continue their dividend paying patterns. Drobetz and Grüninger (2007), Bigelli and 
Sánchez-Vidal (2012) and Wu, Rui and Wu (2012) all contradict the trade-off theory by 
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finding a positive relationship between dividends and cash holdings. The results of Drobetz 
and Grüninger (2007) reveal evidence of a significant positive relationship between 
dividend payments and cash holdings when dividends are measured by means of a dummy 
variable, but no such significant relationship is found when dividends are measured using 
dividend yield.  
Even though Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) find no empirical evidence of the effect of dividend 
payments on cash holdings, they explain that a positive relationship between dividend 
payments and cash holdings imply that dividend paying firms are unwilling to cancel 
dividend pay-outs and thus need to accumulate cash to avoid future liquidity issues. Song 
and Lee (2012) also find that cash dividend payments are positively associated with cash 
holdings in East Asia. Chen et al. (2014) show that Chinese firms that paid dividends in the 
previous year hold more cash the following year in order to sustain dividend pay-outs.  
This argument can be linked to the signalling theory. The signalling theory discusses the 
concept of how information asymmetry between managers and investors can signal the 
firm‟s financial position. Managers tend to know more about the firm‟s future performance 
and so when firms pay dividends this can show a signal of the firm‟s financial position to 
investors (Al-Najjar and Belghitar, 2011). According to the signalling theory, firms that 
pay dividends send a signal of strong future prospects. Dividend paying firms may need to 
keep a cash buffer in order to keep paying regular dividends and thus maintain good 
corporate image. Firms that send out such positive signals to the capital markets may also 
be able to reduce their cost of capital because investors will consider investing in these 
companies as relatively safe and as a result may settle for lower returns. Nevertheless, 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) argue differently to the traditional view explained here by 
explaining that dividend policies are irrelevant to market valuation. Even though paying 
dividends could mean sending a positive signal, firms would have to forgo positive net 
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present value projects in order to pay these dividends which may send a negative one. 
Therefore, dividend pay-outs send no signal to the market and are irrelevant in the 
determination of market prices (Miller and Modigliani, 1961). 
Al-Najjar and Belghitar (2011) argue that the relationship between cash holdings and 
dividends could be a simultaneous one. This means that the decision to pay dividends is 
based on the availability of cash in the company. However, the decision itself to hold cash 
is dependent on the firm‟s dividend policy. Interestingly, their findings from a 
simultaneous equation model show that cash holdings and dividend policy do not have an 
impact on one another when controlling for endogeneity. Findings also show that cash 
holdings and dividend policy have the same determinants.  
The academic debate regarding the effect of dividend pay-outs on cash holdings is clearly 
an on-going one. The trade-off theory argues a negative association between dividend 
payments and cash holdings. Some researchers have supported the trade-off theory by 
finding evidence of the negative relationship. Here, the narrative which goes with the 
findings highlights that dividend-paying firms keep low levels of cash because they are 
free to cancel dividends and raise cash anytime they need. However, other researchers 
contradict the trade-off theory and actually find a positive relationship between dividends 
and cash holdings. These researchers explain their findings through showing that dividend 
paying firms are unwilling to cancel dividends because otherwise their reputation would 
suffer sending a negative signal to the market. These companies hoard cash to be able to 
keep paying dividends, alongside trying to improve their financial position. The next 
section looks at the second determinant of corporate cash holdings, which is investment 
opportunity.  
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2.2.2 Investment Opportunity 
Firms with good investment opportunities will keep higher levels of cash in order to 
decrease the opportunity cost of forgone returns (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). This implies 
that firms will accumulate cash to meet all their profitable investment requirements. Firms 
with higher investment opportunities will also register higher cash levels to protect 
themselves from possible financial distress that may occur from a stretched liquidity 
position, once all investments have been made (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Thus, according 
to the trade-off theory the relationship between investment opportunity and cash holdings 
is expected to be positive. The market-to-book ratio is usually used as a proxy for 
investment opportunity (Opler et al., 1999).  
In the U.S context, Harford et al. (2008) find that firms with higher market-to-book ratios 
have higher cash ratios because they have more growth options. The trade-off theory 
assumes that firms with more investment opportunities will keep higher levels of cash 
earmarked for investment, plus a certain surplus which protects from possible future 
bankruptcy. Dittmar et al. (2003) find a positive association between cash holdings and the 
market-to-book ratio. The academics analysed the data on 11,000 companies from 45 
countries. Kusnadi (2005) find that firms with more attractive opportunities in Singapore 
hold more cash. Guney et al. (2007) and Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) also find a positive 
relationship between investment opportunities and cash holdings. Ogundipe et al. (2012) 
find that firms have higher cash ratios when they have upcoming business and growth 
opportunities. Chen et al. (2014) present evidence in the Chinese context that firms with 
high growth opportunities have high cash levels.  
It may be argued that if firms have investment opportunities, they would have already 
spent the excess cash financing them (Opler et al., 1999). However, it must be noted that 
the argument here is regarding upcoming growth opportunities and not past ones. Firms 
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with upcoming opportunities have an incentive to hold cash in order to invest in them 
because if they face cash shortages they would have to bear a high opportunity cost of the 
forgone investment (Drobetz and Grüninger, 2007). The next determinant of corporate 
cash holdings according to the trade-off theory is liquid asset substitutes. 
2.2.3 Liquid Asset Substitutes  
Firms with more liquid asset substitutes are expected to hold less cash as they can easily 
sell those liquid assets to make up for possible cash shortages (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). 
Most empirical research on cash holdings uses the net working capital to assets ratio as a 
proxy for liquid asset substitutes. A firm with higher net working capital will have less 
need to keep cash out of precautionary motives as liquid current assets can be easily 
converted into cash in case of financial distress. Therefore, according to the trade-off 
theory the relationship between liquid asset substitutes and cash holdings is expected to be 
negative.  
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) find that liquid assets have a negative impact on cash holdings of 
companies in the United Kingdom. Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008) provide 
evidence of a significant negative relationship between liquid assets and cash holdings 
supporting the proposition that liquid assets are a substitute to cash. D‟Mello, 
Krishnaswami and Larkin (2008) find a negative relationship between working capital and 
cash holdings in the U.S. because firms with liquid assets do not need to keep cash. Song 
and Lee (2012) confirm that net working capital has a negative association with cash 
holdings in the East Asian context.   
Dittmar et al. (2003), Ogundipe et al. (2012), Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal (2012), Iskandar-
Datta and Jia (2012), Orens and Reheul (2013), Chen et al. (2014), Masood and Shah 
(2014), Locorotondo, Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2014) and Guizani (2017) all support 
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the trade-off theory through reporting a negative relationship between net working capital 
and cash holdings further justifying that liquid assets are indeed considered as a substitute 
to cash. Al-Najjar (2013) supports previous studies by finding a negative relationship 
between liquid assets and cash holdings of Indian firms. The author‟s conclusions are 
consistent with aforementioned studies. However, according to Al-Najjar (2013) no 
significant relationship is found between liquid asset substitutes and cash holdings in 
Brazil and Russia. Guney et al. (2007) contradict all the previously mentioned studies by 
finding evidence of a positive relationship between liquidity and cash holdings. 
Drobetz and Grüninger (2007) use the length of cash conversion cycle (CCC) as a 
determinant of cash holdings of Swiss firms. As with similar research, they support the 
trade-off theory by reporting evidence of a negative relationship between cash conversion 
cycles and cash holdings. This is because a higher CCC represents more inventory and 
accounts receivables which are generally regarded as liquid assets. A relatively long cycle 
implies that firms are keeping a reasonable level of inventory in order to avoid risks of 
stock outs or interruptions in daily operations. Nevertheless, this approach may be more 
applicable to some industries than others. For example, Chowdhury and Amin (2007) 
explain that in the case of stock outs in the pharmaceutical industry, the results will be 
doctors not prescribing this specific medicine at all. Wang, Ji, Chen, Song (2014) also find 
a negative relationship between the operating cycle and cash holdings up to a certain point, 
after which the relationship becomes positive because companies increase cash holdings 
out of precautionary motives resulting from the high operational risk of a long cycle. 
 Liquid asset substitutes measured using net working capital or the cash conversion cycle 
group liquid current assets altogether. For a more detailed analysis, current assets may be 
examined separately. The effect of inventory and accounts receivables may be considered 
to determine corporate cash holdings. Bates et al. (2009) find that the cash ratio increases 
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with a decrease in inventory levels. This could support the trade-off view that liquid assets 
and cash holdings are considered substitutes. Even though Ogundipe et al. (2012) find a 
negative relationship between net working capital and cash holdings, they find that 
accounts receivables and inventory are positively associated with cash holdings. Ogundipe 
et al. (2012) explain that the positive relationship between accounts receivables and cash 
holdings is due to firms keeping higher cash reserves in order to cover possible losses that 
may occur as a result of bad debts or late payments. The positive relationship between 
inventory and cash holdings can happen when there is risk of erosion of inventory value 
due to obsolescence. Wu et al. (2012) find a negative relationship between liquid asset 
substitutes measured using net working capital and cash holdings. They also examine 
Account Receivables (A/R) and Account Payables (A/P) separately. Wu et al. (2012) find 
a significant negative relationship between A/R and cash holdings indicating that they are 
substitutes. This substitute is higher in places where firms have easy access to external 
finance. More specifically they find that $1 of A/R substitutes only $0.15 of cash. As for 
accounts payable, they find a significant positive relationship between payables and cash 
holdings. They show that for every $1 of A/P firms leave $0.71 of cash. They also argue 
that firms hold less cash for payables if they are in regions with easier financial access.   
In a similar strand of research, Drobetz and Grüninger (2007) measure the effect of 
tangible assets on cash holdings. They use the ratio of fixed assets to total assets in order to 
measure tangibility. The authors report a negative relationship between cash holdings and 
tangibility and explain it by suggesting that firms with more tangible assets can sell these 
assets quickly if they are facing cash shortages. Nevertheless, the conclusion remains 
strongly debatable. The argument of a negative relationship between liquid current assets 
and cash holdings is valid because firms can easily sell liquid assets in case of cash 
shortages. However, the argument may not be as strong in the case of tangible fixed assets 
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which are harder to sell quickly. It is thus more important to analyse the effect of liquid 
asset substitutes on cash holdings.  
Even though there may be a slight academic disagreement regarding the relationship 
between liquid assets and cash holdings, the vast majority of studies reveal a negative 
relationship between the two variables giving an overwhelming support for the trade-off 
theory (Opler et al., 1999; Dittmar et al., 2003; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ozkan and 
Ozkan, 2004; Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2008; Bates et al., 2009; Ogundipe et 
al., 2012; Song and Lee, 2012; Wu et al., 2012; Al-Najjar, 2013; Chen et al., 2014).  
Researchers generally agree that liquid assets are considered to be acceptable substitutes to 
cash and that companies with high levels of net working capital do not need to keep high 
levels of cash. The next determinant of cash holdings with regard to the trade-off theory 
relates to the firm‟s degree of financial leverage. 
2.2.4 Leverage 
According to the trade-off theory, identifying the relationship between cash and leverage 
may be analysed through two different viewpoints. The first point of view suggests a 
positive relationship between leverage and cash holdings proposing that firms that have 
higher leverage are expected to hold more cash to reduce the probability of financial 
distress (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Firms that have higher leverage should keep higher 
levels of cash on hand as precaution in case the firm was unable to settle its obligations on 
time.  
The second point of view suggests a negative relationship between leverage and cash 
holdings. High leverage means that firms have the ability to issue debt. Firms that have 
higher leverage are expected to keep lower levels of cash as leverage is seen as a feasible 
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substitute to cash (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Therefore, the relationship between leverage 
and cash holdings remains indefinite. 
Ogundipe et al. (2012) find a positive relationship between leverage and cash holdings 
which is consistent with the first view of the trade-off theory. The authors claim that firms 
with higher leverage keep higher cash reserves as protection from financial distress. They 
also support a positive relationship between financial distress (measured using Altman‟s Z-
score model) and cash holdings. They explain that in the same sense, firms with higher 
leverage and hence higher financial distress keep higher cash reserves as a means of 
protection from bankruptcy. Locorotondo et al. (2014) also provide evidence of a positive 
relationship between leverage and cash holdings. Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano 
(2008) find that Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) with high leverage keep high 
levels of cash. SMEs prefer to keep cash rather than settling debts because of the relatively 
limited access to capital markets as compared to larger firms.  
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) show support for the second take on the trade-off theory by 
reporting that cash holdings are negatively affected by leverage. This supports the second 
view that debt is a substitute to cash because leverage can act as a proxy for firms‟ ability 
to issue debt instruments. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Al-Najjar and Belghitar (2011) and 
Belghitar and Khan (2013) also support this view with their studies which show a negative 
relationship between leverage and cash holdings in the U.K. Al-Najjar and Clark (2017) 
report a negative relationship between leverage and cash holdings in the MENA region. 
Wu et al. (2012) and Chen et al. (2014) also find a negative relationship between cash 
holdings and leverage in the Chinese context. Harford et al. (2008) and D‟Mello et al. 
(2008) find evidence that firms with low cash holdings tend to have high leverage in the 
U.S. In a cross-country analysis, Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) support a negative 
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relationship between leverage and cash holdings. Guizani (2017) also document a negative 
relationship between leverage and cash holdings in Saudi Arabia.  
Guney et al. (2007) combine both views finding evidence that the relationship between 
leverage and cash holdings is non-linear. They explain that leverage can act as a proxy for 
the firm‟s ability to issue debt at low levels. However, when leverage increases, firms 
accumulate cash for precautionary motives to avoid financial distress (Guney et al., 2007). 
Guney et al. (2007) argue that this non-linear relationship between leverage and cash 
holdings depends on country-specific corporate governance aspects. They find that the 
negative relationship between leverage and cash holdings (which is the substitution effect) 
decreases with creditor protection and ownership concentration but increases with 
shareholder protection.  
Since there are two different views to the relationship between leverage and cash holdings 
according to the trade-off theory, it remains to be seen specifically which view is more 
applicable to the Egyptian context. The next determinant of corporate cash holdings 
according to the trade-off theory is firm size.    
2.2.5 Firm Size 
The trade-off theory predicts that larger firms are expected to keep lower cash levels 
because they are fairly diversified and generally have lower probability of financial distress 
(Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Thus, the precautionary motive suggests that larger firms have 
less need to keep cash than their smaller peers. The trade-off theory supports the 
proposition that large firms do not need to accumulate cash out of transaction motives 
either. Larger firms do not need to accumulate cash because they have greater access to 
capital and debt markets and can better absorb associated fees compared to smaller firms 
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(Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Therefore, according to the trade-off theory the relationship 
between firm size and cash holdings is expected to be negative. 
Dittmar et al. (2003) find that larger firms hold less cash. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) 
propose that larger firms are subject to lower information asymmetry, face fewer 
borrowing constraints and overall enjoy lower costs of external financing. This shows that 
larger firms do not need to keep high levels of cash to finance their projects internally. 
Larger firms are also able to raise funds relatively cheaper than small firms due to apparent 
economies of scale (Opler et al., 1999).  
Gao et al. (2013) and Locorotondo et al. (2014) also find a negative relationship between 
firm size and cash holdings in the U.S. and Belgium, respectively. Drobetz and Grüninger 
(2007) agree that firm size is negatively related to cash holdings. Similarly, Ogundipe et al. 
(2012) support the trade-off theory by finding a strongly significant negative relationship 
between firm size and cash holdings. They suggest that small firms should hold relatively 
higher cash levels. Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal (2012) also find a significant negative 
relationship between cash holdings and firm size in Italian private firms. Wu et al. (2012) 
confirm that firm size impacts cash holdings negatively in China.  
D‟Mello et al. (2008) support this view by finding a negative relationship between cash 
holdings and firm size for firms experiencing spin-offs in the U.S. A spin-off is when a 
company divests one of its segments into a new company and divides the firm‟s assets and 
liabilities between the new and old companies (D‟Mello et al., 2008). They explain that 
around a spin-off, smaller firms need to accumulate cash because they do not have easy 
access to external capital markets. However, Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008), 
Guney et al. (2007) and Orens and Reheul (2013) find a statistically insignificant 
relationship between firm size and cash holdings. This could be because these studies focus 
solely on small and medium enterprises in Spain and Belgium, respectively. Masood and 
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Shah (2014) also find an insignificant relationship between cash holdings and firm size in 
Pakistan. Similarly, Al-Najjar (2013) finds no significant relationship between firm size 
and cash holdings in Russia or Brazil. The next determinant of corporate cash holdings 
according to the trade-off theory is cash flow.  
2.2.6 Cash Flow 
 Firms with higher cash flows are expected to hold lower cash levels because cash flows 
are regarded as a substitute to cash (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Iskandar-Datta and Jia 
(2012) support a negative relationship between cash flows and cash holdings in the U.K. 
and Germany. Therefore, the relationship between cash flows and cash holdings is 
expected to be negative.  
Most empirical research on cash holdings show contradicting evidence of the trade-off 
theory by presenting a positive relationship between cash flows and cash holdings (Drobetz 
and Grüninger, 2007; Harford et al., 2008; Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2008; 
Song and Lee, 2012; Chen et al., 2014; Masood and Shah, 2014; Gao et al., 2013; Orens 
and Reheul, 2013; Kusnadi et al., 2015). The positive relationship between cash flows and 
cash holdings can be interpreted as evidence of the explanatory power of the pecking order 
theory that will be discussed in detail in section (2.3.4). Ogundipe et al., (2012) find that 
cash flows have no significant impact on cash holdings. Also, Iskandar-Datta and Jia 
(2012) show no significant relationship between cash flows and cash holdings in the U.S., 
Canada, Australia, France and Japan. The following determinant of cash holdings relating 
to the trade-off theory is cash flow volatility.  
2.2.7 Cash Flow Volatility 
Firms with higher cash flow uncertainty (Volatility) are expected to hold higher cash levels 
as they have a higher probability of facing cash shortages (Opler et al., 1999). Firms can 
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decrease their cash flow uncertainty and avoid liquidity problems through holding cash 
(Saddour, 2006). In case of high cash flow volatility, firms can experience financial 
distress (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Therefore, the trade-off theory suggests that in the 
instance of greater volatility it would be more beneficial for firms to hold higher levels of 
cash in order to protect themselves from bankruptcy. The trade-off theory predicts the 
relationship between cash flow volatility and cash holdings to be positive.  
In the U.S. context, Harford et al. (2008), Bates et al. (2009), Guney et al. (2007) and Gao 
et al. (2013) find a positive relationship between cash flow volatility and cash holdings. 
These results are in line with the trade-off theory. This could be explained by the 
precautionary motive indicating that firms keep higher cash levels in order to avoid cash 
shortages and financial distress. Chen et al. (2014) suggest that firms with more volatile 
cash flows opt for holding more cash. Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal (2012) and Locorotondo 
et al. (2014) find a positive relationship between cash holdings and volatility in Italy and 
Belgium, respectively. Also, Belghitar and Khan (2013), Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) and 
Guizani (2017) find that cash flow volatility impacts cash holdings positively. Han and Qiu 
(2007) argue that in the U.S., cash flow volatility affects cash holdings positively only in 
firms that have borrowing constraints due to difficult access to external financing. This is 
because when firms have uncertain cash flows, the difficult access to finance causes them 
to keep cash for precautionary motives. However, they find no relationship between cash 
holdings and cash flow volatility of firms that already have easy access to capital markets. 
Shah (2011) finds no relationship between volatility and cash holdings in Pakistan. They 
justify that this may be due to slow court procedures in Pakistan, leading to managers not 
fearing the risk of financial distress. The next determinant of cash holdings according to 
the trade-off theory is debt maturity.  
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2.2.8 Debt Maturity 
Firms with more short term debt are expected to hold more cash as they frequently 
renegotiate their credit terms (Saddour, 2006; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Therefore, firms 
with lower debt maturity hold more cash because they face higher risks of financial distress 
due to uncertainty associated with such refinancing. Therefore, the relationship between 
debt maturity and cash holdings is expected to be negative. Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-
Solano (2008) support Ferreira and Vilela (2004) by finding a significant negative 
relationship between debt maturity structure and cash holdings. Firms with shorter debt 
maturity keep higher cash levels in order to decrease their dependence on external 
financing and reduce refinancing risk. Shah (2011) also finds a negative relationship 
between debt maturity and cash holdings. Nevertheless, Wu et al. (2012) contradict these 
findings through a positive relationship between debt maturity and cash holdings. This is 
because firms with longer debt maturity hold more cash to avoid unexpected liquidity 
risks. The following determinant of corporate cash holdings regarding the trade-off theory 
is capital expenditure.  
2.2.9 Capital Expenditure 
Capital expenditure to assets measures a firm‟s investment opportunity specifically in fixed 
assets. If firms are facing good investment opportunities they will accumulate cash. 
Therefore, according to the trade-off theory, the relationship between capital expenditure 
and cash holdings is expected to be positive. Kusnadi (2005) finds evidence of the trade-
off theory in Singapore by reporting that firms with more capital expenditure hold higher 
levels of cash.  
To sum up, the trade-off theory analyses the financial determinants of corporate cash 
holdings through identifying the benefits and costs of holding cash. One of the main 
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benefits of holding cash is reduced risks of financial distress (Opler et al., 1999). 
According to the trade-off theory, firms with higher leverage, higher cash flow volatility 
and shorter debt maturity are subject to higher financial distress and thus maintain higher 
cash levels. Another benefit of holding cash is that firms with sufficient cash levels do not 
have to rely on expensive external sources or equally (if not more) expensive fire sale of 
existing fixed assets (Opler et al., 1999). According to the trade-off theory, cash levels 
increase with an increase in investment opportunity and capital expenditure because firms 
that have profitable investment opportunities ahead tend to hoard cash prior to such 
investments.  
However, it is by far not optimal to keep unnecessary levels of cash in a firm due to 
associated holding costs. The main cost of holding cash is the opportunity cost of not 
investing in profitable positive net present value projects (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). 
According to the trade-off theory, cash levels decrease with dividend payments because it 
is unnecessary for dividend-paying firms to keep high levels of cash as they can retain 
funds through the cancellation of dividends. Also as per the trade-off theory, cash 
decreases with liquid assets, leverage and cash flows because they are all regarded as 
substitutes to cash. Similarly, larger firms keep relatively low levels of cash because they 
have a lower probability of financial distress and better access of capital markets and 
therefore do not need to keep high levels of cash. 
As the trade-off theory views the determinants of corporate cash holdings through 
weighing the benefits and costs of holding cash, the pecking order theory views the 
financial determinants of corporate cash holdings from a different perspective. The latter 
theory suggests that firms opt to accumulate cash to avoid financing from external sources. 
In the following section, the financial determinants of corporate cash holdings are 
discussed in accordance with the pecking order theory.  
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2.3 Pecking Order Theory 
―In the pecking order theory, firms prefer internal to external funds and debt to equity if 
external funds are needed‖ (Myers, 1984, p. 2).  
This implies that firms would opt to finance projects using retained earnings. If retained 
earnings are insufficient then they would use debt instruments and leave equity as the last 
resort.  
When there are market imperfections, internal and external finance are not perfectly 
interchangeable because the cost of external finance is derived from the extent to which 
companies face capital market imperfections (Arslan, Florackis and Ozkan, 2006). Due to 
information asymmetry, the cost of external finance is thus always higher than internal 
finance and so firms prefer to finance from internal resources before obtaining more 
expensive external resources (Chen, 2008). Unlike the trade-off theory, firms do not have 
an optimal cash level, but try to hoard cash for future investments and overall decrease 
dependence on external financing. 
The firm characteristics related to the pecking order theory according to major studies such 
as Opler et al. (1999), Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Saddour (2006), Shah (2011), Al-Najjar 
(2013) and Guizani (2017) are Investment Opportunity, Leverage, Firm Size, Cash Flow 
and Capital Expenditure. The financial determinants which are applicable to the trade-off 
theory are also applicable to the pecking order theory, albeit with different justifications. In 
the next section, each determinant is discussed in detail from the pecking order point of 
view. An expected relationship between each determinant and cash holdings is presented 
using review of prior research on the subject matter. The first determinant of corporate 
cash holdings under the pecking order theory is investment opportunity.  
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2.3.1 Investment Opportunity 
Firms with higher investment opportunity are expected to have higher cash holdings to 
invest in these opportunities (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). The alternative here would mean 
expensive external financing. In order for companies to save financing costs and decrease 
reliance on issuing debt or equity, firms that have potential investment opportunities would 
simply save cash for that purpose. Therefore, the relationship between investment 
opportunity and cash holdings is expected to be positive. The trade-off theory also 
proposes a positive relationship between investment opportunity and cash holdings but 
suggests competing justifications. As discussed before, according to the trade-off theory 
firms retain cash to take advantage of profitable investment opportunities as well as protect 
themselves from possible financial distress. According to the pecking order theory 
however, firms retain cash in order to avoid having to rely on expensive external financing. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) propose that external financing is costly in the presence of 
asymmetric information between managers and investors as securities may be mispriced. 
Akerlof (1970) explain that information asymmetry occurs when sellers have more 
information than buyers of a specific product. In this case, it is difficult for buyers to 
distinguish good quality products from bad. Since all products should sell at the same 
price, eventually bad quality products drive good quality products out of the market. If 
information asymmetry occurs in capital markets, securities become mispriced and 
external financing becomes very costly. In this case, firms will prefer internal over external 
finance according to the pecking order theory and thus it becomes better for firms to hoard 
cash. To avoid high adverse selection costs, firms with higher information asymmetries 
hold higher cash levels. Song and Lee (2012) find a positive relationship between 
investment opportunity (measured by the market-to-book ratio) and cash holdings in East 
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Asia. Kusnadi et al. (2015) also find that firms with more investment opportunities hold 
higher levels of cash. 
Drobetz and Grüninger (2007) do not find statistically significant results between the 
market to book ratio and cash holdings of firms in Switzerland. They interpret the results 
by explaining that Switzerland is a more bank-oriented economy than the U.K. and U.S., 
and banks usually have stronger monitoring power than capital markets. In this case, there 
would be less information asymmetry and the cash decision would not be affected. Egypt 
also has a bank-based financial system (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999).The authors 
define a bank based financial system as one in which banks play a major role in mobilizing 
savings, allocating capital, overseeing the investment decisions of corporate managers and 
in providing risk management vehicles. However, D‟Mello et al. (2008) also did not find a 
significant relationship between investment opportunity and cash holdings in the U.S. 
However, their analysis is only for firms that divest their segments into new companies. 
They justify that in this case, managers only take advantage of immediate investment 
opportunities instead of upcoming ones. Shah (2011) also finds no significant relationship 
between the market to book ratio and cash holdings. However, the author explains this as a 
problem with the market value of equity data in Pakistan. Therefore, the study uses the 
annual percentage increase in assets as a proxy for growth, instead of the market to book 
ratio. Finally, Guizani (2017) also finds no relationship between investment opportunity 
and cash holdings in Saudi Arabia. The second determinant of cash holdings according to 
the pecking order theory is leverage. 
2.3.2 Leverage 
According to the pecking order theory there is a negative association between leverage and 
cash holdings. This can be shown by means of two scenarios. The first scenario is when 
investment needs exceed retained earnings. This scenario inevitably causes a cash deficit 
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which once all the cash reserves for investments have been used up, the company starts 
financing through issuing debt (Opler et al., 1999). Therefore, a reduction in cash leads to 
higher leverage.  
Similarly, the second scenario also proves a negative relationship between leverage and 
cash holdings. This is when investment spending is less than retained earnings. This 
situation creates cash surplus. In case of cash surplus, firms accumulate cash and use it to 
repay principle debt as they come due (Opler et al., 1999). Debt repayment can be done 
either through periodic instalments or bulk principal repayment subject to availability of 
surplus cash from extraordinary items. In both cases firms try to settle debt obligations first 
and then accumulate cash. Therefore, the relationship between leverage and cash holdings 
is expected to be negative.  
Drobetz and Grüninger (2007) support the pecking order theory reporting a negative 
relationship between leverage and cash holdings. The negative relationship between 
leverage and cash that is suggested by the pecking order theory is similar to the second 
point of view of the trade-off theory that leverage and cash are substitutes. Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Harford et al. (2008), Gao et al. (2013) and Orens 
and Reheul (2013) all find a negative relationship between cash holdings and leverage. 
Song and Lee (2012) also find that leverage is negatively related to cash holdings when 
analysing a sample of East Asian companies. Chen et al. (2014), Wu et al. (2012) and 
Kusnadi et al. (2015) find a negative relationship between leverage and cash holdings in 
China.  
In further analysis, studies such as Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) and Acharya, 
Almeida and Campello (2007) find that the relationship between debt and cash holdings 
depends on whether firms have easy access to capital markets or not. Financial 
development allows easier access to external financing at lower costs (Khurana, Martin 
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and Pereira, 2006). However, when external finance is costly, firm‟s investments are 
limited to its internal funds (Khurana et al., 2006). Financially constrained firms are those 
that do not have easy access to capital markets (Almeida et al., 2004). If firms are 
financially constrained then they will need to hoard cash to protect against future liquidity 
needs and to have cash available for future investment opportunities (Almeida et al., 2004). 
However, unconstrained firms that have unrestricted access to capital markets do not need 
to hoard cash for these reasons. Almeida et al. (2004) measure financial constraints by 
different approaches such as dividing the sample by pay-out policy, asset size, and bond 
and commercial paper ratings. More specifically, Almeida et al. (2004) suggest that 
financial constraints affect cash flow sensitivity of cash. They define cash flow sensitivity 
as the firm‟s intention to save cash from cash inflows. Arslan et al. (2006) support these 
findings by suggesting that constrained firms show higher cash flow sensitivity than 
unconstrained firms.  
In similar sense, Acharya et al. (2007) explain that traditionally cash has been viewed as 
negative debt because cash on a company‟s balance sheet can be easily used to cover the 
company‟s obligations. They study firms that have upcoming profitable investment 
opportunities but have difficult access to external capital markets (financially constrained 
firms). In this case, firms have two different alternatives. The first alternative is to save 
internal funds or issue debt to be able to undertake the profitable investment opportunities. 
The second alternative is to use the excess cash to pay off existing debt. Acharya et al. 
(2007) prove that financially constrained firms with high hedging needs prefer to retain 
excess cash flows into cash holdings. However, those with low hedging needs prefer to pay 
back existing debt. In a cross country analysis, Khurana et al. (2006) also find that firms 
operating in countries that are financially underdeveloped, managers have a greater 
intention to save cash out of cash flows because firms are financially constrained. Pal and 
Ferrando (2010) argue that in Europe, constrained and unconstrained firms prefer to save 
50 
 
cash out of cash flows. This means that even if firms have easy access to external finance, 
they still prefer to hold cash for internal financing. They also find that firms facing difficult 
access to external finance invest at a low rate and grow more slowly. These firms 
specifically hold high cash reserves in bad economic conditions due to precautionary 
motives. Nevertheless, D‟Espallier, Huybrechts and Schoubben (2014) contradict the 
findings of Almeida et al. (2004) and find that accumulating cash out of cash flows is not a 
result of financial constraints. However, they argue that accumulating cash is a result of 
income uncertainty, which is in line with precautionary motives. Moving on to the third 
determinant of corporate cash holdings, firm size is discussed in the next section.  
2.3.3 Firm Size 
Opler et al. (1999) state that larger firms are expected to have more cash because they are 
expected to be more successful and as such do not need to resort to expensive external 
financing. Therefore, the relationship between firm size and cash holdings is expected to 
be positive. 
The pecking order theory totally contradicts the trade-off theory with regard to firm size. 
The trade-off theory states that larger firms are expected to keep lower cash levels because 
they have higher diversification and lower probability of financial distress (Ferreira and 
Vilela, 2004). Conversely, the pecking order theory states that larger firms are able to 
accumulate more cash because they are considered more successful and therefore are better 
able to decrease their reliance on external sources of finance. 
Song and Lee (2012) provide evidence of a positive relationship between firm size and 
cash holdings in East Asia. Shah (2011) shows a positive relationship between firm size 
and cash because larger firms are able to accumulate more cash. Al-Najjar and Clark 
(2017) also find that in the MENA region larger firms hold more cash to be able to finance 
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their projects. Al-Najjar (2013) finds evidence of the pecking order theory in China which 
is indicated by a positive relationship between size and cash holdings. Al-Najjar (2013) 
explains that large Chinese firms actually need to hold more cash due to higher 
diversification. However, in India they find a negative relationship between size and cash 
holdings explaining that smaller sized firms keep higher levels of cash because of their 
inability to obtain external funds easily. The fourth determinant of corporate cash holdings 
according to the pecking order theory is cash flow.  
2.3.4 Cash Flow 
Firms with more cash flows are expected to have more cash (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). 
This indicates that firms with higher cash flows do not need to rely on external financing 
because they can rely on retained earnings for internal finance. Therefore, the relationship 
between cash flows and cash holdings is expected to be positive.  
Major studies such as Opler et al. (1999), Dittmar et al. (2003) and Ferreira and Vilela 
(2004) measure the cash flow ratio as after tax profit plus depreciation divided by total 
assets. According to the pecking order theory firms with more profitability build up cash 
reserves (Opler et al., 1999). Drobetz and Grüninger (2007) support this view by finding a 
significant positive relationship between operating cash flows and cash holdings. The 
trade-off theory argument that cash flows and cash holdings are substitutes is not supported 
by the pecking order theory. In fact, the pecking order theory has the exact opposite view 
once again. Firms with higher cash flows keep higher cash levels to avoid external 
financing.  
The positive relationship between cash flows and cash holdings supports the idea that firms 
with more cash flows prefer to finance their projects internally (Garcia-Teruel and 
Martinez-Solano, 2008). They suggest that this relationship is more pertinent for SMEs 
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because of the greater information asymmetry. Belghitar and Khan (2013) argue that 
problems such as market imperfections, information asymmetry and financial distress are 
found to be more severe in SMEs. Harford et al. (2008) find that firms with high cash 
holdings are the ones with high cash flows. Song and Lee (2012) confirm this view by 
discovering a positive association between cash flows measured by EBIT and cash 
holdings of East Asian firms. Recent studies such as Wu et al. (2012), Gao et al. (2013), 
Chen et al. (2014), Masood and Shah (2014) and Kusnadi et al. (2015) also find that firms 
with higher levels of cash flows hold higher levels of cash. The findings support the 
pecking order theory showing that firms keep cash in order to minimize financing from 
external sources. The fifth determinant of corporate cash holdings according to the pecking 
order theory is capital expenditure. 
2.3.5 Capital Expenditure 
Capital expenditure measures the firm‟s investments in fixed assets. According to the 
pecking order theory, firms finance investments form internal sources. Firms that have 
good investment opportunities in fixed assets have low cash holdings because the cash 
reserves would have been already used in the purchase of such assets. Harford et al. (2008) 
support this view by finding that firms with low cash holdings spend relatively more on 
capital expenditures and acquisitions. Therefore, the relationship between capital 
expenditure and cash holdings is expected to be negative. Bates et al. (2009) argue that one 
of the main reasons behind the increase in cash holdings over time is the decrease in capital 
expenditure. This supports the pecking order theory because when there is a good 
investment opportunity in capital expenditure firms use internal cash to finance it. Wu et 
al. (2012) and Chen et al. (2014) find that firms in China with high capital expenditures 
hold relatively low levels of cash. Guney et al. (2007) and Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) 
find evidence of a negative relationship between capital expenditure and cash holdings in 
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their cross-country study. Masood and Shah (2014) and Gao et al. (2013) also report a 
negative relationship between capital expenditure and cash holdings in Pakistan and the 
U.S., respectively. Locorotondo et al. (2014) also find a negative relationship between 
capital expenditure and cash holdings in Belgium. In the Saudi Arabian context, Guizani 
(2017) confirms a negative relationship between capital expenditure and cash holdings. 
The author explains that firms in Saudi Arabia that have large investments do not have 
surplus cash to keep in the company. However, D‟Mello et al. (2008) find no significant 
relationship between cash holdings and capital expenditure in the U.S. They justify that at 
spin-offs, managers focus on immediate growth opportunities and do not spend cash on 
capital expenditures. 
To sum up, under the pecking order theory, firms prefer to finance projects internally and 
try to minimize financing from external expensive sources. Firms with more investment 
opportunities keep more cash to avoid financing such opportunities from capital markets. 
Similarly, larger firms and firms with more cash flows accumulate cash while they can in 
order to avoid reliance on external financing. Cash holdings decrease with leverage and 
capital expenditure because firms prefer to use up all internal resources before turning to 
external ones.  
While the trade-off theory combines firm characteristics through weighing benefits and 
costs of holding cash and the pecking order theory combines firm characteristics because 
of the preference for internal financing, the agency cost of free cash flow theory presents 
the determinants of corporate cash holdings from an entirely different perspective. The 
agency cost of free cash flow theory is based on the agency motive to holding cash which 
relates to factors affecting managerial discretion. The determinants of corporate cash 
holdings with regard to agency considerations are discussed in the next section.   
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2.4 Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow Theory 
Free cash flow is the excess cash generated by a firm which is left over after financing all 
positive net present value projects when discounted at the relevant cost of capital (Jensen, 
1986). Agency cost of free cash flow refers to the agency conflict which arises between 
managers and investors concerning cash holdings. According to Jensen (1986), managers 
want to accumulate cash to increase the amount of assets under their control and thus gain 
power over the firm‟s investment decisions.  
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) suggest that when managers accumulate cash they become 
exposed to less pressure to perform well and get the discretion to invest in projects that 
best suit their own interests and at the expense of shareholders. In developing the free cash 
flow hypothesis, Jensen (1986) assumes that in stronger corporate governance regimes 
shareholders are more powerful and force managers to pay-out that cash in the form of 
dividends. This essentially means that companies with stronger corporate governance hold 
less cash. According to major studies such as Ferreira and Vilela (2004), the firm 
characteristics related to the agency cost of free cash flow theory are Investment 
Opportunity, Leverage and Firm Size. All of these firm characteristics have been 
previously discussed under the trade-off and pecking order theories but will now be 
discussed from the agency perspective. The first financial determinant of corporate cash 
holdings according to the agency cost of free cash flow theory is investment opportunity. 
2.4.1 Investment Opportunity 
According to Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), if decisions are left entirely to managers, 
they will waste corporate resources. Firms with more investment opportunities are 
expected to have lower cash holdings because managers fail to identify positive net present 
value projects and are likely to simply waste the cash. Jensen (1986) suggests that firms 
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with poor growth opportunities keep higher levels of cash. Therefore, under the agency 
theory the relationship between investment opportunity and cash holdings is expected to be 
negative.  
Dittmar et al. (2003) claim that in countries with low shareholder protection the 
relationship between investment opportunity and cash holdings weakens and thus the 
transaction cost motive is no longer considered the primary determinant of the cash 
decision. In these countries, managers pay less attention to investment opportunities while 
the cash holdings are viewed as a product of agency conflicts. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) 
state that managers may invest in growth projects even if they have a negative net present 
value and will likely erode shareholders wealth. Rezaei and Saadati (2015) confirm this 
view by finding that companies that have free cash flow in Iran invest in negative net 
present value projects due to agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. 
Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) find that managers in Germany that have poor growth 
opportunities hold excess cash which is evidence of an agency motive. However, they do 
not find evidence of this in the U.S., U.K, Canada, Australia or France. The second 
determinant of cash holdings according to the agency theory is leverage.  
2.4.2 Leverage 
Firms with higher leverage hold less cash because they are subject to greater monitoring 
(Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Firms that issue debt securities are monitored by capital 
markets. In such cases managers have lower managerial discretion and are forced to invest 
excess cash or otherwise distribute it as dividends to shareholders. Therefore, the 
relationship between leverage and cash holdings is expected to be negative. 
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) find that firms that have access to non-bank finance in 
Japan hold significantly lower levels of cash than firms that depend heavily on the banking 
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system. This shows that banks encourage firms to accumulate cash in order to benefit the 
bank itself. The negative relationship between leverage and cash holdings that is developed 
by the agency theory is similar to the negative expectations developed by the pecking order 
theory and the second view of the trade-off theory. As mentioned before, Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Drobetz and Grüninger (2007), Harford et al. 
(2008), Song and Lee (2012), Chen et al. (2014) and Kusnadi et al. (2015) all find a 
negative relationship between leverage and cash holdings. According to the agency cost of 
free cash flow theory, managers with high leverage are better monitored by capital markets 
and thus are forced to keep lower levels of cash.  
Underinvestment problems may be created when there are agency conflicts between 
shareholders and creditors. In this case, it is more costly and difficult to acquire funds and 
so firms can keep liquid assets to decrease dependence on external financing (Garcia-
Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2008). This means that in the presence of agency problems, 
managers keep high levels of cash to avoid external financing implying a negative 
relationship between leverage and cash holdings. The third determinant of cash holdings 
according to the agency theory is firm size.  
2.4.3 Firm Size 
Larger firms are expected to hold more cash because managers of larger firms have higher 
discretionary power (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). This is because of dispersed ownership, 
inability to speak with one voice, free riding problems and lower probability of takeover. 
Therefore, according to the agency theory the relationship between firm size and cash 
holdings is expected to be positive.  
The positive relationship between firm size and cash holdings suggested by the agency 
theory is in line with the expectations of the pecking order theory but contradicts the 
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expectation of the trade-off theory. Al-Najjar and Belghitar (2011), Song and Lee (2012) 
and Al-Najjar (2013) find a positive relationship between firm size and cash holdings. 
To sum up, the agency cost of free cash flow theory offers three determinants of corporate 
cash holdings from agency standpoints. Firms with more investment opportunities are 
expected to forgo them because they will fail to identify the positive net present value 
projects. Firms with more leverage are expected to hold less cash because they are better 
monitored from capital markets and so managers are forced to decrease cash levels. 
Similarly, managers of large firms keep high levels of cash because shareholders are 
unable to control cash decisions. This argument leads to the conclusion that stronger 
corporate governance mechanisms will decrease managerial opportunism and force 
managers to take decisions in favour of shareholders‟ best interests. This strongly suggests 
that corporate governance has a significant impact on the managerial decisions regarding 
cash.  
This chapter relates to financial determinants of corporate cash holdings with the 
theoretical framework behind the discussion made up of the trade-off, pecking order and 
agency theories. The next chapter focuses solely on the effect of the agency theory on 
corporate cash holdings because the cash decision does not depend only on financial 
determinants, but on corporate governance as well. The corporate governance variables 
that add to the understanding of corporate cash holdings from the agency perspective 
specifically are discussed in the next chapter. Before considering the effect of corporate 
governance on corporate cash holdings, it is important to overview other variables that may 
have an impact on cash holdings in certain contexts which are not considered in this study. 
The following section briefly reviews miscellaneous variables that have been discussed in 
previous research but are beyond the scope of this research.    
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2.5 Miscellaneous Variables 
As mentioned before, the opportunity cost of holding cash is the firms‟ need to sacrifice 
more profitable investments. However, usually firms hold cash for transaction and 
precautionary motives. Recent literature discovered that cash decisions may be affected by 
other factors such as agency conflicts, information asymmetry and financial distress 
(Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2008). Here, the focus is on Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises (SMEs) because it is argued that agency conflicts, information asymmetry and 
financial distress are all more severe in the context of such companies.  
This section overviews other miscellaneous variables examined in previous studies. These 
variables may have a significant impact on cash holdings in certain contexts but are 
considered to be beyond the scope of this study. This could be because their effect is 
already captured by other variables or they are not applicable to the Egyptian context. The 
first miscellaneous firm specific variable that has been addressed in prior research is 
financial distress.  
2.5.1 Financial Distress  
Re-considering the trade-off theory, it can be noted that financial distress is an important 
element of the theory. Most determinants of corporate cash holdings relating to the trade-
off viewpoint are somewhat linked to financial distress. Firms with higher investment 
opportunities hold higher cash levels as protection from risks associated with financial 
distress. Similarly, firms with higher leverage, higher cash flow volatility and shorter debt 
maturity are expected to keep higher cash levels as they may be more exposed to the risk 
of financial distress. On the other hand, larger sized firms and firms with more liquid asset 
substitutes keep lower cash levels because they have lower probability of financial distress.  
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Ogundipe et al. (2012) find a positive relationship between financial distress and cash 
holdings. They measure financial distress using Altman‟s Z-score model. According to the 
trade-off theory, firms with a higher probability of financial distress keep higher cash 
levels in order to avoid bankruptcy. Drobetz and Grüninger (2007) follow Kim et al. 
(1998) using the inverse of an adjusted version of Altman‟s (1968) Z-score (1/ZSCORE) in 
order to analyse the effect of the probability of financial distress on corporate cash 
holdings. Drobetz and Grüninger (2007) argue that there could be a positive relationship 
between the probability of financial distress and cash holdings as firms try to avoid 
financial distress by accumulating cash. However, there could also be a negative 
relationship between the probability of financial distress and cash holdings as firms in 
distress are unable to hold excess cash. Their results support a significant negative 
relationship between the inverse of the Z-score and cash holdings. They explain that 
financial pressure may decrease the agency cost of free cash flow according to Jensen 
(1986) and so managers are pressured to keep lower levels of cash. 
The Z-score is not used in this study to measure financial distress because financial distress 
is already considered through the means of other variables such as leverage, cash flow 
volatility and debt maturity. Higher leverage and higher cash volatility are in themselves 
proxy indications of higher financial distress. Adding the Z-score could be a duplication of 
the existing variables in the research model causing multicollinearity among them. Also 
Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008) and Shah (2011) find no significant relationship 
between financial distress (ZSCORE) and cash holdings. The second miscellaneous 
variable that has been analysed in some previous research is bank debt. 
2.5.2 Bank Debt 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) find that bank debt impacts cash holdings negatively. Firms that 
have a relationship with banks have better access to bank finance and thus keep lower 
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levels of cash (Ogundipe et al., 2012). The academics support this claim by reporting a 
negative relationship between the bank debt/total debt ratio and the cash ratio. Garcia-
Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008) also find a significant negative relationship between 
bank debt and cash holdings. This indicates that companies that maintain a good 
relationship with banks do not need to keep high levels of cash because they have reliable 
access to bank financing. Bank debt is not considered in this study because it is difficult to 
distinguish between bank debt and other types of debt by examining balance sheet data 
pertaining to Egyptian listed companies. It is also expected that the majority of balance 
sheet debt of Egyptian companies would be already bank debt. This is due to the fact 
mentioned before that Egypt has a bank-based financial system (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 1999). Therefore, adding a bank debt variable would be duplication to the 
incorporated leverage variable. Another variable widely addressed in previous studies is 
research and development expenditure. However, data collection is a major limitation 
regarding this variable. 
2.5.3 Research and Development 
According to the trade-off theory, firms will keep high levels of cash to invest in research 
and development (Opler et al., 1999). Therefore, the relationship between Research and 
Development (R&D) expenditure and cash holdings is expected to be positive. Dittmar et 
al. (2003) support the trade-off theory by finding that firms that hold more cash have 
higher research and development expenditures. Bates et al. (2009) find that cash holdings 
increase with R&D expenditures. This is explained by the fact that firms will accumulate 
cash if they have the intention to invest in useful research and development. Research and 
development is not considered in this study because it represents a firm‟s growth 
opportunity which is already captured through the investment opportunity variable 
measured using the market-to-book ratio. Also there is no availability of information 
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regarding research and development expenditures of companies in Egypt. The next section 
briefly reviews how cash holdings can be affected by firm structure.  
2.5.4 Firm Structure 
Previous research also examined how different organizational structures may have 
different cash holding policies. The factors addressed in this section are not related to any 
specific theory, but could be generally linked to firm structure. Dittmar and Duchin (2011) 
analyse the effect of corporate life cycle on cash holdings. Dittmar and Duchin (2011) find 
that cash holdings of companies decrease as they progress through their life cycles. This is 
because older (mature) firms have lower need to keep cash for precautionary motives.  
Fernandes and Gonenc (2015) measure the effect of „multinationality‟ on corporate cash 
holdings. Even though it has been widely accepted that multinational firms hoard more 
cash, Fernandes and Gonenc (2015) find no evidence of this suggestion. In fact they 
observe the opposite by confirming that multinationality of firms and cash holdings are 
negatively associated. The academics find that in emerging markets firms with foreign 
sales have higher cash levels. More specifically, Fernandes and Gonenc (2015) find that 
more diversified multinationals hold higher cash levels compared to focused 
multinationals. This is because multinationals selling different products in different 
countries have a greater need for cash. 
Duchin (2010) contradict this view finding that diversified firms hold significantly less 
cash than specialized firms in the U.S.  This is because diversified firms have lower risk 
due to the fact that risky debt is spread out across different operations (Duchin, 2010). 
Duchin (2010) specifies that in the U.S. the cash holdings of specialized firms are double 
the cash holdings of diversified firms. The author explains that diversified firms do not 
need to keep high cash levels for precautionary motives. Diversified firms are less exposed 
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to risk due to coinsurance. They do not need to accumulate cash because when in need, 
cash can be transferred from one segment to the other. For this reason, diversified firms 
will hold less cash for precautionary motives because their investment opportunities and 
the outcomes of their divisions are not perfectly correlated. Duchin (2010) also explains 
that when there is a smaller financing gap (which is higher correlation between investment 
opportunity and cash flows), firms keep lower levels of cash. They also find that cash 
holdings are specifically sensitive to diversification when firms are financially constrained. 
Cai, Zeng, Lee and Ozkan (2016) analyse cash holdings from a slightly different 
perspective based on whether firms are part of business groups or not. They define 
business groups as an organizational form in which legally independent firms affiliate 
together formally or informally. The research focuses on China because this type of 
organizational form is specifically popular in transition economies (Cai et al., 2016). 
Cai et al. (2016) find that business group affiliated firms hold significantly lower levels of 
cash than non-affiliated firms in China. Locorotondo et al. (2014) confirm that business 
group affiliated firms hold lower cash levels than non-affiliated firms in Belgium. Cai et al. 
(2016) explain that this is due to the fact that business groups create internal capital 
markets which decrease the importance of external capital markets. There is no need for 
firms that are members of a business group affiliation to hoard cash for precautionary 
motives because even at difficult times, higher performing affiliates may transfer funds to 
the lower performing ones. This is similar to the findings of Duchin (2010). In addition to 
this, members of a group affiliation can gain external capital easier than stand-alone firms 
because of the increased debt capacity and enhanced reputation. Cai et al. (2016) argue that 
the aforementioned benefits of group-affiliations are more evident is privately controlled 
firms than state-controlled firms in China.  Cai et al. (2016) do not find evidence to support 
the opposite view that business groups could complicate ownership structures leading to 
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information asymmetry and increasing agency problems. In further analysis, Locorotondo 
et al. (2014) find that affiliates of financially distressed groups hold less cash than non-
distressed groups. This is because financially distressed firms are pressured to meet firm 
obligations. 
Klasa, Maxwell and Ortiz-Molina (2009) investigate cash holdings of manufacturing firms. 
Klasa et al. (2009) examine a unique perspective of cash holdings related to the 
unionizations of firm‟s labour. They provide evidence that unionization affects cash 
holdings negatively. Klasa et al. (2009) explain that keeping low levels of cash, gives firms 
a strong case of not fulfilling the union‟s demands due to liquidity shortage threats. They 
also find that high levels of cash increase the risk of a strike. The next section reviews 
studies that examine how cash holdings could affect firm value. 
2.5.5 The Effect of Cash Holdings on Firm Value  
As mentioned before, holding cash has many advantages. Maintaining sufficient cash 
allows firms to maintain their daily operations, reduce financing from expensive external 
sources and decrease the risk of financial distress. The main disadvantage of holding cash 
is the opportunity cost of not investing it in profitable projects. Most literature on cash 
holdings has been examining the determinants of corporate cash holdings in order to get a 
full understanding of the factors that affect managerial decisions regarding cash levels. 
Some researchers have examined the issue from a different angle. A number of studies 
attempt to link cash holdings with firm value. This is beyond the scope of this study 
because this study aims to investigate the determinants affecting managerial decisions 
regarding cash holdings in Egypt and not the effect of cash holdings on firm value. Even 
though it is beyond the scope of this study, it is still important to review studies that try to 
examine the effect of cash holdings on firm value.  
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Harford et al. (2008) find that in the U.S. firms accumulating cash have lower firm value. 
Martinez-Sola, Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2013) measure the effect of cash 
holdings on firm value using the market-to-book ratio. They find that accumulating cash 
holdings increases firm value up to a certain point. Beyond that point, accumulating cash 
decreases firm value. This proves evidence of the trade-off theory, that firms do have an 
optimal cash level and that firm value decreases if firms deviate from this level. This 
optimal level depends on firm specific characteristics such as growth potential, size and 
leverage. Saddour (2006) finds that cash holdings impact firm market value positively. The 
relationship is stronger for growth firms than for mature firms (Saddour, 2006). 
While the previous sections present firm specific variables that may impact corporate cash 
holding, the next section presents studies that focus on economic and political factors that 
may have a significant impact on corporate cash holdings decisions. A few studies have 
analysed several macro-economic variables affecting cash holdings. However, this study is 
the first to investigate the effect of political stability on cash holdings.  
2.6 Political Stability and Cash Holdings 
Researchers have viewed corporate cash holdings from different angles. Country specific 
factors have a significant impact on the determinants of corporate cash holdings (Guney et 
al., 2007). Recent research on the determinants of corporate cash holdings have been 
focusing on political and economic factors that may affect cash holding decisions.  
Kusnadi et al. (2015) claim that prior studies show that there is discrimination in 
regulations against the private sector in China. They also claim that there should be more 
knowledge regarding managerial actions to protect firm‟s assets from political extraction, 
especially cash as it is the most liquid asset and possibly the most subject to political 
extraction. Kusnadi et al. (2015) argue that non-state-controlled firms which are exposed to 
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higher political extraction may hold less cash reserves to secure their firms against risks of 
political extraction. These firms may also invest more in fixed assets as they are harder to 
expropriate (Kusnadi et al., 2015). However, the academics find a positive relationship 
between institutional development and cash holdings. When they compare firms in Chinese 
provinces having more developed institution with firms in provinces having less developed 
institutions, they find that the former hold more cash. This is because more developed 
institutions decrease the risk of political extraction and are therefore able to keep higher 
levels of cash. Political connections help non-state controlled firms decrease political 
extraction and so allow firms to keep the required level of cash reserves for future 
investments (Kusnadi et al., 2015). Similarly, Feng and Johansson (2014) provide evidence 
of a positive relationship between political participation and cash holdings in China, 
especially in areas with weak institutions. The reason for this is that firms controlled by 
entrepreneurs involved in stronger political participation hold more cash because they face 
lower risks of political extraction. 
Rezaei and Saadati (2015) state that political support affects cash holdings of companies 
because the government facilitates the process of obtaining resources. They discover that 
companies that have political support in Iran hold less cash because they will quickly 
access financial resources when needed. These companies are also considered reliable and 
so are able to purchase from suppliers on credit. Rezaei and Saadati (2015) also find that 
this impact of political relations on cash holdings increases with agency costs. This means 
that companies with strong political relations have less agency costs and so hold less cash. 
Hill, Fuller, Kelly and Washam (2014) agree that firms with political connections have 
lower cash holdings. They measure political connections using lobbying expenditures 
which are the expenses paid to political insiders to influence legislative decisions that are 
beneficial to the lobbying firm. When such lobbying activities increase, they create 
stronger connections. Political affiliations can influence access to capital and reduce risks 
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of cash shortages for firms. As a result, the need for firms to keep cash for precautionary 
motives is reduced. Ullah and Kamal (2017) agree that politically connected firms have 
lower cash holdings. However, they find that connected firms with board independence 
accumulate cash. They suggest that this is because independent directors are not able to 
effectively monitor management due to the complicated nature of these firms. Boubakri, 
Ghoul and Saffar (2012) argue that there are two different views to the relationship 
between political connections and cash holdings. The first view is similar to the one 
previously discussed (Hill et al., 2014; Rezaei and Saadati, 2015; Ullah and Kamal, 2017). 
However, the second view states that politically connected firms actually hold more cash 
because they face more severe agency problems than non-connected firms. Boubakri et al. 
(2012) find evidence of the second view through a positive relationship between political 
connections and cash holdings in a cross-country analysis. They define a firm as politically 
connected if at least one of its shareholders or top executives is a member of parliament, 
minister, head of state or closely connected to top officials. Boubakri et al. (2012) explain 
that politically connected firms may have more severe agency problems because they may 
focus on obeying political objectives rather than focusing on maximizing shareholder 
wealth. In this case, monitoring mechanisms by the board are weakened and managers are 
left to take decisions for their own personal benefits such as cash hoarding. Ullah and 
Kamal (2017) suggest that policy makers should develop strong mechanisms to monitor 
political connections.   
Ullah and kamal (2017) also compare the differences in the determinants of cash holdings 
in a democratic regime and a dictator regime in Pakistan. They find that board size and 
board independence have a significant positive effect on cash holdings in a democratic 
regime but are insignificant in a dictator regime. They provide evidence that female 
directors increase cash levels in dictator regimes only. This is due to precautionary motives 
which could be heightened during dictator regimes.  
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Other studies suggest that the government quality is a significant determinant of corporate 
cash holdings. Chen et al. (2014) find that a good government decreases firm‟s financial 
constraints and agency problems and thus enables firms to hold lower levels of cash. They 
report a negative relationship between local government quality and cash holdings in 
China. Gao et al. (2013) compare differences in cash policies between public and private 
firms in the U.S. They find that public firms hold almost double the amount of cash 
compared to private firms. Gao et al. (2013) explain that this is not due to precautionary 
motives because public firms are expected to have easier access to external finance. 
Nevertheless, the increase in cash holdings by public firms is mainly due to higher agency 
conflicts compared to private firms.  
Other studies such as Chen and Mahajan (2008) use macro-economic factors as control 
variables to investigate if these factors affect corporate cash decisions. According to Chen 
and Mahajan (2008) there is a positive relationship between GDP growth rate and cash 
holdings. Companies keep higher cash reserves during times of good economic conditions 
because they suspect profitable investment opportunities ahead which will require 
substantial cash reserves. Dittmar (2008) states that cash holdings are specifically 
important during times of bad financial situations because cash decreases the risks of 
financial distress and allows firms to invest in valuable projects if available. In case of 
economic upturn companies may decide to invest the unnecessary cash hoarded (Dittmar, 
2008). Chen and Mahajan (2008) find a negative relationship between inflation and cash 
holdings. When there are high inflation rates, the value of cash decreases through weaker 
purchasing power making investments in real assets more attractive (Chen and Mahajan, 
2008). However, Wang et al. (2014) argue that the relationship between cash holdings and 
inflation is U shaped rather than linear. They explain that when there is high inflation, 
firms spend cash to take speculative opportunities. However, when inflation increases 
beyond a certain limit, listed firms hoard cash because financial constraints occur due to 
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the government setting limits to funds in capital markets. Chen and Mahajan (2008) also 
find that when short term interest rates are high, firms keep higher cash reserves in banks 
because they are less willing to undertake risky investments. Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-
Solano (2008) find a negative relationship between interest rates and cash holdings but no 
relationship between GDP and cash holdings which may be due to the study being carried 
out in one economic cycle. 
This study extends on the existing literature regarding the effect of political and economic 
factors on cash holdings through addressing a new perspective. This perspective is the 
effect of political stability on corporate cash holdings in Egypt. Political stability is 
specifically important in Egypt because it has faced the highest deterioration in political 
stability out of 25 major emerging market economies since 2011 (Euromonitor 
International, 2014). In emerging market economies, political stability has a direct impact 
on investor and consumer confidence (Euromonitor International, 2014). Therefore, it is 
important to analyse if low political stability causes managers to hoard cash due to 
precautionary motives. At times of low political stability, managers may not be willing to 
undertake risky investments and instead choose to accumulate high levels of cash. When 
managers accumulate cash, they will hedge against future cash shortages and decrease 
risks of financial distress. Nevertheless, companies will face significant opportunity costs 
of forgone return, which could be at times when the economy needs investing activities the 
most. Additionally, the determinants of corporate cash holdings in Egypt are compared 
before and after the revolution in order to analyse if managerial behaviour towards cash 
decisions has significantly changed. The next section addresses the issue of firms having 
target cash levels and analysing if they are able to adjust to these target levels. 
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2.7 Cash Holdings Speed of Adjustment 
A very important issue to address is investigating whether firms set target cash levels that 
they try to reach or not. Many studies such as Opler et al. (1999), Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004), Drobetz and Grüninger (2007), Al-Najjar and Belghitar (2011), Dittmar and 
Duchin (2011), Shah (2011), Ogundipe et al. (2012), Gao et al. (2013), Guizani (2017), 
Martínez-Sola et al. (2018) and Orlova and Rao (2018) prove that firms have target cash 
levels and try to adjust their current cash holdings towards these targets. Investigating 
whether firms have target cash ratios is done through investigating if cash holdings revert 
back to the mean (Opler et al, 1999). If firms adjust quickly towards their target cash 
ratios, it indicates that they do not bear significant costs to reach their target cash levels. 
The speed of adjustment is measured by the adjustment coefficient on a scale ranging from 
zero to one. If the speed of adjustment is close to one, then it means firms adjust quickly to 
their target cash ratios with low cost, because the target cash is close to the actual cash. 
However, if the speed of adjustment is close to zero, this indicates that adjustment costs are 
high and firms are unable to adjust quickly to their targets. 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) find that the adjustment coefficient is slightly higher than 0.6 
indicating a dynamic nature of the model and showing that firms in the U.K. adjust to their 
target cash ratios relatively quickly. The results indicate that it is costly for firms to deviate 
from their target cash holdings. Al-Najjar and Belghitar (2011) confirm that there is a 
significant cost for firms that deviate from their target cash holdings in the U.K. by finding 
the adjustment coefficient is more than 0.5 for a sample of U.K. firms.  
Drobetz and Grüninger (2007) find that the speed of adjustment for Swiss firms is 
significantly lower than other countries as the adjustment coefficient is between 0.35-0.5. 
Since Swiss firms adjust slowly toward their targets, Drobetz and Grüninger (2007) 
explain that firms must hold high cash levels to avoid cash shortages that may incur high 
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adjustment costs. Dittmar and Duchin (2011) find the adjustment coefficient to be only 
0.38 indicating that firms in the U.S. do not adjust quickly towards their target cash ratios. 
Shah (2011) finds that the speed of adjustment in Pakistani firms is almost 0.5 explaining 
that there is some delay for firms to adjust to their target cash ratios. Orlova and Rao 
(2018) provide evidence of an adjustment coefficient of 0.54 in the U.S. Guizani (2017) 
estimate a high adjustment coefficient of 0.85 in Saudi Arabia. The author explains that in 
Saudi Arabia, firms keep 15% gap between the actual and target cash ratios within one 
year. Ogundipe et al. (2012) also find that cash holdings of the current year are 
significantly and positively related to the cash holdings of the previous year in Nigeria. 
Ogundipe et al. (2012) show an adjustment coefficient around 0.89 and comment that 
firms cannot instantly adjust towards their target cash levels due to transaction and other 
adjustment costs. However, this figure is relatively higher than previous research 
indicating that firms in Nigeria are able to adjust relatively quickly to their target cash 
ratios compared to previously mentioned studies in the U.K., U.S., Switzerland and 
Pakistan. Gao et al. (2013) find that public firms adjust slower to their target cash ratios 
than private firms. This could be because public firms have higher target cash levels. More 
specifically, they find that well governed public firms adjust slower than poorly governed 
firms.  
In further analysis, Martinez-Sola, Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2018) find that 
Spanish SMEs try to adjust to their target cash ratios. They find that the speed of 
adjustment is higher for firms that have more growth opportunities and for financially 
constrained firms. They also find that smaller firms and firms with lower cash flows adjust 
relatively quicker to their target cash holdings than large firms and those with higher cash 
flows. Finally, they find that firms with higher probability of financial distress adjust 
relatively quickly to their target cash levels trying to avoid distress costs. Since the 
financial crisis of 2008 decreased credit supply, Martínez-Sola et al. (2018) report that the 
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speed of adjustment is quicker after the financial crisis. Orlova and Rao (2018) find that 
the speed of adjustment is quicker for firms that have excess cash than those with cash 
deficit. They also find that smaller firms adjust quicker to their target cash ratios than 
larger firms. Dittmar and Duchin (2011) argue that more established firms (older firms) 
adjust their target cash ratios much slower than younger firms. They explain that this could 
be due to the fact that older firms are not keen on rebalancing their cash balances to reach 
their targets. As such, older firms may face higher adjustment costs leading them to adjust 
slowly to their target cash ratios.  
In addition to investigating the determinants of corporate cash holdings in Egypt, this study 
extends on the existing literature by analysing the speed of adjustment in Egypt. It is 
important to investigate if companies listed on the Egyptian stock market have target cash 
ratios that they try to reach or not. If firms have target cash ratios, an important issue 
remains to investigate the speed of adjustment to these target cash ratios in Egypt and 
compare it to the speed of adjustment found in major studies in other context. The final 
part of this chapter presents the hypotheses development related to firm specific 
characteristics. 
2.8 Hypotheses Development for Firm Specific Characteristics 
According to the trade-off, pecking order and agency cost of free cash flow theories, all of 
the previously mentioned firm characteristics affect corporate cash holdings. The following 
diagram summarizes all three theories. The relationship between each firm characteristic 
and cash holdings is presented in order to facilitate the understanding of the hypotheses 
development. 
 
72 
 
Diagram 2. 1 : The Financial Determinants of Corporate Cash Holdings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Determinant Expected Relationship Expected Relationship Expected Relationship 
Dividend Payments Negative - - 
Investment Opportunity Positive Positive Negative 
Liquid Assets Substitutes Negative - - 
Leverage Positive/ Negative Negative Negative 
Firm Size Negative Positive Positive 
Cash Flow Negative Positive - 
Volatility Positive - - 
Debt Maturity Negative - - 
Capital Expenditure Positive Negative - 
Source: Author 
According to the trade-off theory there should be a negative relationship between dividend 
payments and cash holdings because companies that pay dividends can simply cancel them 
and raise cash when needed (Jensen, 1986; Guney et al., 2007; Harford et al., 2008; Bates 
et al., 2009; Iskandar-Datta and Jia, 2012; Al-Najjar, 2013; Belghitar and Khan, 2013; Gao 
et al., 2013; Al-Najjar and Clark, 2017). 
Cash Holdings 
Precautionary Motive 
 
Trade-off Theory 
Transaction Motive 
 
Agency Motive 
 
Pecking Order Theory Agency Theory 
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H1: There is a significant negative relationship between dividend payments and cash 
holdings 
According to the trade-off and pecking order theories firms accumulate cash when there 
are good investment opportunities. This is done in order to seize these opportunities 
without having to face financial distress or having to use expensive external financing 
(Dittmar et al., 2003; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Guney et al., 
2007; Harford et al., 2008; Iskandar-Datta and Jia, 2012; Ogundipe et al., 2012; Song and 
Lee, 2012; Chen et al., 2014; Kusnadi et al., 2015). However, according to the agency cost 
of free cash flow theory, managers may not even identify such opportunities and might end 
up wasting cash (Jensen, 1986; Rezaei and Saadati, 2015). Therefore, the relationship 
between investment opportunities and cash holdings is indefinite.  
 H2: There is a significant relationship between investment opportunities and cash 
holdings 
According to the trade-off theory, firms with high liquid assets keep low levels of cash 
because the former are regarded as substitutes to the latter. Cash holdings are negatively 
affected by the amount of liquid asset substitutes held by a firm (Opler et al., 1999; 
Dittmar et al., 2003; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; D‟Mello et al., 
2008; Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2008; Bates et al., 2009; Bigelli and Sánchez-
Vidal, 2012; Iskandar-Datta and Jia, 2012; Ogundipe et al., 2012; Song and Lee, 2012; Wu 
et al., 2012; Al-Najjar, 2013; Orens and Reheul, 2013; Chen et al., 2014; Locorotondo et 
al., 2014; Masood and Shah, 2014; Guizani, 2017). Therefore, the hypothesis related to 
this factor could be formulated as follows: 
H3: There is a significant negative relationship between liquid asset substitutes and cash 
holdings 
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The trade-off theory views the relationship between leverage and cash holdings from two 
different standpoints. One view assumes a positive relationship between leverage and cash 
because cash acts as protection from possible bankruptcy (Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-
Solano, 2008; Al-Najjar and Belghitar, 2011; Ogundipe et al., 2012; Locorotondo et al., 
2014), whereas the other view assumes a negative relationship between leverage and cash 
because they can be regarded as substitutes (Al-Najjar, 2013).  
Moreover, the pecking order theory and the agency theory support the latter view of the 
trade-off theory indicating that leverage and cash holdings are negatively related. The 
pecking order theory assumes that firms do not prefer to finance projects by issuing debt 
and instead they choose to rely on internal funds. When there is a cash deficit, firms use up 
all of the retained cash before they turn to borrowing. Similarly, in case of cash surplus 
firms use the extra money to pay back principal on debts before accumulating cash. For 
this reason leverage and cash holdings always go in different directions. Opler et al. (1999) 
find that cash holdings decrease with leverage. The agency theory also supports a negative 
relationship between leverage and cash holdings because managers are forced to keep 
lower levels of cash due to higher monitoring brought about by capital markets. Ferreira 
and Vilela (2004), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Drobetz and Grüninger (2007), D‟Mello et al. 
(2008), Harford et al. (2008), Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012), Song and Lee (2012), Wu et 
al. (2012), Belghitar and Khan (2013), Gao et al. (2013), Orens and Reheul (2013), Chen 
et al. (2014), Masood and Shah (2014), Kusnadi et al. (2015), Guizani (2017) and Al-
Najjar and Clark (2017) all find a negative relationship between leverage and cash 
holdings. Thus, the relationship between leverage and cash holdings is indefinite. 
H4: There is a significant relationship between leverage and cash holdings 
According to the trade-off theory, larger firms do not need to accumulate cash because 
they have greater access to external financing. Opler et al. (1999), Dittmar et al. (2003), 
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Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Drobetz and Grüninger (2007), 
D‟Mello et al. (2008), Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal (2012), Ogundipe et al. (2012), Wu et al. 
(2012), Gao et al. (2013) and Locorotondo et al. (2014) find a negative relationship 
between firm size and cash holdings because larger firms can raise external fund relatively 
cheaper than smaller firms.  
Nevertheless, the pecking order and agency theories assume a positive relationship 
between firm size and cash holdings (Al-Najjar and Belghitar, 2011; Shah, 2011; Song and 
Lee, 2012; Al-Najjar, 2013; Al-Najjar and Clark, 2017). The pecking order theory assumes 
that larger companies do not have a preference towards external financing and in general 
are better positioned to accumulate more cash. The agency theory supports the pecking 
order theory suggesting a positive relationship between size and cash holding because of 
the higher discretionary power of managers which is brought about by highly dispersed 
ownership. Omran, Bolbol and Fatheldin (2008) find that in Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, 
Oman and Tunisia) larger firms have lower ownership concentration.  
The trade-off theory indicates a negative relationship between size and cash holdings 
whereas the pecking order and agency theories suggest a positive relationship. Therefore, 
the relationship between firm size and cash holdings remains to be indefinite. 
H5: There is a significant relationship between firm size and cash holdings 
According to the trade-off theory, firms with higher cash flows are expected to have lower 
cash holdings because they are both seen as substitutes (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). This 
view is supported by minimal studies such as Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012). However, the 
pecking order theory contradicts the trade-off theory in this context explaining that higher 
cash flow leads to higher cash levels. This is because under pecking order considerations, 
any excess cash flows would be retained resulting in higher cash levels in order to 
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minimize the need to depend on external financing (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Drobetz and 
Grüninger, 2007; Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2008; Harford et al., 2008; Song 
and Lee, 2012; Wu et al., 2012; Gao et al., 2013; Orens and Reheul, 2013; Chen et al., 
2014; Masood and Shah, 2014; Kusnadi et al., 2015). Preferring to finance from internal 
rather than external sources, causes firms with higher cash flows to keep higher amounts of 
cash holdings (Okzan and Ozkan, 2004).  The relationship between cash flow and cash can 
be seen as indefinite. 
H6: There is a significant relationship between cash flows and cash holdings 
The trade-off theory predicts higher levels of cash when there is higher cash flow 
volatility. This is based on the desire of firms to protect themselves from such volatility. 
Firm Volatility affects cash holdings positively (Opler et al., 1999; Saddour, 2006; Guney 
et al., 2007; Harford et al., 2008; Bates et al., 2009; Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal, 2012; Gao 
et al., 2013; Iskandar-Datta and Jia, 2012, Belghitar and Khan, 2013, Chen et al., 2014, 
Locorotondo et al., 2014; Guizani, 2017). 
H7: There is a significant positive relationship between Cash flow volatility and cash 
holdings 
According to the trade-off theory, firms with short term borrowing (lower debt maturity) 
feel the need to keep higher cash levels as a form of protection from the risks associated 
with renegotiation of credit terms (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Saddour, 2006; Garcia-Teruel 
and Martinez-Solano, 2008; Shah, 2011). Therefore, the shorter the debt maturity within 
the firm‟s capital structure, the higher the cash levels.  
H8: There is a significant negative relationship between debt maturity and cash holdings 
The trade-off theory assumes that firms accumulate cash when there is a good investment 
opportunity in fixed assets whereas the pecking order theory suggests that if this 
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opportunity exists the company would have already spent the cash reserves on it. Kusnadi 
(2005) finds a positive relationship between capital expenditure and cash holdings whereas 
Guney et al. (2007), Harford et al. (2008), Bates et al. (2009), Iskandar-Datta and Jia 
(2012), Wu et al. (2012), Gao et al. (2013), Chen et al. (2014), Locorotondo et al. (2014), 
Masood and Shah (2014) and Guizani (2017) find a negative relationship between capital 
expenditure and cash holdings. Therefore, the relationship between capital expenditure and 
cash holdings can be considered indefinite. 
H9: There is a significant relationship between capital expenditure and cash holdings 
The final hypothesis for this chapter is related to political stability. At times of low 
political stability, managers may take decisions in favour of hoarding cash for 
precautionary motives disregarding the opportunity cost of forgone returns. At these 
difficult times, managers may not be willing to undertake risky investment. Instead, 
managers could choose to accumulate high levels of cash to hedge against future cash 
shortages and decrease risks of financial distress. Therefore, the hypothesis for the 
relationship between political stability and cash holdings can be formulated as follows: 
H10: There is a significant negative relationship between political stability and cash 
holdings 
Conclusion 
To sum up, this chapter gives an overview of previous research which focuses on the 
financial determinants of corporate cash holdings. This chapter addresses the second 
research objective by reviewing the literature on corporate cash holdings from a financial 
perspective. There are three main theories that attempt to explain corporate cash decisions. 
Overwhelmingly, this is done by analysing the relationship between firm specific 
characteristics and cash holdings. The hypotheses formulated help answer the first research 
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question regarding the investigation of the financial determinants of corporate cash 
holdings of firms listed on the Egyptian stock market. Importantly, the debate about which 
theory better explains corporate cash policies remains an on-going one.  
The trade-off theory attempts to explain cash holdings through weighing the benefits and 
costs of holding cash (Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira and Vilela., 2004; Drobetz and 
Grüninger, 2007). The pecking order theory attempts to explain cash holdings through the 
hypothesis originally formulated by Myers (1984) that companies accumulate cash to 
finance their projects internally and try to avoid expensive external financing. Finally, the 
agency cost of free cash flow theory is based on Jensen‟s (1986) hypothesis that managers 
want to increase cash levels in order to increase their own power and managerial 
discretion.  
Since previous research has found contradicting evidence on the determinants of corporate 
cash holdings, there still remains to be a gap in the literature regarding the theories that 
best explain cash holding decisions. Al-Najjar (2013) states that it is specifically important 
to focus on developing markets because they have greater market imperfections and higher 
bankruptcy related costs as compared to developed markets. This study is the first to 
investigate the determinants of corporate cash holdings in Egypt. Recent research has been 
attempting to analyse the effect of political and economic factors on corporate cash 
holdings. This study extends on the existing literature by investigating if political stability 
has a significant impact on corporate cash holdings in Egypt. At times of low political 
stability, managers may choose to accumulate cash due to precautionary motives.  
As mentioned earlier, the agency cost of free cash flow theory is based on agency conflicts 
between managers and shareholders. Since managers with higher discretion feel free to 
accumulate cash for their own private benefits, then a new issue comes to light. Corporate 
governance can be a very important determinant of corporate cash holdings. Stronger 
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corporate governance regimes should force managers to take decisions in favour of 
shareholders‟ best interest. Higher monitoring effectiveness should force managers to 
invest excess cash in positive net present value projects or distribute it as dividends to 
shareholders. The next chapter focuses on how corporate governance affects corporate cash 
holdings. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review Part 2: Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Cash Holdings 
Introduction  
Corporate governance is vital for deterring managers from destroying firm value (Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). The academics find that better governance significantly increases 
the value of a dollar of cash. To recall from the previous chapter, the agency cost of free 
cash flow theory suggests that managers hoard cash because they want to increase 
resources under their control to increase their personal power and managerial discretion 
(Jensen, 1986). Therefore, it is important to highlight that good corporate governance 
practices should in theory decrease managerial discretion and force managers to take 
decisions that are value adding to shareholders.  
Dittmar et al. (2003) and Kusnadi (2011) confirm that in the presence of poor corporate 
governance practices firms prefer to hold higher cash levels. Al-Najjar (2013) highlights 
the importance of further academic enquiry into corporate cash holdings in developing 
countries. Al-Najjar (2013) specifically suggests that research in developing countries 
should focus more on firm-level corporate governance factors that impact cash holdings, 
namely board of directors, audit features and CEO characteristics. Rezaei and Saadati 
(2015) also suggest the investigation of ownership structure and board of director 
parameters. In addressing these calls, this study aims to investigate the determinants of 
corporate cash holdings in Egypt which is a developing country from two perspectives. 
The first perspective is the firm characteristics that act as financial determinants of 
corporate cash holdings as discussed in the previous chapter. The second perspective is 
through adding corporate governance variables to analyse how corporate governance 
practices can be a key factor in managerial decisions regarding cash. This study contributes 
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to the literature by analysing how board characteristics and ownership structure impact the 
cash holding decisions of firms listed in Egypt further contributing to agency based 
conclusions. This chapter provides a general overview of the agency theory followed by a 
focused discussion of the effects of corporate governance on corporate cash holdings from 
the agency perspective.  
3.1 The Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as a contract under which a 
principal person(s) delegates authority of decision making to an agent to act on their 
behalf. They explain that it is impossible for the agent to always make optimal decisions on 
behalf of the principal at zero cost. Since the relationship between stockholders and 
managers can be seen as an agency relationship in all organizations, it is inevitable that 
separation of ownership and control may lead to more acute agency problems (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Agency problems are a major concern when managers have significant 
control over company resources, known as managerial discretion.  
3.1.1 Managerial Discretion 
Managerial discretion occurs when managers have significant control rights over the 
allocation of corporate resources that were originally financed through investors (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). In many cases managers expropriate these resources. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) explain that managerial expropriation can take many forms. The simplest 
form of expropriation is managers taking out cash. More complicated forms include 
managers establishing private companies (other than the main company they already 
manage) and then selling inventory or assets from the main company to their private 
company below market prices. Another very important way in which managers can 
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expropriate shareholders is by staying in their jobs for significant periods of time even 
when they are no longer suitable or efficient.  
Research on cash holdings have found that managerial discretion affects cash holding 
decisions. In fact, as cash is the most liquid asset, it is the most subject to managerial 
expropriation leading to severe agency problems. Pinkowitz et al. (2006) expect that 
controlling shareholders invest excessively in liquid assets because they can be easily 
turned into private benefits. Therefore, it is important to investigate the agency theory with 
regard to the level of liquidity of underlying assets. This investigation is specifically 
important in countries with low shareholder protection because people in control of 
corporations can easily gain their private benefits due to poor corporate governance 
structures.   
Jensen (1986) explains that managers will prefer to hold high cash levels because of their 
own personal self-wealth maximizing motives. According to Pinkowitz et al. (2006) those 
who control firms only pay-out to shareholders the part of cash that they cannot use for 
their own private benefits. They try to make the business safer in order to stay in control 
for the longest time possible, hence increase the resources under their control and increase 
their personal wealth. At times of uncertainty, cash serves as a buffer for controlling 
shareholders and allows them to stay in control. However at other times, they will just try 
to extract private benefit. Liquid assets give controllers the opportunity to extract private 
benefits so much easier than fixed assets (Pinkowitz et al., 2006). The following section 
discusses ways in which managerial discretion could be handled so that managers act in the 
favour of the shareholders‟ interests rather than pursuing their personal objectives.  
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3.1.2 Solutions to Agency Problems 
In order to decrease agency problems, the interests of managers and shareholders must be 
aligned. One way for this to be achieved is through creating incentive plans to align the 
interests of managers with the interests of shareholders (Hill and Jones, 1992). Incentive 
costs are the costs incurred by the principal as a means of trying to align the interests of the 
agents with their own interests. In most organizations, incentives are used through 
rewarding managers financially for acting on behalf of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) state that a good way to deal with agency problems is 
giving managers long term incentive plans to align their interests with the interests of 
shareholders. Incentives can be in many forms including top executives taking shares, 
tying executive compensation to shareholder returns or deferring part of executive 
compensation to the future in order to enhance long term corporate value maximization 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) state that managerial ownership 
encourages managers to seek profit maximization. If managers have ownership in the firm 
there is no longer complete separation of ownership and control which is the original cause 
of agency problems. Hill and Jones (1992) state that stock option plans help managers and 
employees focus on shareholder wealth maximization since this will gain benefits for them 
as stock owners. Nevertheless, incentive plans do not completely eliminate agency 
problems. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that in certain cases managers may manipulate 
accounting earnings to increase their pay.  
The second way to decrease agency problems is through effective monitoring. However, 
shareholders will have to incur monitoring costs to limit managerial opportunism (Hill and 
Jones, 1992). Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that one of the major components of 
agency costs are monitoring costs.  
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Managers have the ability to control important information inside the firm (Hill and Jones, 
1992). Managers of firms may filter information in a way that does not allow individual 
shareholders to monitor if management is working toward the shareholders‟ best interest or 
not. Therefore, governance structures include board of directors to act as monitoring 
mechanisms (Hill and Jones, 1992). 
Donaldson and Davis (1991) state that the board of directors has a major role in decreasing 
managerial opportunism through monitoring managers on behalf of shareholders. 
According to the agency theory, this monitoring power will be more efficient if the 
chairman of the board is independent from the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). However, if 
both roles are carried out by the same person (i.e. there is CEO-Chairman duality), 
decisions will be in favour of management and at the expense of shareholders causing 
managerial opportunism and agency loss.      
Donaldson and Davis (1991) argue that the stewardship theory, unlike the agency theory 
suggests that managers actually want to perform well in favour of the corporation and be 
good stewards of corporate assets. Under the stewardship theory, it is only a matter of 
whether the organizational structure facilitates this good performance or not. Therefore, 
they find evidence of the stewardship theory suggesting that when the CEO of the 
corporation is also the chairman of the board, they have higher authorities and hence can 
perform better and achieve higher returns. 
Previous research on corporate governance and corporate cash holdings build on the free 
cash flow hypothesis originally developed by Jensen (1986) which states that managers 
accumulate cash for their own private benefits. Jensen (1986) state that managers prefer to 
accumulate cash reserves to increase resources under their control. Previous research such 
as Dittmar et al. (2003), Kalcheva and Lins (2007) and Kusnadi (2011) show that agency 
theory impacts cash holding decisions. In the cash holding literature, effective monitoring 
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has proved to have a significant effect on the way that managers handle cash. When there 
is effective monitoring, managers will be forced to invest cash in positive net present value 
projects or distribute cash as dividends to shareholders. Managers will not be able to 
accumulate cash if there is effective monitoring by large shareholders (Ferreira and Vilela, 
2004). 
The agency theory explains managerial behaviour more than any other corporate 
governance theory in countries with poor shareholder protection (Chang and Noorbakhsh, 
2006). The following section provides a review of the literature on corporate governance 
and cash holdings. Ownership structure, board characteristics and audit features all have an 
impact on corporate cash holding decisions that are explained in the following sections.  
3.2 Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings 
Higher levels of cash allow managers to have higher managerial discretion (Chen, 2008). 
Jensen‟s (1986) agency cost of free cash flow hypothesis suggests that managers hoard 
cash to increase resources under their control and thus gain power over the firm‟s 
investment decisions. Dittmar et al. (2003) and Ferreira and Vilela (2004) propose that 
managers keep cash because of their own private benefits rather than shareholders‟ best 
interest. Ammann, Oesch and Schmid (2011) find evidence showing that managers of 
firms with poor firm-level governance accumulate more cash in order to protect 
themselves. Kusnadi (2005) explains that managers sometimes want to build cash reserves 
because executive remuneration schemes could be related to firm size (both directly 
through bonuses and indirectly through budget size). This motivates managers to build 
assets regardless of their future profitability prospects. Jensen (1986) argues that managers 
prefer not to pay-out cash to shareholders because it decreases the resources under 
managerial control making them less powerful. Similarly, in the presence of stronger 
corporate governance, managers are forced to keep lower levels of cash because they are 
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consequently better monitored. This fact of accountability forces them to make positive 
NPV investments which they otherwise would have not identified. Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith (2007) explain that shareholders‟ defence against managerial inefficient use of 
corporate resources is strong corporate governance. 
This argument leads to the conclusion that corporate cash holding decisions are not limited 
to firm characteristics but also include corporate governance and investor protection 
aspects as determining factors. When investor protection is low, management will have an 
incentive to hold high cash balances to gain discretionary power over the company‟s 
investment decisions (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004).  
Dittmar et al. (2003) state that there has been weak evidence of agency related 
considerations regarding corporate cash holdings in previous literature, possibly because 
the vast majority of studies have focused on the U.S., where there is strong shareholder 
protection. In their cross country analysis, they find evidence that the agency motive is the 
primary determinant of cash holdings. Dittmar et al. (2003) specifically find that firms 
operating in countries with low shareholder protection hold double the amount of cash as 
those operating in countries with high shareholder protection. Since counties with low 
shareholder protection are predominantly those operating in developing economies, 
corporate governance is a very important determinant of cash holdings in such economies. 
This is specifically important in Egypt as the World Bank ranking of the index measuring 
shareholder protection has ranked Egypt number 122 in 2016 and number 81 in 2018. This 
particularly low shareholder protection rating shows that potentially Egyptian companies 
have relatively high cash balances. 
Dittmar et al. (2003) support this by finding that Egypt has the highest median cash 
balance out of 45 countries. They state that the agency motive is the primary determinant 
of corporate cash holdings and highlight the importance of this matter in countries with 
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poor shareholder protection. Since Egypt has the highest median cash balance in their cross 
country analysis, there is a compelling call for the analysis of the determinants of corporate 
cash holdings specifically in Egypt and particularly from the agency perspective. 
Even studies like Dittmar et al. (2003) and Al-Najjar (2013) that attempt to explain agency 
problems have been focusing mainly on the effect of country-level governance on 
corporate cash holdings. Chen et al. (2014) claim that cross-country studies have three 
limitations. Firstly, they focus on shareholder rights showing evidence of law rather than 
enforcement of shareholder protection. The law on paper and the enforcement of the law 
can be very different in many countries. Chen et al. (2014) suggest that it is harder for 
insiders to take advantage of corporate resources in the presence of a good government that 
protects investors through properly enforcing laws. Secondly, Chen et al. (2014) present 
theoretical evidence that recent literature has found contradicting evidence regarding the 
effect of shareholders‟ rights on cash holdings. Finally, Chen et al. (2014) argue that cross-
country studies fail to capture the effect of firm-level agency problems on corporate cash 
holdings.  
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) claim that cash holdings are a material issue in poorly-
governed firms, whereas there may be minimal costs to holding high cash levels in well-
governed firms. They find that governance has a significant effect on how managers spend 
cash. Their results suggest that corporate governance exerts greater influence over 
investing decisions compared to financing decisions. 
To conclude, corporate governance has a significant impact on cash holding decisions, 
especially in a country like Egypt. This is mainly because many studies reveal that firms in 
countries with low shareholder protection hold higher cash balances (Dittmar et al., 2003; 
Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Al-Najjar, 2013). Also, Dittmar et al. (2003) find that Egypt has the 
highest cash holding level out of 45 countries. This study fills the gap in the literature by 
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investigating the effect of firm-level corporate governance determinants on corporate cash 
holdings of firms listed on the Egyptian stock market. Corporate governance has many 
different aspects. The following sections discuss the relationship between corporate 
governance and corporate cash holdings addressing each aspect of corporate governance 
separately. Ownership structure, board characteristics and shareholder protection are 
discussed in details with respect to previous studies conducted to analyse the relationship 
between corporate governance and cash holdings. 
3.3 Ownership Structure 
Corporate governance decreases agency problems of free cash flows by decreasing cash 
holding levels (Chen, 2008). One very important corporate governance issue is ownership 
structure. Ownership structure includes many sub-categories such as managerial 
ownership, ownership concentration, institutional ownership, government ownership and 
family ownership. For example, when there is higher ownership concentration, managers 
have lower discretionary powers and are thus forced to keep lower levels of cash. In certain 
ownership structures, the goals of managers and shareholders may be aligned and so 
managers have the incentive to maximize shareholder wealth. The following section 
presents how each ownership structure type can affect managerial discretion regarding 
corporate cash holding decisions.   
3.3.1 Managerial Ownership 
Separation of ownership and control causes conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders (Chen, 2008). According to Jensen (1986), managerial ownership decreases 
agency problems of free cash flows. The traditional interest alignment hypothesis proposes 
that when managers hold more shares in the firm, conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and managers are reduced (Chen and Chuang, 2009). When the interests of 
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shareholders and managers are aligned, there is goal congruence and managers keep lower 
levels of cash. Managers will be encouraged to invest the excess cash in positive net 
present value projects in order to generate future returns benefiting them as shareholders. 
In other words, when there is high managerial ownership, the agency problem is less 
severe, which in turn lowers managerial discretion and levels of cash. Therefore, the 
relationship between managerial ownership and cash holdings is expected to be negative.  
Drobetz and Grüninger (2007) find that managerial ownership is negatively associated 
with cash holdings. This is because the incentives of managers who own a high percentage 
of shares in the company are aligned with the incentives of stockholders and thus they are 
encouraged to keep lower levels of cash. Jensen (1986) claims that managers with higher 
managerial discretion hold higher cash levels for their own purposes. If they have excess 
cash they may invest in projects that could not be financed through capital markets. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) suggest a negative relationship between managerial ownership and 
cash holdings because managerial ownership decreases the incentives for actions that may 
destroy shareholders‟ wealth. Masood and Shah (2014) also find a negative relationship 
between managerial ownership and cash holdings in Pakistan. 
Nevertheless, the entrenchment hypothesis totally contradicts the expectations of the 
interest alignment hypothesis. The entrenchment hypothesis proposes that higher 
managerial ownership encourages managers to take decisions in favour of their private 
interests and at the expense of shareholders (Chen and Chuang, 2009). There would be a 
positive relationship between managerial ownership and cash holdings under the 
entrenchment hypothesis, because entrenched managers will keep higher levels of cash for 
their own private benefits. Belghitar and Khan (2013) agree to the entrenchment 
hypothesis by finding a negative relationship between non-executive ownership and cash 
holdings in U.K. small and medium enterprises. They explain that non-executive 
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ownership is the most powerful internal governance monitoring mechanism. In further 
analysis, Belghitar and Khan (2013) divide the sample into high growth and low growth 
firms based on investment opportunity set. They find that ownership structure is only 
significant for high growth SMEs. Belghitar and Khan (2013) conclude that internal 
governance tools such as ownership structures are particularly important to decrease 
agency problems arising from conflicts over cash held for investment purposes in high 
growth SMEs. However, external governance tools such as capital market monitoring due 
to leverage are more important for low growth SMEs. 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) argue that the relationship between managerial ownership and 
cash holdings of firms in the U.K. is non-linear. As managerial ownership increases, 
managers go from alignment to entrenchment and to alignment again. Kusnadi (2011) 
confirm that the relationship between insider ownership and cash holdings is non-linear. 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) state that at high levels of managerial ownership, there could be 
less efficient monitoring and so managers of U.K. firms could be seen as entrenched. 
Managers may keep high levels of cash out of precautionary motives because managerial 
ownership causes them to become more risk averse (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). Harford et 
al. (2008) confirm that insider ownership is positively related to cash holdings. 
Chen (2008) find that CEO ownership impact cash holdings negatively in old economy 
firms but have no significant impact in listed new economy firms (firms from the 
computer, software, internet, telecommunications or networking  industries). Chen and 
Chuang (2009) opted to investigate high-tech firms because of their highly competitive 
market. They explain that these firms typically prefer to hold sufficient cash reserves in 
order to invest in new projects and in doing so keep their competitive advantage. In this 
case, shareholders are in a dilemma to either face agency problems caused by accumulating 
cash or bear the loss of profitable investment opportunities forgone. 
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Chen and Chuang (2009) argue that in high tech firms it is actually better for firms to 
accumulate cash in order to seize the profitable investment opportunities in a highly 
competitive market. Shareholders will accept large cash holdings only if strong governance 
mechanisms are present and so they do not have to worry about managerial expropriation. 
Chen and Chuang (2009) find that in high tech firms there is a positive relationship 
between CEO ownership and cash holdings. This is consistent with the interest-alignment 
hypothesis because in high-tech firms it is better to hold more cash. When firms 
accumulate cash for profitable investment opportunities, they will invest in positive net 
present value projects with high required rate or return. In this case, shareholders benefit 
from higher returns rather than requesting dividend pay-outs. 
Kalcheva and Lins (2007) find no relationship between management ownership and cash 
holdings. They measure management ownership as the percentage of control rights held by 
the management and their families. Nevertheless, they find that when managers control 
more votes than other block holders, entrenched managers keep significantly larger cash 
reserves to further increase resources under their control. 
Kuan, Li and Liu (2012) specifically focus on the separation of control and cash flow 
rights in Taiwan. They explain that control rights are the ability of controlling shareholders 
to influence the way the firm is managed, whereas cash flow rights is the controlling 
shareholders‟ share of profits and losses from decision making activities. Kuan et al. 
(2012) find that when cash holdings of a firm are low, and there is separation of control 
and cash flow rights, cash holdings decrease as a result. The above argument is based on 
the alignment of interests of managers and shareholders and thus grants managers freedom 
to undertake profitable investment opportunities. However, in firms that already have high 
cash holding levels, agency conflicts are more severe and controlling shareholders have 
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more power. In this case, entrenched managers choose to hold cash in order to pursue their 
own interests (Kuan et al., 2012). 
3.3.2 Ownership Concentration 
―The most direct way to align cash flow and control rights of outside investors is to 
concentrate share holdings‖ (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.754).  
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) claim that large shareholders have enough capital to 
influence managerial decisions. When there is ownership concentration, there is higher 
monitoring, and large shareholders have enough voting rights to put pressure on 
management in certain situation (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Kusnadi (2005) finds that 
non-management block-holder ownership has a significant negative effect on cash 
holdings. This is due to the fact that these block-holders perform effective external 
monitoring and by doing so impact managerial decisions regarding cash. Large 
shareholders are able to force managers to pay-out cash or invest excess cash in projects 
that increase shareholder wealth. Thus, the relationship between ownership concentration 
and cash holdings is expected to be negative. Large shareholders decrease possible agency 
problems and improve governance by protecting their own investments through monitoring 
management (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007).  Kusnadi et al. (2015) confirm that firms 
with lower ownership concentration hold higher cash reserves. Guney et al. (2007) also 
find a negative relationship between ownership concentration and cash holdings. 
Similar to this argument, an important aspect of ownership concentration is institutional 
ownership. Institutional ownership is a way to measure agency problems that occur due to 
ownership concentration (Kuan et al., 2011). This is because large shareholders play an 
important role in decreasing agency problems through their monitoring roles. Large 
shareholders are an important tool to decrease agency problems and force managers to take 
decisions in favour of the shareholders‟ best interests. When a large portion of the firm‟s 
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ownership is represented by institutions, the shareholders‟ monitoring power increases and 
managerial opportunism decreases. Kuan et al. (2011) and Kuan et al. (2012) confirm this 
view by finding a negative relationship between institutional ownership and cash holdings 
in Taiwan.  
Even though it would be expected that cash holdings would decrease with institutional 
ownership, Harford et al. (2008) contradict this view and find a positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and cash holdings. This may be because institutional 
shareholders typically seek formal compliance with corporate governance rules. 
Nevertheless, formal compliance does not necessarily mean good corporate governance 
practices, thus the results may not be always constant. Masood and Shah (2014) also find a 
positive relationship between institutional ownership and cash holdings, but they explain 
that this is due to shareholder rights being not protected by the law in Pakistan. This means 
that even in the presence of institutional ownership, the large insider shareholders who are 
managing the firms cannot be forced to pay-out dividends to the minority outside 
shareholders. Thus, the conflict of interest in Pakistan remains between inside and outside 
shareholders. Belghitar and Khan (2013) find a positive relationship between cash holdings 
and institutional ownership in U.K. SMEs, explaining that institutional shareholders do not 
perform effective monitoring in the U.K. Al-Najjar and Clark (2017) show evidence of a 
positive relationship between institutional ownership and cash holdings in the MENA 
region. They explain that institutional shareholders do not provide effective monitoring and 
they try to maximize their private benefits. 
Previous research has mainly focused on measuring ownership concentration through 
institutional ownership. This is because large shareholders decrease agency problems 
though performing as a monitoring function (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). A more 
specific aspect of ownership concentration that is expected to perform a more powerful 
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monitoring function than any other agency is the government. There still remains to be a 
gap in the literature in analysing how government ownership can enhance monitoring 
managers and thus impact cash holding decisions. Despite the trials towards privatization 
in the recent years in Egypt, research has shown that government ownership remains 
relatively high in Egyptian listed firms. Omran et al. (2008), Abdelsalam El-Masry and 
Elsegini (2008) and Wahba (2014) find that the average government ownership in 
Egyptian listed firms is 34%, 29.97% and 10.937%, respectively. In this respect, this study 
contributes to the existing literature by investigating how government ownership impacts 
cash holding decisions in Egypt. 
3.3.3 Government Ownership 
Government ownership can perform a strong monitoring function, thus it would be 
expected that firms with high government ownership have low cash holding levels. 
Megginson, Ullah and Wei (2014) find a negative relationship between cash holdings and 
state ownership in China but explain it from a slightly different perspective. From 
Megginson et al. (2014)‟s perspective, inefficiencies in state-owned firms come from the 
economics theory „soft budget constraint‟ effect. This means that state-owned firms can 
depend heavily on other state-owned organizations for help. They explain that state-owned 
firms will have easy access to financial resources from state-owned banks even if these 
companies are financially distressed. This way there is no need for state-owned firms to 
keep high levels of cash. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) explain that state owned firms usually 
do not serve the public interest better than private firms. In fact, state owned firms are 
inefficient and their losses have a negative impact on their country‟s treasuries (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). Also, Wu et al. (2012) find that state-controlled firms have low cash 
holdings in China due to their easy access to finance.  
95 
 
3.3.4 Family Ownership 
Another aspect of ownership structure is family ownership. Kuan et al. (2011) investigate 
the relationship between cash holdings and corporate governance within family-controlled 
firms in Taiwan. They define family controlled firms as those where families own a large 
percentage of shares that exceed the critical control level. In this case, the family 
controllers become the majority shareholders and have enough power to influence the 
firm‟s financial decisions. Kuan et al. (2011) explain that in this case, agency problems 
start to rise between the majority shareholders and the minority shareholders. They 
highlight the importance of family ownership through explaining that in family-controlled 
firms agency problems are more complicated than in other firms due to separation of 
ownership and control. Families could force the firm to implement financial policies that 
are in the favour of their best interest but not favourable to minority shareholders. 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) find that Family ownership controllers impact cash holdings 
positively. They explain that this is because controlling shareholders want to increase 
resources under their control. Kuan et al. (2011) suggest that in Taiwanese family-
controlled firms there are more severe agency problems than in non-family-controlled 
firms. This is due to the fact that in family-controlled firms majority shareholders are able 
to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. This increased agency problems in 
family controlled firms causes them to have higher external financing costs and thus 
require to hold higher cash levels. 
Kusnadi (2011) also agree with Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and Kuan et al. (2011) on a 
positive relationship between cash holdings and family control. Kusnadi (2011) also finds 
that Pyramidal ownership structure (measured using a dummy variable) has a positive 
impact on cash holdings. The author defines a pyramid structure as a firm with ownership 
“inter-connected through a chain” (Kusnadi, 2011, p.557). Interconnected through a chain 
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means that ownership structure is just like a pyramid (firm A owns firm B and firm B owns 
firm C) and the controlling shareholders at the top of it are a family. Firms with pyramidal 
ownership are usually family controlled firms having less effective boards and higher 
managerial discretion. Due to higher managerial discretion caused by weaker monitoring, 
these firms keep higher cash levels and refuse to pay excess cash to remaining 
shareholders. Kusnadi (2005) finds that family-controlled firms have lower cash holdings 
levels. These findings are contrary to the results of Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Kusnadi 
(2011) and Kuan et al. (2011). 
3.4 Board Characteristics 
―The board of directors is the key internal governance mechanism, and its main functions 
are to monitor management decisions on behalf of shareholders and to verify the accuracy 
of information released to shareholders‖ (Chen, 2008, p. 433).  
The board‟s main responsibility is to monitor and evaluate top management (Harford et al., 
2008). This section addresses the relationship between board characteristics and corporate 
cash holdings. According to previous empirical research board size, board independence 
and CEO duality all impact corporate cash decisions. 
3.4.1 Board Size 
When the board size is larger, the decision-making process slows down causing boards to 
be less effective (Jensen, 1993). Kusnadi (2005) find that board size has a significant 
positive impact on cash holdings. This could be because larger boards provide less 
effective monitoring and hence corporate governance structures work less effectively in 
those companies. Due to their weak monitoring power, these boards will not be able to 
force managers to distribute residual cash to shareholders. Ullah and Kamal (2017) also 
find a significant positive relationship between board size and cash holdings in Pakistan. 
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Harford et al. (2008) clarify that the literature on board size effectiveness has found 
different views. The first view suggests that smaller boards are more effective because they 
provide better decision making, whereas the second view suggests that larger boards are 
more effective because they perform a stronger monitoring function. Loukil and Yousfi 
(2016) clarify that the first view that smaller boards are more effective is consistent with 
the agency theory. This is because smaller boards are expected to provide higher 
monitoring and control over management than larger boards due to more efficient 
communication and coordination (Jizi, Salama, Dixon and Stratling, 2014). However, the 
second view that larger boards are more effective is consistent with the resource 
dependency theory because larger boards have access to more skills and resources (Loukil 
and Yousfi, 2016). 
Masood and Shah (2014) find that larger boards have more monitoring powers and control 
over management in Pakistani firms, leading to a negative relationship between board size 
and cash holdings. Kuan et al. (2012) also find that companies with lower cash holdings 
have larger boards in Taiwan. Al-Najjar and Clark (2017) also report a negative 
relationship between board size and cash holdings in the MENA region. On the contrary, 
Chen and Chuang (2009) claim that relatively smaller boards are more effective because 
they have lower costs of coordination and less severe free riding problems. However, Chen 
and Chuang (2009) suggest that even if this is the case in firms analysed in previous 
studies, the case may be different in high tech-firms. They explain that the average board 
size in high tech firms shows that larger boards are actually more effective because they 
provide more monitoring and advising in such a competitive business.  Chen and Chuang 
(2009) find evidence of a positive relationship between board size and cash holdings 
explaining that in high tech firms, larger boards are more effective and allow managers to 
keep higher cash levels for future investments. This is specific to high tech firms due to the 
dynamic market requiring immediate cash to invest in profitable opportunities. Because 
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high-tech businesses are more complex than traditional businesses, there appears to be 
higher information asymmetry between managers and investors causing higher costs of 
external financing (Chen and Chuang, 2009). In order for large shareholders to be part of 
the cash holdings decision making process, they seek board membership. Nevertheless, 
Kusnadi (2011) finds no significant relationship between board size and cash holdings in 
Singapore and Malaysia. Also, Harford et al. (2008) and Boubaker and Derouiche (2015) 
find no significant relationship between board size and cash holdings in the U.S. and 
France, respectively. Kalcheva and Lins (2007) argue that empirical research in the U.S. 
have mostly found no evidence that poor firm-level corporate governance increases cash 
holdings and/or in turn decreases firm value. They state that this is probably due to strong 
corporate governance already existing in the U.S. which leads to investors not discounting 
the value of firms with poor corporate governance, even if they are holding relatively high 
amount of cash. 
3.4.2 Board Independence 
More independent boards exert higher monitoring powers and thus cause lower managerial 
opportunism and improved firm performance (Harford et al., 2008). Due to this higher 
monitoring effectiveness, independent directors enhance long-term firm value 
maximization (Jizi et al., 2014). Firms with high board independence have lower 
information asymmetry and therefore it is easier for their respective companies to access 
capital markets (Chen, 2008). Such firms do not need to accumulate cash. Since 
independent directors are not closely involved in setting firm strategies and policies, they 
are able to assess managers more objectively than executive directors (Jizi et al., 2014). If 
independent directors create higher monitoring, they will be able to force managers to 
invest excess cash in positive net present value projects. Accordingly, the relationship 
between board independence and cash holdings is expected to be negative.  
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Kusnadi (2005) finds that when there are more insiders on the board, firms tend to hold 
more cash. More insiders on the board of directors means that the board overall becomes 
less independent and as a result have weaker monitoring powers. Therefore, in the 
presence of a more independent board, the board‟s monitoring power increases and 
managers are forced to pay-out or invest excess cash. Boubaker and Derouiche (2015) 
support this view by finding that when there are more independent directors on the board, 
cash levels decrease because more independent boards are more effective. 
Kusnadi (2011) agree to this argument by discovering that firms having less independent 
directors on the board have higher cash levels. As such, firms with less independent boards 
have lower monitoring effectiveness, leading to more severe agency problems. In the 
presence of such weak governance structures, managers have the opportunity to increase 
cash balances under their control. Kuan et al. (2011) contradict this argument by reporting 
a significant positive relationship between cash holdings and board independence in 
family-controlled firms. Similarly, Kuan et al. (2012) and Ullah and Kamal (2017) provide 
evidence of a positive relationship between board independence and cash holdings. 
Nevertheless, Ullah and Kamal (2017) find a negative relationship between non-executive 
directors on the board and corporate cash holdings. Ullah and Kamal (2017) argue that 
non-executive directors perform a strong monitoring function and force managers to 
decrease cash holdings. However, it is difficult for independent directors to monitor 
managers effectively.  
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) find that board characteristics do not impact cash holdings 
significantly. Harford et al. (2008) and Al-Najjar and Clark (2017) find no significant 
relationship between board independence and cash holdings. Similarly, Belghitar and Khan 
(2013) find no significant relationship between non-executive directors on the board and 
cash holdings in U.K. small and medium enterprises. Chen (2008) finds no empirical 
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evidence regarding the effect of board independence on corporate cash holdings in old 
economy firms but finds that board independence affects cash holdings positively in new 
economy (high technology) firms. Board independence is one way of protecting 
shareholders‟ interests. In new economy firms in the U.S., it is acceptable to keep high 
levels of cash as long as the board of directors is protecting shareholders‟ interests. 
Similarly, in high tech firms, when there are more effective boards, shareholders will 
actually allow managers to accumulate cash (Chen and Chuang, 2009). When boards are 
more independent, corporate governance mechanisms are stronger. In such a dynamic 
market, shareholders will allow managers to keep cash in order to seize risky yet profitable 
investment opportunities. 
3.4.3 CEO Duality 
CEO duality appears when the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman of the Board 
(COB) are the same person. Companies with a dual CEO have higher cash ratios than 
companies with CEO and COB separation (Drobetz and Grüninger, 2007). Kusnadi (2011) 
confirm that firms with CEO-Chairman duality have larger cash reserves. Boubaker and 
Derouiche (2015) also find that firms with CEO duality keep higher cash holdings. They 
explain that firms with CEO duality favour hoarding cash which could in turn enable 
insider expropriation. This shows that boards happen to be more effective and have 
stronger monitoring powers when the CEO and chairman are two different people. This 
leads to the conclusion that companies with CEO-chairman duality have less effective 
boards and so managers have the discretion to accumulate cash.  Kuan et al. (2011) also 
find a positive relationship between chair duality and cash holdings.  
Chen and Chuang (2009) explain that the governance mechanisms in high tech firms may 
be different than in traditional firms. For example, one way to ensure stronger governance 
mechanisms is having the founder of the firm as its CEO. This way the CEO will act in the 
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firm‟s best interest because they believe that the firm‟s existence is a product of their 
effort. Chen and Chuang (2009) find a positive relationship between CEO founder and 
cash holdings. When the CEO of a high-tech company is also its original founder, the 
interests of the CEO and shareholders are aligned and the CEO is encouraged to keep cash 
for future investments. 
3.4.3.1 CEO Characteristics  
Some studies have focused more on how CEO characteristics such as age, gender and 
compensation can affect cash holding decisions. Tong (2010) explains that while 
shareholders are risk neutral, managers are risk averse because they invest their human 
capital in a single firm and sometimes part of their wealth due to stock-based 
compensations. Therefore, Tong (2010) focuses on the relationship between risk-related 
agency theory and cash holdings through measuring risk-related CEO incentives. Tong 
(2010) finds that firms with higher CEO risk incentives hold less cash. This is evidence of 
the agency theory that managers keep more cash to decrease risk even if it is at the expense 
of shareholder wealth. Liu and Mauer (2011) contradict the findings of Tong (2010) by 
finding a positive relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives and cash holdings. 
They explain that this could be because firms with higher risk-taking incentives have a 
higher probability of facing financing constraints. This could increase the costs of external 
financing and hence managers prefer to hold cash in order to ensure financing needs in the 
future are met. The second reason is that higher risk-taking incentives increase the conflict 
between shareholders and bondholders. The higher risk leads to bondholders requiring 
extra liquidity. Liu and Mauer (2011) prove that debt-holders actually have a significant 
impact on shaping liquidity policies of firms with high CEO risk-taking incentives.  
Regarding CEO characteristics, Orens and Reheul (2013) analyse the effect of CEO 
demographics on corporate cash holdings of Belgian SMEs. They find that older CEOs 
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keep more cash than younger CEOs for precautionary motives due to their natural risk 
aversion attitude. They also find that CEOs that have experiences in different industries 
hold less cash because they are concerned about the opportunity cost of holding cash and 
have a positive attitude towards innovation. 
Zeng and Wang (2015) analyse the effect of CEO gender diversity on cash holdings. They 
highlight that previous research show that women are more risk averse and more caring 
about corporate spending patterns. They state that previous research also shows that 
women extract less private benefits and make more ethical decisions and so companies 
managed by women perform better that companies managed by men. Zeng and Wang 
(2015) focus on Chinese listed firms to find that firms with female CEOs have higher cash 
holdings because women are more concerned with precautionary motives to holding cash 
and less concerned with the opportunity cost of cash. They also find that in firms with 
female CEOs there are less agency problems because females are risk averse and so 
mitigate over-investment problems of free cash flow. Liang, Hsieh, Lin and Chi (2018) 
also confirm a positive relationship between female CEOs and cash holdings in Taiwan. 
They explain that this is because women are more risk averse and so hold more cash for 
precautionary motives, regardless of the opportunity cost of cash. Since some studies find 
that CEO demographics such as CEO gender diversity affect cash holdings, other studies 
focus on analysing board gender diversity on corporate cash holdings.  
3.4.4 Board Gender Diversity 
Ullah and Kamal (2017) explain that there are two different views to the effect of board 
gender diversity on corporate cash holdings. The first view is from an agency perspective 
and suggests that female directors benefit the board by increasing its monitoring 
effectiveness and decreasing agency problems. Adams and Ferreira (2009) prove that 
women perform better monitoring functions than men. They show that women attend more 
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board meetings and are likely to be assigned more monitoring roles. Under this view, the 
high monitoring effectiveness of female directors will decrease cash holdings. However, 
the second view is from a precautionary perspective suggesting that females are risk averse 
and so firms with females on the board will hold more cash (Ullah and Kamal, 2017) 
Ullah and Kamal (2017) support the first view by finding a negative relationship between 
board gender diversity and corporate cash holdings in Pakistan. Ullah and Kamal (2017) 
measure board gender diversity using a dummy variable of 1 if the board of directors 
includes a female director and zero otherwise. They explain that including a female 
director on the board, benefits the firm by enhancing the monitoring effectiveness of the 
board and hence decreasing agency costs.  
On the other hand, Loukil and Yousfi (2016) support the second view to board gender 
diversity by finding that the participation of women on the board actually increases cash 
holdings in Tunisia. They explain that this is due to the risk avoidance behaviour carried 
out by women. This implies that women prefer high cash holdings due to precautionary 
motives.  
3.5 Shareholder Protection 
One of the major components of corporate governance that impacts corporate cash 
holdings is shareholder protection. When there is weaker shareholder protection, managers 
have higher managerial discretion and are free to accumulate cash for their own private 
benefits. In a cross country study, Dittmar et al. (2003) use La Porta's anti-directors‟ rights 
index to measure investor protection. They find that firms in countries with poor 
shareholder protection hold more cash than firms in countries with strong shareholder 
protection. However, most studies carried out to investigate the effect of shareholder 
protection on corporate cash holdings, measure shareholder protection on a country level. 
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Pinkowitz et al. (2006) explain that there are 2 components of shareholder protection. 
These components are a legal rights component and an enforcement component. The 
former determines the legal rights granted to shareholders and the latter determines if the 
country‟s institutions actually enforce these rights. Pinkowitz et al. (2006) state that 
controlling shareholders intend to influence firms in order to increase their welfare. 
Agency problems arise when the interests of controlling shareholders and outside investors 
are not aligned. In countries where investor protection is weak, controlling shareholders are 
able to extract more private benefits causing firm value to fall (Pinkowitz et al., 2006).  
Kalcheva and Lins (2007) find that in firms with poor corporate governance, where 
shareholders are less protected, managers hold more cash. Chen, Chen, Schipper, Xu and 
Xue (2012) agree to this view when studying the split share structure reform in China. The 
split share structure reform allowed shareholders to convert non-tradable shares to tradable 
ones. This improved governance structure has led firms to decreases cash holdings. Al-
Najjar (2013) compares the determinants of cash holdings in developing and developed 
markets. Here developing countries such as Brazil, Russia, India and China are 
investigated and compared with a sample of firms in the U.K. and the U.S. which represent 
developed markets. In emerging markets, Al-Najjar (2013) find that firms operating in 
countries with low shareholder protection hold more cash than firms operating in countries 
with high shareholder protection. This is due to the fact that when there is low shareholder 
protection, managers have high discretionary powers and shareholders are not able to force 
dividend pay-outs. This negative relationship between shareholder protection and cash 
holdings can also be explained by the fact that when shareholder protection is relatively 
higher, there is higher certainty and thus a lower need to keep a cash buffer.    
Dittmar et al. (2003) find that firms in countries where shareholders are not well protected 
accumulate double the amount of cash than firms in countries that enjoy good shareholder 
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protection. Harford et al. (2008) find contradicting results to those of Dittmar et al. (2003). 
Harford et al. (2008) provide evidence that firms with weaker shareholder protection have 
smaller cash holdings. One reason for the contradicting findings could be the different 
measures used to represent shareholder protection. Dittmar et al. (2003) use La Porta's 
anti-directors‟ rights index to measure shareholder protection (La Porta et al., 1997), 
whereas Harford et al. (2008) use the G-index (Gompers et al., 2003). Guney et al. (2007) 
agree that companies operating in countries with strong shareholder protection hold more 
cash. However, their sample included developed countries which are expected to have 
strong shareholder protection anyway, namely France, Germany, Japan, the U.K. and the 
U.S. Cash holdings have minimal costs in strongly governed firms (Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith, 2007). In strong corporate governance countries, investors do not discount the value 
of firms, even if they are holding significant cash balances (Kalcheva and Lins, 2007). 
Therefore, the effect of the agency theory on cash holdings is more critical for firms 
operating in countries with weak shareholder protection. This study contributes to the 
existing literature by focusing on the relationship between corporate governance and 
corporate cash holdings specifically in Egypt, which is predominantly a country of weak 
shareholder protection.  
Another reason to explain why firms in countries with poor shareholder protection hold 
more cash could be the overall access to financial markets. Countries with low shareholder 
protection are usually those with inferior financial development (Pinkowitz et al., 2006). If 
firms keep low levels of cash then they would regularly require access to the operationally 
inefficient capital markets and so bear high financing costs. As for cash value, Pinkowitz et 
al. (2006) find that investors in countries with poor shareholder protection, value cash 
holdings less and value dividends more compared to investors in counties with strong 
shareholder protection. More specifically, they find that cash is worth more in countries 
with higher financial development and that this could be mainly due to capital market 
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infrastructure and not necessarily related to investor protection. The value of cash is 
discussed later in section 3.7. The following section addresses how corporate governance 
may be related to corporate cash holdings in Egypt through presenting studies that have 
included Egypt in their research. 
3.6 Corporate Cash Holdings in Egypt 
There has been very limited research on corporate cash holdings in developing countries 
and more specifically in the Egyptian context. Al-Najjar (2013) suggests that it is 
important to analyse corporate cash holdings in developing countries, especially from a 
corporate governance perspective. In countries with poor shareholder protection, the 
agency theory explains managerial behaviour more than any other corporate governance 
theory (Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2006). 
Even though there has been no research on cash holdings in Egypt, a few cross country 
studies have included Egypt as one of the countries among many others. Dittmar et al. 
(2003) analyse international corporate governance and cash holdings of 45 countries. In 
this cross country analysis, Egypt had the highest median cash ratio of all 45 countries. The 
overall median of the cash ratio was only 6.6% whereas Egypt had a median cash ratio of 
29.57%. Dittmar et al. (2003) explain that firms hold higher cash ratios when shareholder 
protection is weak.  
Chang and Noorbakhsh (2006) investigate cash holdings using data from 22,000 firms 
from 48 countries including Egypt. They divide their sample into 2 groups, high corporate 
governance and low corporate governance countries. They include Egypt in the low 
corporate governance category. Also in this study, Egypt was one of the countries with an 
exceptionally high cash ratio. Among the low corporate governance countries, Egypt had 
the third highest cash ratio of 16.76% after Jordan and China with 17.36% and 16.83%, 
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respectively. Their findings are similar to Dittmar et al. (2003) showing that firms in 
countries with low shareholder protection hold higher levels of cash. Chang and 
Noorbakhsh (2006) measure shareholder protection based on the governance index of La 
Porta et al. (1998). The findings are consistent with the agency theory implying that when 
shareholder protection is weaker, managerial discretion is higher and so managers keep 
high cash holdings. They also find that larger firms have lower cash holdings relative to 
total assets which is consistent with the trade-off theory. 
Chang and Noorbakhsh (2006) extend the analysis of Dittmar et al. (2003) by applying the 
same model but introducing a new variable to analyse the effect of globalization on cash 
holdings. They do so by studying the effect of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on 
corporate cash holdings. Foreign direct investment has been increasing due to 
globalization. They find that when the ratio of FDI to GDP increases, firms hold lower 
amounts of cash implying that FDI inflows and cash holdings are substitutes. They also 
highlight that countries with higher shareholder protection, usually have lower political 
risks and attract more foreign direct investment. Since Egypt is a country with low 
shareholder protection and high political risk, then FDI inflows and cash holdings will not 
be considered as substitutes. This justifies the assumption that in countries with a high 
uncertainty levels, companies hold higher cash levels to hedge against future risks. Once 
again, this supports the fact that companies in Egypt hold significant amounts of cash 
similar to the findings discovered by Dittmar et al. (2003).  
Ramirez and Tadesse (2009) also include Egypt in their cross country analysis on cash 
holdings, uncertainty avoidance and the multinationality of firms. They use a large panel of 
firms representing 49 countries from 1990 to 2004. Egypt had the second highest cash ratio 
of 19% immediately after Hong Kong of 20%. Ramirez and Tadesse (2009) explain that 
uncertainty avoidance is a dimension of national culture that relates to the level of stress in 
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a society that deals with an uncertain future. Uncertainty avoidance is the degree of which 
society tries to decrease this risk of an uncertain future. They find that culture has an 
impact on corporate financial decisions. More specifically, they find that firms in countries 
with high uncertainty avoidance hold higher levels of cash. Ramirez and Tadesse (2009) 
also find that the degree of multinationality of firms is positively related to cash holdings. 
They also control for firm specific variables and country level variables. For the firm 
specific variables, their findings are mostly in line with previous literature, which is a 
negative association between cash holdings and leverage, size, cash flow and capital 
expenditure and a positive association between cash holdings and R&D. These findings are 
mostly in line with the trade-off theory. As for the country level control variables, the 
study reveals a positive relationship between GDP and inflation with cash holdings.  
A recent study by Al-Najjar and Clark (2017) investigates the relationship between 
corporate governance and cash holdings in the MENA region. The sample included in their 
analysis comprises of 430 non-financial firms from Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and United Arab Emirates. They include 78 firms from 
Egypt. However, when searching for internal corporate governance data specifically 
regarding institutional ownership and board independence, they are able to get data for 
only 13 firms in Egypt. Contrary to expectations, they find partial evidence that countries 
in the MENA region that have better corporate governance practices hold more cash.   
Even though a few studies included Egypt in their cross country analysis, no study 
analyses corporate cash holdings in the Egyptian context in details. This research is 
different to prior research in that it focuses on the determinants of corporate cash holdings 
in Egypt only. This allows a detailed investigation of firm characteristics of Egyptian 
companies in order to show the effect of the trade-off, pecking order and agency cost of 
free cash flow theories. With regard to corporate governance, a major drawback of cross 
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country studies is that they focus on country level governance and do not capture the major 
effect of firm-level governance on corporate cash holdings failing to show the importance 
of agency problems (Chen et al., 2014). Cross country studies such as Dittmar et al. 
(2003), Chang and Noorbakhsh (2006) and Ramirez and Tadesse (2009) focus on broad 
concepts of corporate governance on the country level such as investor protection. 
However, this thesis investigates corporate governance attributes on a firm level capturing 
the important effect of the agency theory on corporate cash holdings. Focusing solely on 
Egyptian companies will show important corporate governance aspects that have an effect 
on the firm level such as managerial discretion and monitoring. 
3.7 Corporate Governance and the Value of Cash Holdings  
In a different line of literature, the value of cash holdings has been addressed by many 
researchers. Dittmar (2008) explain the concept as an enquiry by investors on how much a 
dollar of cash on the company‟s balance sheet is worth to its investors. If accumulating 
cash results in the company being able to undertake profitable investments, then the value 
of a 1 dollar of cash is worth more than 1 dollar. However, if accumulating cash results in 
idle investment, then the value of 1 dollar is worth less than 1 dollar (Dittmar, 2008). In 
order to estimate the impact of excess cash holdings on firm value, studies measure the 
impact of the residuals from the normal cash holding regression on firm value. They use 
only the observations with positive residuals, because these are the firms that keep excess 
cash over the cash needed for operation and investment. The relationship between cash 
holdings and firm value has been reviewed in the previous chapter (section 2.5.5.). In this 
section, the relationship between cash holdings and firm value is reviewed from a 
corporate governance perspective. As mentioned before, analysing firm value is beyond 
the scope of this study as this study aims to analyse the determinants of corporate cash 
holdings. Nevertheless, it is important to review major studies such as Kalcheva and Lins 
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(2007), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Megginson et al. (2014) that analyse the 
effect of corporate governance on the value of cash.  
Harford et al. (2008) find that firms that accumulate cash have lower firm value. This is 
evident by the negative relationship between the firm‟s cash residual and its market to 
book ratio. They also find that poor corporate governance affects firm value negatively and 
this relationship is stronger in the presence of excess cash. Kusnadi (2011) find that 
shareholders discount firms that have large cash balances. They support previous research 
that strong corporate governance increases the marginal value of excess cash holdings. 
3.7.1 Shareholder Protection and the Value of Cash  
Pinkowitz et al. (2006) find that in countries with poor shareholder protection a dollar of 
liquid assets is worth much less than countries with strong shareholder protection. 
Kalcheva and Lins (2007) extend the analysis of Pinkowitz et al. (2006) by combining 
firm-level governance with country level governance. Kalcheva and Lins (2007) find that 
in cases of firms in which managers are expected to be entrenched, external shareholders 
discount the cash held by these firms. They also find that in such cases of expected 
managerial entrenchment, paying out dividends to shareholders increases firm value. They 
conclude that poor shareholder protection along with managerial entrenchment and the 
intention to retain cash, negatively affect firm value. Dittmar (2008) recommend that 
excess cash can be managed using stock repurchase because it is more flexible than the 
commitment of dividend payments. Pinkowitz et al. (2006) explain that one possible 
reason that minority shareholders value cash less in countries with weak shareholder 
protection is because shareholders believe that accounting statements misrepresent cash. 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) examine how corporate governance impacts the value and 
eventual use of cash holdings. They employ two different specifications to carry out this 
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investigation. First, they evaluate how a change in cash affects a change in the firm‟s 
market value measuring market value using stock returns (25 size and book-to-market 
portfolios) adopted from Fama and French (1993). Second, they measure the impact of 
governance on the value of excess cash measuring market value using the market to book 
ratio adopted from Fama and French (1998). Excess cash is the cash left in excess of that 
needed for operations and investments. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) explain that this 
excess cash is at highest risk of being wasted because it is highly at managerial discretion. 
Fresard and Salva (2010) measure excess cash as the residual from the cash holding 
regression equation. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) also find that firms with high levels 
of excess cash and poor corporate governance have relatively lower operating profits.   
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) conclude that holding significant cash reserves has little 
costs in well governed firms but significantly affects the value of poorly governed firms. 
More specifically, they find that in the presence of stronger corporate governance, less 
entrenched managers and stronger monitoring effectiveness (through institutional block 
holdings), the value of a dollar of cash increases significantly. To carry out this 
investigation they use an interaction term between governance variables and the change in 
cash. These findings imply that poorly governed firms waste excess cash and hence destroy 
firm value.   
In a cross-country analysis, Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) find that the value of cash in 
Japan increased through time from $0.42 to $0.58 and then to $1.08, reflecting more 
optimal cash holdings in Japan throughout the years. They find that the value of a dollar 
change in cash in the U.S. is $1.68, Canada $1.66 and the U.K. $1.24. However, in 
Germany building up cash causes only $0.49 change in firm value which reflects agency 
problems in Germany. 
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3.7.2 State Ownership and the Value of Cash 
Megginson et al. (2014) and Sun and Wang (2016) analyse the effect of state ownership on 
the value of cash holdings. Megginson et al. (2014) find that state ownership decreases the 
marginal value of cash. This is because the soft budget constraint effect found in these 
firms increases agency costs. Under the soft budget constraint effect managers do not 
worry about investing efficiently or increasing returns because they can easily rely on other 
government organizations for finance. They explain that in this case, managers have a 
better chance to expropriate liquid assets for their own private benefits. They also explain 
that corruption could lead managers in state-owned firms to just invest in projects due to 
political reasons instead of investing in projects that maximize the firm‟s net present value. 
Sun and Wang (2016) contradict the findings of Megginson et al. (2014). Sun and Wang 
(2016) find that in China, the marginal value of a dollar of cash in state owned firms is 
higher than private firms. This indicates that investors believe that state-ownership 
performs as a strong monitoring function. 
3.7.3 Financial Constraints and the Value of Cash  
Studies such as Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Denis and Sibilkov (2010) focus on the 
effect of financial constraints on the value of cash. Faulkender and Wang (2006) explain 
that if shareholders believe that the difficulty to access external financing causes managers 
to forgo profitable investment opportunities, then the value of a dollar of cash should be 
more than one. However, if shareholders believe that excess cash cause cash flow 
problems, then the value of a dollar of cash should be less than one. They find that the 
marginal value of a dollar of cash is $0.94. Faulkender and Wang (2006) show that the 
marginal value of cash is higher for firms with low cash holdings, less leverage and firms 
facing difficulties to access capital markets. Denis and Sibilkov (2010) find that in 
financially constrained firms, high cash holdings results in high investment levels which in 
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turn increase firm value. Denis and Sibilkov (2010) explain that high cash holdings in 
financially constrained firms, allows these firms to undertake projects that otherwise would 
be forgone.  
Drobetz, Grüninger and Hirschvogl (2010) explain that there are two different views to the 
market value of corporate cash holdings. The first view is through the pecking order 
theory, stating that the marginal value of a dollar of cash increases when there is higher 
information asymmetry because external financing becomes very costly and firms keep 
cash to try to avoid this costly external financing. The second view is through the agency 
theory, stating that the marginal value of a dollar of cash decreases when there is higher 
information asymmetry due to moral hazard problems. The authors analyse 8500 firms 
from 45 countries from 1995-2005 to find that the value of one dollar of cash is almost 
one. However, they provide evidence that the marginal value of a dollar of cash decreases 
when firms face higher information asymmetry, which is in support of the agency theory. 
3.7.4 Cross-Listing and the Value of Cash 
When U.S. firms choose to cross-list, firms face changes such as more disclosure 
requirements and higher informal monitoring from large investors or analysts (Fresard and 
Salva, 2010). The authors find evidence that the value of cash for investors of cross-listed 
firms is more than the value of cash for non-cross-listed firms. They find that $1 of excess 
cash is $0.58 for non-U.S. firms and $1.61 for firms cross-listed in the U.S. Even though 
excess cash premium is larger for firms in countries with low shareholder protection, 
investors view the value of cash similarly for any country once it enters the U.S. market 
through cross listing. This shows that firm‟s corporate governance improves through U.S. 
cross-listing (Fresard and Salva, 2010). Investors also view cross-listing as a firm‟s 
commitment to decrease the risk of cash holdings being extracted into private benefits.  
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Fresard and Salva (2010) also find that investor valuation of excess cash increases when 
there is higher informal monitoring measured by the number of financial analysts 
following the firm, especially in over the counter listings. Insider‟s extracting private 
benefits is decreased through higher legal protection, transparency and higher monitoring 
by financial analysis and large investors (Fresard and Salva, 2010). 
3.7.5 CEO risk incentives and the Value of Cash  
Tong (2010) finds that in firms with higher CEO risk incentives, the value of cash is 
higher. More specifically, in firms with higher CEO risk incentives an additional dollar of 
cash is worth 1.10 dollars. However, in firms with low CEO risk incentives an additional 
dollar of cash is worth only 0.93 dollars (Tong, 2010). The author finds that the value of 
cash is higher in firms with higher CEO risk incentives even after controlling for financial 
constraints and growth options. 
3.7.6 Diversification and the Value of Cash 
Tong (2011) finds that firm diversification decreases the marginal value of a dollar of cash 
through agency problems. The author finds evidence that the value of a dollar of cash is 
$0.92 in diversified firms and $1.08 in single segment firms. Since cash is the most liquid 
asset, managers can easily derive private benefits from cash holdings. In diversified firms, 
managers can easily transfer cash from well-performing divisions to poor-performing 
divisions (Tong, 2011). Therefore, in diversified firms, investors view the value of a dollar 
of cash less than one because they expect inefficient use of cash from managers.  
3.8 Hypotheses Development 
Jensen‟s (1986) agency cost of free cash flow theory suggests that managers accumulate 
cash reserves to increase resources under their control, provide job security or benefit from 
compensation schemes related to firm size. Dittmar et al. (2003) and Ferreira and Vilela 
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(2004) confirm that managers keep cash because of their own private benefits disregarding 
immediate value to shareholders. Managers choose to keep cash for their own private 
benefits and effective corporate governance structures force them to decrease cash levels 
(Harford et al., 2008; Kusnadi, 2011). Therefore, building on previous studies, hypotheses 
are formulated in the sense that when corporate governance effectiveness increases, cash 
holdings decrease.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that when there is separation of ownership and control 
managers have more power to pursue their own interest and may decrease value for 
shareholders. They propose a negative relationship between managerial ownership and 
cash holdings because managerial ownership aligns the interest of shareholders and 
managers, allowing managers to keep lower cash levels. According to Jensen (1993, cited 
in Harford et al., 2008) if firms increase managerial equity ownership they will decrease 
managerial opportunism problems and managers will hold less cash. Drobetz and 
Grüninger (2007) and Masood and Shah (2014) also find a negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and cash holdings. If the company has a higher percentage of its 
managers as owners in the company, there will be goal congruence and thus lower 
managerial opportunism and lower levels of cash. The hypothesis related to managerial 
ownership can be formulated as follows: 
H11: There is a significant negative relationship between managerial ownership and 
cash holdings 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) state that corporate governance is improved by large 
shareholders because they perform a monitoring function to protect their own investments 
and decrease agency problems. Guney et al. (2007) and Kusnadi et al. (2015) find a 
negative relationship between ownership concentration and cash holdings. Kuan et al. 
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(2011) and Kuan et al. (2012) specifically find a negative relationship between institutional 
ownership and cash holdings. 
If there is a higher level of institutional ownership in the company, there will be higher 
monitoring effectiveness, lower managerial opportunism and managers will be forced to 
keep lower levels of cash.  The hypothesis related to institutional ownership can be 
formulated as follows: 
H12: There is a significant negative relationship between institutional ownership and 
cash holdings 
Similar to the previous argument on institutional ownership, if there is higher government 
ownership, there will be higher monitoring effectiveness, lower managerial opportunism 
and managers will be forced to keep lower levels of cash. Wu et al. (2012) and Megginson 
et al. (2014) find a negative relationship between state-ownership and cash holdings in 
China. However, there still remains to be a gap in the literature regarding the effect of 
government ownership on corporate cash holdings. The hypothesis related to government 
ownership can be formulated as follows: 
H13: There is a significant negative relationship between government ownership and 
cash holdings 
According to Harford et al. (2008) different views on the effect of board size on firm value 
can be found in the literature. They explain that some studies find that smaller boards are 
more efficient as they provide better decision making. Studies like Kusnadi (2005), Chen 
and Chuang (2009) and Ullah and Kamal (2017) find that smaller boards provide better 
monitoring due to lower costs of coordination and less acute free riding problems. Thus, 
these studies find evidence of a positive relationship between board size and cash holdings. 
In this case, when there is a larger board, there is lower monitoring, higher managerial 
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opportunism and higher cash levels suggesting a positive relationship between board size 
and cash holdings. 
However, Harford et al. (2008) explain that other studies find that larger boards will 
provide better monitoring. In this case, when there is a larger board, there is higher 
monitoring, lower managerial opportunism and lower cash levels suggesting a negative 
relationship between board size and cash holdings. Kuan et al. (2012), Masood and Shah 
(2014) and Al-Najjar and Clark (2017) all support this view by finding a negative 
relationship between board size and cash holdings. Therefore, the theory does not suggest a 
clear cut direction of the relationship. The hypothesis for board size can be formulated as 
follows: 
H14: There is a significant relationship between board size and cash holdings 
Board independence is also an important issue. It can be expected that when the board is 
more independent, it‟s monitoring ability increases, the fact which in turn reduces 
managerial opportunism (Harford et al., 2008). Since board independence provides a 
strong monitoring power, managers of firms with more independent boards will be forced 
to decrease cash holdings. Kusnadi (2011) reveal evidence that when the board is more 
independent, there is higher monitoring, lower managerial opportunism and lower cash 
levels. Boubaker and Derouiche (2015) also support a negative relationship between board 
independence and cash holdings. The hypothesis related to board independence can be 
formulated as follows: 
H15: There is a significant negative relationship between board independence and cash 
holdings 
Boards of directors are less effective when the roles of chief executive officer and 
chairman of the board are performed by the same person (Kusnadi, 2011). In the presence 
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of CEO-duality, there is less monitoring effectiveness, higher managerial opportunism and 
higher cash holdings (Drobetz and Grüninger, 2007; Kuan et al., 2011; Kusnadi, 2011; 
Boubaker and Derouiche, 2015). Therefore, the hypothesis related to CEO duality can be 
formulated as follows:  
H16: There is a significant positive relationship between CEO duality and cash holdings 
There are different views on the effect of board gender diversity on cash holdings. The first 
view states that women directors benefit the board by increasing monitoring effectiveness 
and hence decreasing cash holdings (Ullah and Kamal, 2017). This view suggests a 
negative relationship between female directors on the board and cash holdings. This view 
is supported by the findings of Ullah and Kamal (2017). 
The second view states that women are more risk averse than men and so are more 
concerned with precautionary motives to holding cash and hence are expected to take 
decisions in favour of hoarding cash (Zeng and Wang, 2015). This view suggests a positive 
relationship between the percentage of women on the board and cash holdings. Also 
women are better at long term planning so may force managers to take decisions in favour 
of accumulating cash. Loukil and Yousfi (2016) support the second view by finding a 
positive relationship between female directors and cash holdings. Therefore, there is no 
clear cut identification on the relationship between the percentage of women on the board 
and cash holdings. The hypothesis for percentage of women on the board can be 
formulated as follows: 
H17: There is a significant relationship between the percentage of women on the board 
and cash holdings 
There has been minimal research on the relationship between audit quality and cash 
holdings. When the firm‟s audit quality increases, monitoring effectiveness increases and 
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cash holdings are expected to decrease. Therefore, the final hypothesis can be formulates 
as follows: 
H18: There is a significant negative relationship between audit quality and cash holdings  
Conclusion 
To sum up, this chapter addresses the third research objective by presenting an overview of 
previous studies analysing the effect of corporate governance on corporate cash holdings. 
The main theory that explains the relationship between corporate governance and cash 
holdings is the agency theory. Agency problems occur when managers act as agents on 
behalf of shareholders and do not take all optimal decisions from the shareholders‟ point of 
view. When corporate governance structures are weak, agency problems increase because 
managers have more power over cash holding decisions. Jensen (1986) explains that under 
the agency cost of free cash flow hypothesis, managers increase cash levels to increase 
resources under their control and thus gain power over the firm‟s investment decisions. 
Nevertheless, previous literature has found mixed evidence on the effect of agency 
problems on cash holdings (Gao et al., 2013). In order to analyse the effect of the agency 
theory on cash holdings, the hypotheses formulated help answer the second research 
question regarding the investigation of the corporate governance determinants of corporate 
cash holdings of firms listed on the Egyptian stock market. The two main aspects of 
corporate governance that affect cash holding decisions focused on in this research are 
ownership structure and board characteristics. This chapter presents a review of previous 
research on cash holdings from a corporate governance perspective around the world. 
Some key studies have included Egypt in their cross country analysis (Dittmar et al., 2003; 
Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2006; Ramirez and Tadesse, 2009; Al-Najjar and Clark, 2017). 
Nevertheless, there still remains to be a gap in the literature regarding the determinants of 
corporate cash holdings from a firm-level governance perspective, particularly in 
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developing countries. Recent studies have been calling for further academic inquiry into 
the effect of board characteristics, audit features and ownership structure on corporate cash 
holdings in developing economies (Al-Najjar, 2013; Rezaei and Saadati, 2015). Many 
academics agree that the effect of the agency theory on corporate cash holdings is more 
important in countries with poor corporate governance and weak shareholder protection 
(Dittmar et al., 2003; Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Kalcheva 
and Lins, 2007; Al-Najjar, 2013). Most of the cross country studies that include Egypt find 
that Egyptian companies have relatively large cash balances (Dittmat et al., 2003; Chang 
and Noorbakhsh, 2006; Ramirez and Tadesse, 2009). Due to poor corporate governance 
structures, weak shareholder protection and exceptionally large cash holdings, Egypt offers 
an ideal case of investigating the effect of the agency theory on corporate cash holdings. 
This study contributes to the existing literature by analysing the effect of the agency theory 
on corporate cash holdings in Egypt. 
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
Introduction 
This research aims to analyse the determinants of corporate cash holdings of firms listed on 
the Egyptian stock market. In doing so, the study tests hypotheses that are formulated 
based on the trade-off, pecking order and agency cost of free cash flow theories. According 
to the theories, the factors affecting the all-important cash holding decision can be either 
linked to firm specific financial determinants and/or corporate governance determinants. 
The first part of chapter 4 presents the philosophical underpinning of this research 
including discussion of ontology, epistemology and methodology. Then the chapter 
continues with an explanation of the research method used to analyse the determinants of 
corporate cash holdings. This is followed by a detailed discussion of all the variables used 
in the study in the context of the selected research models. Additionally, each variable is 
discussed in terms of the corresponding literature and the most appropriate measurement 
technique. The chapter proceeds with a discussion of the regression model assumptions 
and the necessary diagnostic testing. The regression estimators used to analyse the 
determinants of corporate cash holdings are further supported by the review of major 
studies in the cash holding literature. Finally, the sampling and data collection methods are 
presented in details. Accordingly, the chapter concludes by setting a procedure in order to 
ensure the most robust research design.   
4.1 Philosophical Underpinning  
The philosophical underpinning of a research is linked to the assumptions of how the 
researcher views the world. In order to design a comprehensive piece of research it is 
important to clearly identify what these assumptions are. The philosophical underpinning 
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then determines the methodology and methods to be used to answer the research question 
(Crotty, 1998).  
Ontology is a strand in philosophy that helps researchers define what is meant by objective 
reality and how they can search for it. Ontological assumptions are related to the essence of 
the phenomena under analysis, addressing questions about whether reality actually exists in 
the world or is just a product of human mind (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Epistemology on 
the other hand, is the relationship between the reality and the researcher. Once the two 
have been clearly defined, research methodology can be formulated in terms of quite 
specific techniques designed for effective study of the phenomenon in question (Sobh and 
Perry, 2006). The following section explains the different views to ontology, epistemology 
and methodology and specifically explains the philosophical underpinning of this research.  
4.1.1 Ontology (Objectivism)  
―Ontology is the study of being‖ (Crotty, 1998, p. 10). Ontology refers to issues 
concerning the nature of existence and reality. There are two opposing views on ontology, 
namely objectivism and subjectivism. Objectivism is also known as realism which is a 
concept of assuring that there is an objective reality outside the human mind regardless of 
individual perception. Burrell and Morgan (1979) state that realists perceive the social 
world as a real world that is tangible just like the natural world and not something that the 
individual creates. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009) define objectivism as the 
researcher‟s belief that social entities exist outside and independently of the social actors. 
They give an example of objectivism with reference to the discipline of business 
management. They explain that in organizations, people have clear job descriptions, rigid 
procedures and formal structures. This leads to the reporting process being very similar 
across all organizations.  
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The opposite view in ontology is subjectivism, which is based on the perception and 
actions of the social actors. Unlike realists, they do not acknowledge a real structure to the 
world and believe that external to individual perception, the social world merely consists of 
names, concepts and labels (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). This implication here is that 
people may interpret the same situation differently based on their own views of the world. 
Saunders et al. (2009) explain that in customer service, customers perceive reality 
differently and so there must be a dynamic interaction between the organization and its 
customers.  
The aim of this research is to analyse the determinants of corporate cash holdings. 
Objectivism ontology also referred to as realism, views that reality exists outside the 
human mind, regardless of individual perception. The determinants of corporate cash 
holdings are divided into two categories, namely firm specific financial determinants and 
corporate governance determinants. Firm specific financial determinants are financial 
ratios based on figures extracted from financial statements issued by corporations. These 
are actual figures based on objective facts that have actually occurred during the period 
under analysis. The corporate governance determinants are attributes that are based on 
actual figures of ownership structure and board of director‟s compositions. In both cases 
there is an existing reality of actual financial figures and corporate governance attributes 
representing facts and transactions regardless of human perception. This study confirms an 
objectivism ontological view as it analyses how the financial and corporate governance 
determinants can generate knowledge regarding the level of retained cash in corporations. 
After determining ontology, the next section describes the different views on epistemology 
and justifies the one followed in this research. 
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4.1.2 Epistemology (Positivism) 
Epistemology is a manner of understanding and explaining how we know what we know 
(Crotty, 1998). Epistemology is the establishment of the knowledge in a field (Saunders et 
al., 2009). The main two epistemological views are positivism and interpretivism. Under 
the positivistic view, researchers use resources and deal with observable social reality to 
develop hypotheses from the existing theory (Saunders et al., 2009). Positivists believe in 
existence of actual facts that occur due to cause and effect regardless of human ideas (Tuli, 
2010). For positivists, research is carried out to find scientific explanation (Tubey, Rotich 
and Bengat, 2015). Positivistic epistemology is consistent with realism in which the 
researcher discovers knowledge about an objective reality (Scotland, 2012).  
On the other hand, interpretivism suggests that humans are very different and interpret 
situations differently in the sense that reality is socially constructed and that individuals 
make their own sense of social realities (Tubey et al., 2015). Under interpretivism, 
researchers have to communicate with the social world and understand their unique 
perspectives (Saunders et al., 2009). Unlike positivists, they do not test hypotheses 
developed from existing theory. However, they believe that business situations occur as a 
result of humans interacting with these situations at a specific point in time. 
This research endeavours to discover knowledge about an objective reality, namely the 
factors affecting the level of cash held by companies in the research sample. Since this 
research is based on the objectivist philosophical underpinning, it is naturally connected to 
the positivist epistemology. This research develops hypotheses based on the existing and 
established theories taken from the cash holding literature. These theories are the trade-off, 
pecking order and agency cost of free cash flow theories. Actual facts are analysed in order 
to test the developed hypotheses (see chapter 2, section 2.8; and chapter 3, section 3.8) and 
provide evidence of the explanatory power of the theories in a specific context.  Under 
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positivism, statistical analysis of an accessible reality is used in order to generalize the 
sample based findings to the entire population (Sobh and Perry, 2006). Tubey et al. (2015) 
state that ontology and epistemology influence the determination of research methodology. 
They explain that ontology determines the methodology about the nature of reality and 
what should be studied. However, epistemology determines the methodology about the 
nature of knowledge or where it is to be found. Once the research methodology is clear, the 
research methods are determined which are the specific techniques used to answer the 
research questions and hypotheses under analysis. The following section discusses research 
methodology which later feeds into the specific research methods used to analyse the 
determinants of corporate cash holdings of firms listed on the Egyptian stock market. 
4.1.3 Methodology (Quantitative)  
Research methodology is the strategy used to determine the application of particular 
methods (Crotty, 1998). It deals with the reasons and strategies of gathering data and 
analysing it (Scotland, 2012). The main two research methodology paths are quantitative 
and qualitative, each prescribing a group of appropriate research methods. 
 Tuli (2010) explains that positivist researchers, who believe in facts outside the human 
mind, use quantitative data to explain relationships between variables or causes of events 
and outcomes. They claim that many researchers use statistical techniques that are based 
on direct observation for their analysis and produce inferential results. Quantitative 
research is referred to as a deductive approach because it tests existing theories. Tubey et 
al. (2015) state that quantitative researchers in social science believe that social 
observations should be treated as entities, similar to those in physical science. They 
confirm that quantitative researchers express assumptions that are consistent with positivist 
paradigm. 
126 
 
However, interpretive researchers usually use qualitative research methodologies (Tuli, 
2010). Qualitative research methodologies involve personal contact with the participants 
under analysis trying to deeply understand the research problem under consideration. 
Qualitative research is an inductive approach, which means it develops theories rather than 
testing existing ones. This approach deals more with discovery but has lower concern for 
generalizability compared to the quantitative approach (Tubey et al., 2015). Qualitative 
researchers (Interpretivists) deal with reality as a matter that is subjective by individuals 
(Tubey et al., 2015). The following table illustrates a comparison between quantitative and 
qualitative research methodologies. 
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Table 4. 1 : Comparison between Quantitative and Qualitative Research 
Methodologies 
 Quantitative Methodology Qualitative Methodology  
Nature Objective Subjective 
Theory Tests Theory (Deductive) Develops Theory (Inductive) 
Purpose Establishing relationships and 
causation 
Describing meaning and discovery 
Testing Hypotheses Research Questions 
Literature 
Review 
Conducted early in study Conducted as study progresses or 
afterwards 
Reality One (Narrow Focus) Multiple (Broad Focus) 
Facts Unbiased Biased 
Data 
Collection 
Use Subjects and instruments Use Participants, communications and 
observation 
Sample Size Concern Not a concern 
Setting Highly Controlled Flexible 
Context Free Dependent 
Strives for Generalizability Uniqueness 
Source: Tubey et al. (2015) 
This research analyses the determinants of corporate cash holdings of listed companies in 
Egypt. Tubey et al. (2015, p.226) states that: 
―The positivist research paradigm underpins quantitative methodology owing to its 
deductive nature‖.  
Based on an objectivist ontological approach and positivistic epistemology, this study uses 
quantitative research methodology. Under the positivist paradigm, an objective research 
methodology is required because the target is to measure variables and test hypotheses that 
occur due to causal explanations (Tubey et al., 2015). The theoretical underpinning of this 
research is based on determinants suggested by the trade-off, pecking order and agency 
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theories. A quantitative approach is used because this study aims on testing existing 
theories instead of developing new ones. As mentioned in the literature review, each theory 
deals with a set of determinants with expectations on their effects on cash holdings.  
Positivists use data collection techniques that involve collecting number data to present 
hard evidence in a quantitative form (Tubey et al., 2015). The determinants of cash 
holdings consist of financial determinants based on financial ratios extracted from financial 
statements and corporate governance variables extracted from disclosure reports. This data 
is historical secondary data mostly based on scalar measurable values. The quantitative 
data used in this study is based on direct observation of actual facts resulting in knowledge 
about the level of retained cash in Egyptian corporations. The results of this study will 
explain how the selected theories explain the all-important cash holding decisions of a 
sample of Egyptian listed firms and seek for generalization among all firms listed on the 
Egyptian stock market. Tubey et al. (2015) state that positivist researchers explain how 
variables interact, shape events and cause outcomes in quantitative terms. They highlight 
that the most common contributions for quantitative research are multivariate analysis and 
techniques for statistical prediction. The specific research method used in this research is 
multivariate regression analysis which is discussed in details in the following sections.  
4.1.4 Research Methods 
The research methods are the specific techniques used to answer a research question or 
hypothesis under consideration. These techniques include data collection procedures and 
analysis (Crotty, 1998). In order to adequately measure the determinants of corporate cash 
holdings in relation to firms listed on the Egyptian stock market, panel data will be 
collected. Here, the observations include time series and cross sectional units. Panel data 
give more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among variables and more 
efficiency (Baltagi, 2005). Based on the theoretical underpinning of this research addressed 
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in the previous sections, a quantitative research approach is used to test evidence of the 
trade-off, pecking order and agency theories that impact corporate cash holdings. In a 
quantitative research approach data analysis is carried out using statistical techniques and 
mathematical operations (Tubey et al., 2015). As is the case in the vast majority of studies 
on the subject matter, multivariate regression analysis is used to analyse the determinants 
of corporate cash holdings. The next section presents the research model and explains the 
variable calculations in details. However, before commencing the discussion on regression 
analysis and the presentation of the research model, the theoretical underpinning is 
summarized in table 4.2 in order to differentiate between research approaches. The table 
highlights the quantitative approach used in this study which is underpinned by 
objectivist/realist ontology and positivistic epistemology. 
Table 4. 2 : Research Approach used in this study 
Philosophical Underpinning  Quantitative Approach 
(Used in this study) 
Qualitative Approach 
Ontology Objectivism/ Realism Subjectivism 
Epistemology Positivism Interpretivism 
Research Methodology Quantitative Qualitative 
Research Methods Statistical techniques  
Multivariate Regression  
Non-numerical techniques 
 
4.2 Multivariate Regression 
According to previous research on corporate cash holdings, multivariate regression is an 
appropriate method to analyse the determinants of corporate cash holdings, be it on firm or 
country level (see appendix 2). In order to analyse and test the hypotheses previously 
formulated, two regression models are constructed. This section discusses model 
130 
 
specification and presents the research models. It also provides detailed identification of 
each variable used in the models.  
4.2.1 Cash Holdings 
In order to analyse the determinants of corporate cash holdings, the dependent variable for 
the model is the firm‟s cash holdings measured using the natural logarithm of the cash 
ratio. The cash ratio is computed as cash and equivalents over the book value of assets less 
cash and equivalents. Dittmar et al. (2003) explain that the reason for removing cash from 
assets in the denominator is because a firm‟s profitability is mainly related to assets in 
place and cash should be measured relative to this base. However, Bates et al. (2009) state 
that using assets less cash and equivalents in the denominator causes the problem of 
extreme outlier for firms with most of their assets in cash. They suggest that using the 
natural logarithm of the ratio decreases this problem. Logarithmic functions bring numbers 
closer together along the number line decreasing the problem of extreme outliers. Drobetz 
and Grüninger (2007) also use the natural logarithm of the cash ratio because using the 
natural logarithm of a ratio is one way to reduce the problem of non-normal panel data. 
This ratio is used by many key studies on the determinants of cash holdings such as Opler 
et al. (1999), Dittmar et al. (2003), Kusnadi (2011), Gao et al. (2013) and Locorotondo et 
al. (2014).  Even though Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and Saddour 
(2006) use the cash ratio without the natural logarithm, the natural logarithm is preferred 
because it normalizes the data and reduces the problem of extreme outliers. 
4.2.2 Firm Specific Variables  
Based on the trade-off, pecking order and agency cost of free cash flow theories, the 
independent variables in the model correspond to firm specific characteristics that have an 
impact on corporate cash holdings.  
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Dividend Payment is measured through a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm pays 
dividends and zero if it does not. If the value of one is given to a company in a certain year 
it means that the company paid out dividends to its investors in that year, if it is given a 
value of zero then the company did not pay dividends in that year (Opler et al., 1999; 
Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Guney et al., 2007; Kusnadi, 2011; 
Iskandar-Datta and Jia, 2012; Wu et al., 2012; Masood and Shah, 2014). Al-Najjar (2013) 
uses the dividend pay-out ratio to measure dividend payments. Drobetz and Grüninger 
(2007) measure dividend using both dividend dummy and dividend yield but find no 
significant relationship between dividends and cash holdings when dividends are measured 
using dividend yield.  
Investment Opportunity is a measure used to capture the firm‟s investment opportunities. 
The market-to-book ratio is used as a proxy for a firm‟s investment opportunities (Smith 
and Watts, 1992). The market-to-book ratio is estimated through dividing the market value 
of assets over the book value of assets. The market value of assets in the numerator is 
computed as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value 
of equity (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). The book value of assets in the denominator 
represents assets in place (Smith and Watts, 1992). A relatively high market-to-book ratio 
shows a relatively high market value of assets in relation to the book value of assets for a 
firm, indicating that it has more investment opportunities ahead. Even though Kusnadi 
(2011) measure investment opportunity using sales growth, similar results are reported 
when trying to measure investment opportunity using the market to book ratio. Opler et al. 
(1999), Dittmar et al. (2003), Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), 
Saddour (2006), Guney et al. (2007), Harford et al. (2008), Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) 
and Wu et al. (2012) all use the market-to-book ratio to measure firm‟s investment 
opportunities. 
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Liquid Asset Substitutes measures the company‟s liquidity through the net working capital 
to assets ratio (Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; 
Harford et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2012; Gao et al., 2013; Locorotondo et al., 2014). The net 
working capital to assets ratio is calculated as current assets minus total cash and 
equivalent minus current liabilities over the total book value of assets minus cash and 
equivalents. Other measures of liquidity such as the current ratio or acid test ratio are not 
used because they are static ratios at a given point in time. However, the net working 
capital measures the firm‟s on-going liquidity.  
Leverage is computed using the debt to assets ratio which represents the percentage of the 
company‟s assets that are financed through debt rather than equity. It is calculated as total 
debt over total assets less cash and equivalents according to Opler et al. (1999), Ferreira 
and Vilela (2004), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Saddour (2006) and Harford et al. (2008). If 
the ratio is relatively high, it indicates that the company is depending more on borrowing 
rather than using internal resources.  
Firm Size measures the size of the company through the natural logarithm of total assets 
(Opler et al., 1999; Dittmar et al., 2003; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ozkan and Ozkan, 
2004; Kusnadi, 2011; Saddour, 2006; Harford et al., 2008; Iskandar-Datta and Jia, 2012; 
Wu et al., 2012; Locorotondo et al., 2014; Masood and Shah, 2014).  
Cash Flow is estimated using the cash flow to assets ratio (Opler et al., 1999; Dittmar et 
al., 2003; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Masood and Shah, 2014). Cash flow is measured 
using firm‟s cash flow from its income statement by calculating the after tax profit, but 
depreciation is added back because it is a non-cash expense.  
Cash Flow Volatility measures the uncertainty of cash flows by calculating the standard 
deviation of the cash flow ratio mentioned above for the period of the study (Opler et al., 
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1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Saddour, 2006; Guney et al., 2007; Harford et al., 2008; 
Chen et al., 2014; Locorotondo et al., 2014). 
Debt Maturity measures the maturity of borrowed funds. It is measured by calculating the 
total debt after deducting the short term debt. If the ratio is relatively high, this indicates 
higher dependence on long term debt (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Wu et al., 2012). 
Capital Expenditure measures a firm‟s investment in fixed assets. It is calculated as the 
change in fixed assets plus depreciation over total assets (Opler et al., 1999; Dittmar et al., 
2003; Guney et al., 2007; Harford et al., 2008; Iskandar-Datta and Jia, 2012; Wu et al., 
2012; Gao et al., 2013). 
4.2.3 Corporate Governance Variables  
Based on the agency cost of free cash flow theory, the independent variables in the second 
model correspond to corporate governance variables that have an impact on corporate cash 
holdings. These variables are divided into three main categories, namely ownership 
structure, board characteristics and audit quality. 
The first variable under ownership structure is Insider Ownership, also known as 
managerial ownership which represents the percentage of managers that are also owners in 
the company. Harford et al. (2008) measure insider ownership as the ratio of top-five 
insider holdings of common stocks. However, Masood and Shah (2014) use the percentage 
of director‟s ownership to the total number of shares outstanding. Due to data availability 
in Egypt, the ratio used in this study is the percentage of outstanding shares held by 
insiders, similar to the measurement used by Masood and Shah (2014). 
The second variable under ownership structure is Institutional Ownership which is 
measured as the ratio of shares that institutions own in the firm divided by the total number 
of shares outstanding (Harford et al., 2008; Kuan et al., 2011; Kuan et al., 2012). 
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The third variable under ownership structure is Government Ownership which is computed 
by the ratio of shares held by the government of Egypt divided by the total number of 
shares outstanding. In a similar sense, Megginson et al. (2014) measure state ownership as 
the percentage of shares owned by the state and managed by the state management 
authority in China. Even though Wu et al. (2012) measure state ownership using a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm is controlled by the government and zero otherwise, the 
percentage of government ownership is a more comprehensive measure.  
Moving on to board characteristics, the first variable used is Board size. Following the 
technique used by Harford et al. (2008), Board Size is measured by the number of directors 
on the board over the natural logarithm of total assets. Other studies such as Chen and 
Chuang (2009) and Kusnadi (2011) measure board size as the natural logarithm of the total 
number of directors in the board without taking assets into consideration. Kuan et al. 
(2011) and Ullah and Kamal (2017) measure board size using just the total number of 
directors on the board. However, Harford et al. (2008) divide the number of directors on 
the board by the natural logarithm of total assets to avoid any correlation between board 
size and firm size. For this reason the method used by Harford et al. (2008) is preferred.  
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Harford et al. (2008), Chen and Chuang (2009), Kuan et al. (2011), Kusnadi (2011), Kuan 
et al. (2012) and Boubaker and Derouiche (2015) all measure Board Independence using 
the ratio of non-executive independent directors to total directors. Chen and Chuang (2009) 
define outside directors as non-executives having no personal relationship with current or 
past executives. Since independent directors are not reported in Egypt, this study will be 
computing this ratio as non-executive directors to total directors. The ratio of non-
executive directors is used in previous cash holding literature by Belghitar and Khan 
(2013) and Ullah and Kamal (2017). In this study, the percentage of non-executive 
directors is used as a proxy for board independence.  
The third variable regarding board characteristics is CEO-Chairman Duality. This ratio is 
used to determine if the chairman of the board is also the company‟s Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO). CEO duality is measured using a dummy variable set to one if the chairman 
of the board is also the CEO and zero otherwise (Kusnadi, 2011; Kuan et al., 2011; Kuan 
et al., 2011). 
The fourth variable regarding board characteristics is the percentage of women on the 
board to measure the extent of board gender diversity. This ratio is calculated as the 
number of women on the board divided by the total number of directors on the board. Even 
though Ullah and Kamal (2017) use a dummy variable set to one if the company has a 
female director and zero otherwise, the percentage of women on the board is a more 
detailed and comprehensive measure. The percentage of women on the board is also used 
by Loukil and Yousfi (2016). 
The final corporate governance variable is audit quality which is a dummy variable set to 1 
if the company‟s audit firm is one of the big four audit firms in a given year and zero 
otherwise (Kusnadi, 2005). 
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4.2.4 Control Variables 
Control Variables for year and industry are applied. Yearly dummies are used to control 
for macroeconomic events (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Yearly dummies have been used by 
most major studies such as Opler et al. (1999), Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Drobetz and 
Grüninger (2007), Bates et al. (2009), Kusnadi (2011), Chen et al. (2014), Kusnadi (2015) 
and Al-Najjar and Clark (2017). Industry dummies are used to control for differences in 
cash holdings across industries which may not be accounted for by the other variables in 
the model (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Industry dummies have been applied by Opler et al. 
(1999), Dittmar et al. (2003), Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Chang 
and Noorbakhsh (2006), Guney et al. (2007), Bates et al. (2009), Kusnadi (2011), Chen et 
al. (2014), Kusnadi (2015) and Al-Najjar and Clark (2017). The industry dummies are 
based on the Egyptian Stock Market Industry classification 
(http://www.egx.com.eg/English/ListedStocks.aspx). 
As shown in the regression models in the next section, this research relies on firm specific 
characteristics and corporate governance structures as independent variables and corporate 
cash holdings as the dependent variable. The first research model includes firm 
characteristic variables and the second model includes the same variables with the addition 
of corporate governance ones. 
4.2.5 Research Models 
The following equations show the two research models. Research model 1 incorporates 
firm specific variables. Research model 2 includes both firm specific variables and 
corporate governance variables together. Both models include control variables for year 
and industry. 
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Model 1 
CASH i,t  = β0 i,t  + β1 DIV i,t  + β2 INVEST i,t  + β3 LIQ i,t  + β4 LEV i,t  + β5 SIZE i,t  + β6 CF 
i,t  +β7 VOL i,t  + β8 DEBTMAT i,t  + β9 CAPEX i,t  + Ʃdt YEAR t + Ʃek INDUSTRY k + μ i,t  
                                                                                                                                        (4-1) 
                    
Model 2 
CASH i,t  = β0 i,t  + β1 DIV i,t  + β2 INVEST i,t  + β3 LIQ i,t  + β4 LEV i,t  + β5 SIZE i,t  + β6 CF 
i,t  +β7 VOL i,t  + β8 DEBTMAT i,t  + β9 CAPEX i,t +  β10 INSIDER i,t + β11 INST i,t + β12 GOV 
+ β13 BOARDSIZE i,t  + β14 BOARDINDEP i,t  + β15 DUAL i,t  + β16 WOMEN + β17 AUDIT 
+ Ʃdt YEAR t + Ʃek INDUSTRY k + μ i,t                                                                           (4-2)                                                                                                                        
 
 
Where: 
CASH i,t is the cash holdings for firm i at period t 
DIV i,t  is the dividend payments 
INVEST i,t  is the investment opportunity 
LIQ i,t  is the liquid asset substitutes 
LEV i,t  is the leverage 
SIZE i,t  is the firm size 
CF i,t  is the cash flow ratio 
VOL i,t  is the cash flow volatility 
DEBTMAT i,t  is the debt maturity  
CAPEX i,t  is the capital expenditure ratio  
INSIDER i,t is the insider ownership 
INST i,t is the institutional ownership 
GOV i,tis the government ownership 
BOARDSIZE i,t is the board size 
BOARDINDEP i,t is the board independence 
DUAL i,t is the CEO-Chairman duality 
WOMEN it is the women on the board 
AUDIT it is the audit quality 
Ʃdt YEAR t are the yearly dummies 
Ʃek INDUSTRY k are the industry dummies 
μ i,t  is the error term 
4.2.6 Variable Description and Calculations 
The variables tabulated below are used to analyse the determinants of corporate cash 
holdings. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the cash ratio which is used as 
a proxy for cash holdings. The independent variables correspond to firm specific 
characteristics and corporate governance variables. Table 4.3 shows the firm specific 
variables and their established measurement techniques. A summary of the literature 
review findings regarding the discussed financial determinants is presented in appendix 1a. 
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Table 4. 3 : Firm Specific Variables 
Firm Specific Variables 
Dependent Variable  
Variable  Measurement Variable 
Type 
References 
Cash 
Holdings 
Natural Logarithm of Cash 
Ratio= cash and cash equivalents/ 
book value of assets less cash and 
equivalents 
Continuous 
Variable 
(Ratio) 
Opler et al. (1999) 
Dittmar et al. (2003)  
Drobetz and Grüninger (2007) 
Kusnadi (2011) 
Gao et al. (2013) 
Locorotondo et al. (2014) 
Independent Variables  
Variable  Measurement Variable 
Type 
References 
Dividend 
Payments 
Dummy variable that is set to one 
if the firm paid dividends in the 
year under consideration and zero 
if it did not in that year 
Dummy 
Variable 
Opler et al. (1999) 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) 
Guney et al. (2007) 
Kusnadi (2011) 
Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) 
Wu et al. (2012) 
Masood and Shah (2014) 
Investment 
Opportunity 
Market-to-book ratio = book 
value of assets – the book value 
of equity + the market value of 
equity/ the book value of assets 
Continuous 
Variable 
(Ratio) 
Opler et al. (1999) 
Dittmar et al. (2003) 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) 
Saddour (2006) 
Guney et al. (2007) 
Harford et al. (2008) 
Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) 
Wu et al. (2012) 
Guizani (2017) 
Liquid Asset 
Substitutes 
Net working capital to assets ratio 
= Current assets – total cash and 
equivalents – current liabilities/ 
the total book value of assets – 
cash and equivalents 
Continuous 
Variable 
(Ratio) 
Opler et al. (1999) 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) 
Harford et al. (2008) 
Wu et al. (2012) 
Gao et al. (2013) 
Locorotondo et al. (2014) 
Leverage Total debt/ total assets – cash and 
equivalents 
Continuous 
Variable 
(Ratio) 
Opler et al. (1999) 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) 
Saddour (2006) 
Harford et al. (2008) 
Firm Size Natural logarithm of total assets Continuous 
Variable 
(Ratio) 
Opler et al. (1999) 
Dittmar et al. (2003) 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) 
Saddour (2006) 
Harford et al. (2008) 
Kusnadi (2011) 
Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) 
Wu et al. (2012) 
Locorotondo et al. (2014) 
Masood and Shah (2014) 
Al-Najjar and Clark (2017) 
Guizani (2017) 
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Table 4.3: Firm Specific Variables (Continued)  
Variable  Measurement Variable Type References 
Cash Flow 
Ratio 
 
Cash flow to assets = Net income 
+ depreciation/ total assets 
 
Continuous 
Variable 
(Ratio) 
Opler et al. (1999) 
Dittmar et al. (2003) 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) 
Masood and Shah (2014)  
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
 
Cash flow uncertainty = Standard 
deviation of the cash flow ratio 
Continuous 
Variable 
(Ratio) 
Opler et al. (1999) 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) 
Saddour (2006) 
Guney et al. (2007) 
Harford et al. (2008) 
Chen et al. (2014) 
Locorotondo et al. (2014) 
Guizani (2017) 
Debt 
Maturity 
Total debt – debt repayable in 
less than one year/ total debt 
Continuous 
Variable 
(Ratio) 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) 
Wu et al. (2012) 
Capital 
Expenditure 
 
Capital expenditure to assets = 
Change in fixed assets + 
depreciation/ total assets 
Continuous 
Variable 
(Ratio) 
Opler et al. (1999) 
Dittmar et al. (2003) 
Guney et al. (2007) 
Harford et al. (2008) 
Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) 
Wu et al. (2012) 
Gao et al. (2013) 
 
The second set of variables is used to measure the effect of corporate governance structures 
on cash holdings. They are divided into variables measuring ownership structure, variables 
measuring board characteristics and a variable measuring audit quality. Table 4.4 shows 
the corporate governance variables and their established measurement techniques. A 
summary of the literature review findings regarding the discussed corporate governance 
determinants is presented in appendix 1b. 
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Table 4. 4: Corporate Governance Variables 
Ownership Structure  
Variable Measurement Variable Type References 
Insider 
Ownership 
Percentage of outstanding 
shares held by insiders 
Continuous 
Variable 
(Ratio) 
Masood and Shah (2014) 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Percentage of outstanding 
shares held by institutions 
Continuous 
Variable 
(Ratio) 
Harford et al. (2008) 
Kuan et al. (2011)  
Kuan et al. (2012) 
Government 
Ownership 
Percentage of outstanding 
shares held by the 
government of Egypt 
Continuous 
Variable 
(Ratio) 
Megginson et al. (2014) 
Board Characteristics 
Variable Measurement Variable Type References 
Board Size  Number of directors on the 
board/ natural logarithm of 
total assets  
Continuous 
Variable 
(Ratio) 
Harford et al. (2008) 
 
Board 
Independence 
Non-executive directors on 
the board/ total directors on 
the board 
Continuous 
Variable 
(Ratio) 
Belghitar and Khan (2013) 
Ullah and Kamal (2017) 
CEO-
Chairman 
Duality 
Dummy variable that is set to 
one if the chairman of the 
board is also the CEO for the 
year under consideration and 
zero other wise 
Dummy 
Variable 
Kusnadi (2011)  
Kuan et al. (2011) 
Kuan et al. (2012) 
Boubaker and Derouiche (2015) 
Percentage of 
Women on 
the Board 
Women directors on the 
board/ total directors on the 
board 
Continuous 
Variable 
(Ratio) 
Loukil and Yousfi (2016) 
Audit 
Variable Measurement Variable Type Reference 
Audit Quality Dummy variable that is set to 
one if the company auditor is 
one of the BIG FOUR audit 
firms for the year under 
consideration and zero 
otherwise. 
Dummy 
Variable 
Kusnadi (2005) 
 
4.3 Regression Assumptions and Diagnostic Testing 
Regression is a widely used method when it comes to testing theory. To be able to 
formulate a regression model, important decisions such as model specification and model 
estimation must be made. Model specification deals with decisions relating to independent 
variables and importantly, how they should be represented in the model. On the other hand, 
model estimation deals with different ways in which the model can be estimated. Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression despite its almost ubiquitous use is only one of many 
estimators that could be obtained. Nevertheless, OLS is the most commonly used estimator 
in the cash holding literature (see appendix 2). OLS is commonly used because if the 
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assumptions of the Gauss-Markov Theorem are satisfies, OLS ensures that the result is in 
fact the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE). In this section, the Gauss-Markov 
Theorem assumptions are evaluated. The Gauss-Markov assumptions are considered 
below: 
4.3.1 Assumption 1: Sum of Error Terms must Equal to Zero  
OLS draws a line of best fit to a set of data points to minimize the sum of least squares. The 
first assumption for OLS linear regression is that the average value of the error terms must 
equal to zero. However, if the regression model has a constant term included, then this 
assumption will never be violated (Brooks, 2008). This assumption is only a problem in 
regression lines with no intercept parameter and hence those lines are forced to run through 
the origin. This could lead to severe biases in the slope coefficient estimates (Brooks, 
2008). In the analysis of corporate cash holdings there will always be an intercept because 
even when all independent variables are equal to zero, the dependent variable cash i,t will 
still have a value because companies will at least hold a minimum amount of cash for daily 
operations. 
4.3.2 Assumption 2: Variance of Error Terms are Homoscedastic  
The second assumption requires that the variance of the error terms in a regression model 
should be homoscedastic. This means that the variance of the distribution of the errors 
should be constant. If the variance of errors increases systematically with the increase in 
any given independent variable, then the problem of heteroscedasticity must be addressed.  
The problem of heteroscedasticity appears when the error terms are not constant and not 
random around the line of best fit. The regression line may be fitted correctly, yet the error 
terms may increase or decrease as the independent variable increases in value. In such a 
case, parts of the regression line that have lower variance in the error terms will be closer 
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to the true regression line. These low variance points are considerably more informative 
than other points which have errors that are distant from the line. These informative low 
variance points should be given a larger weight than the high variance points. The problem 
with OLS is that it gives equal weights to all data points.  
If the problem of heteroscedasticity exists in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression then 
its estimators are not the Best Linear Unbiased Estimators (BLUE) (Brooks, 2008). 
Heteroscedasticity can be measured using the White‟s test. If the test shows significant 
results, then there is a problem of heteroscedasticity. The advantages of the White‟s test are 
that it is a non-parametric test that does not require knowledge of the exact form of 
heteroscedasticity and it does not require normality of the errors. For these reasons, the 
White‟s test is recommended in most cases as it is more robust that other tests for 
heteroscedasticity. The White‟s test is based on the null hypothesis that the variance is 
constant. If the results show a large t-statistic then the null hypothesis is accepted 
indicating that the errors are homoscedastic. If the test shows significant results, then there 
is a problem of heteroscedasticity. Reasons behind the problem of heteroscedasticity are 
discussed in the following section. 
4.3.2.1 Reasons for Heteroscedasticity 
Since this study is mostly dealing with firm specific financial ratios, the variables in 
question are predominantly scalar values. This is one of the possible reasons behind the 
problem of heteroscedasticity. For example, a large size company may have a large 
variance in cash holdings just because it has the option of holding cash or spending it. 
However, a small sized company can only afford to hold limited amounts of cash, thus the 
variance in its cash holdings will be limited. In a large data set that comprises of different 
sized companies, it is reasonable to assume that firm size will be positively correlated with 
the variance in cash holdings. This assumption, if true, increases the risk of 
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heteroscedasticity. One very important control procedure that is already observed to avoid 
such variances in errors between companies relates to model specification where cash 
holdings and firm size variables are both measured in terms of natural logarithm functions. 
The natural logarithm brings numbers closer together along the number line to avoid 
significant differences in scale variables. When the numbers are brought closer together 
they will be better fitted along the regression line. Using logarithmic forms decreases 
heteroscedasticity because the numbers will show smaller variances in the residuals. 
Another very common reason for the presence of heteroscedasticity in a regression model 
is incorrect model specification. There are two main reasons behind this. The first relates to 
the problem of omitted variables in the model. There are many factors that account for 
changes in corporate cash holdings and so it may be possible for some variables to be 
omitted. The second reason behind model misspecification arises from incorrect variable 
transformations. The two variables that are presented in natural logarithm forms in this 
model are the cash holdings and firm size. They are calculated as logarithmic functions and 
this is consistent with major studies such as Opler et al. (1999) and Dittmar et al. (2003). 
For this reason, variable transformation should not be a problem in this particular model. 
The Ramsey (1969) RESET test is commonly used to test for functional form 
misspecification (Brooks, 2008). 
Similar to reasons that cause heteroscedasticity by an increase in the variance of error 
terms, there are also valid and equally important reasons that may cause heteroscedasticity 
by a decrease in the variance of error terms through time. One reason for the latter is that 
the learning curve of some companies may improve over time and so the variance in error 
terms decreases. Another reason that may cause the variance of the error terms to decrease 
is the improvement in data collection techniques by time due to factors like technology 
advancement. These reasons are not considered as applicable to this particular study since 
144 
 
it is dealing with financial data of listed companies. These companies are expected to be 
mostly mature companies with reliable audited and published annual reports. 
Another reason for heteroscedasticity is the presence of outliers in the data set due to 
possible major events. If outliers occur frequently as to cause the change in the entire 
distribution of the data, then heteroscedasticity may appear. However, random outliers that 
occur merely due to chance are not a problem. Outliers are a common issue in corporate 
finance research. Therefore, the data for this sample will be checked against outliers. A 
common method used by major studies such as Dittmar et al. (2003), Bates et al. (2009) 
and Kusnadi et al. (2015) to deal with outliers is winsorizing. Winsorizing creates a new 
variable almost exactly similar to the original one, but giving outliers a lower weight by 
bringing the extreme observations closer to the defined percentile.  
If heteroscedasticity is present due to magnitude and frequency of the outliers it is not 
preferable to use ordinary least squares regression. OLS minimizes the sum of least squares 
and importantly squares the estimated errors giving them a greater weight. Outliers are data 
points with significant error terms, thus when the errors are squared they exert a 
disproportionately strong influence on the OLS estimator. Under such circumstances, it is 
more appropriate to use another estimator. 
4.3.2.2 Dealing with Heteroscedasticity 
As mentioned before, the problem of heteroscedasticity appears when the variance of the 
error terms change with the increase in the independent variables. In this case, there will be 
certain data points that have variances that are considerably closer to the regression line 
than others. The points with variances close to the true regression line are more accurate 
and informative than their high variance counterparts. The problem with OLS is that it 
gives all data points equal weights. 
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As the White‟s test is used to test for presence of heteroscedasticity, it is also used as a 
correction tool. In order to fix the problem of heteroscedasticity in OLS, the independent 
variable X should be divided by its variance. If the variance is low, then X will thus be 
given a higher weight. However, if the variance is high, then X will be given a lower 
weight. Therefore, in order to address heteroscedasticity problems White‟s robust standard 
errors are commonly used. 
4.3.3 Assumption 3: Error Terms are Uncorrelated  
The third assumption requires random error terms to be uncorrelated with one another. If 
this assumption does not hold then there is a problem of autocorrelation, existence of 
which indicates that ordinary least squares estimator is not the most appropriate.  
Autocorrelation can be tested using the Durbin Watson test. The test assumes that the 
errors of time t-1 and t are independent of each other (Brooks, 2008). Test results vary 
between zero and four. If the Durbin Watson Statistic (d-statistic) is two then there is no 
autocorrelation problem. However, if the test gives a result of zero then there is perfect 
positive autocorrelation and if it gives a result of four then there is perfect negative 
autocorrelation.  
One of the criticisms of the Durbin Watson (DW) test is that it only diagnoses first-order 
serial correlation. If the error t is correlated to error t-1 it will be easily determined by the 
DW test. However, if error t is related to error t-2 or t-3 for example, then the test is not fit 
for the purpose. In this case, it is necessary to use the Breusch-Godfrey LM test. If the 
probability calculated by the test is very low, this indicates that the null hypothesis (that 
there is no serial correlation) must be rejected. In this case, the significant test results 
confirm that there is a problem of autocorrelation.  
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4.3.3.1 Reasons for Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation is of significantly greater concern in time series data. The presence of 
autocorrelation in a sample is an indication that the error terms of previous years and the 
error term of current year are correlated. Since the sample comprises of listed companies, 
which by definition comply with the listing requirements, they are reasonably expected to 
be at the mature stage of their life cycle. Such companies usually experience smooth 
changes in their financial variables over time rather than random significant ones.  
As an example, the capital structure choice of a listed company is not a random decision. 
The leverage ratio of a listed company would not be expected to change significantly year 
on year. For instance, the leverage ratio of 2013 is expected to be positively influenced by 
the changes in the leverage ratio of 2012. This implies that the error term in 2012 and the 
error term in 2013 are related. This indicates a problem of autocorrelation. Autocorrelation 
is a very common problem in corporate finance. As far as this research is concerned, the 
dependent variable is the cash ratio. Cash is a permanent account from a company‟s 
balance sheet which brings high expectations of autocorrelation. 
4.3.3.2 Dealing with Autocorrelation 
A common approach to deal with autocorrelation is through using Newey-West standard 
errors. If there is serial correlation and it is unspecified, then the model will be estimated 
assuming uncorrelated errors and as a result standard error will be incorrect. Newey-West 
takes into account that the errors are serially correlated. The Newey-West approach 
produces heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors (Brooks, 2008). 
Similarly, another approach to deal with autocorrelation is using Driscoll-Kraay standard 
errors. The Driscoll-Kraay approach produces standard errors that are robust to general 
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types of spatial and temporal dependence (Baltagi, 2005). This means that Driscoll-Kraay 
deals with both time series and cross sectional correlation.  
Another common way to solve the autocorrelation problem is through adding a Lagged 
Dependent Variable (LDV) as an independent variable. In case of the model in this study, 
for each year where the dependent variable is CASH i,t, a new independent variable would 
be generated and added to the model as CASH i,t-1 representing the cash ratio of the 
previous year.  
―Lagged Dependent Variables (LDVs) are frequently used as a robust strategy to eliminate 
autocorrelation in the residuals and to model dynamic data generating processes‖ 
(Wilkins 2014, p.1).  
Keele and Kelly (2006) cited in Wilkins (2014) state that excluding lagged dependent 
variables may cause omitted variable bias. However, Achen‟s (2000) cited in Wilkins 
(2014) argues that when there is autocorrelation, adding LDVs to a regression model may 
create biased coefficient estimates.  
4.3.4 Assumption 4: The Independent Variables are Non-stochastic 
This assumption requires that the independent variables of the model must not be randomly 
chosen. The determinants of corporate cash holdings have been analysed before in other 
contexts so this assumption is not violated in this study. The independent variables of the 
model are very carefully selected based on existing theories. If the lagged cash holdings 
variable is introduced to the model then it will be considered as a random variable and thus 
the assumption will be violated. However, the lagged cash ratio has been introduced in 
previous studies such as Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) in order to measure the speed of 
adjustment towards the target cash ratio. Nevertheless, when the lagged cash ratio is 
introduced to the model it is inappropriate to use OLS. This issue will be discussed in more 
details in section 4.6.1. Even if the independent variables are stochastic, OLS is still 
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regarded as consistent and unbiased provided assumption 1 (the sum of error terms are 
equal to zero) holds true (Brooks, 2008). 
4.3.5 Assumption 5: The Disturbances are Normally Distributed  
In order to test the hypotheses a normality assumption is required. A normal distribution 
involves data that are normally distributed and symmetric about its mean. Skewness 
measures how much the data is not symmetric around the mean and kurtosis measures the 
fatness of the tail of the distributions (Brooks, 2008). Normality can be measured using the 
Shapiro-Wilk test which gives significant results if the data is not normal. Brooks (2008, 
p.3) state that: 
―Financial data are almost always not normally distributed in spite of the fact that most 
techniques in econometrics assume that they are‖.  
The importance of normality decreases as the sample size increases. This means that in a 
large sample analysis, the normality condition is somewhat relaxed.  
4.3.6 Assumption 6: There is no Perfect Multicollinearity between 
Independent Variables  
When multivariate ordinary least squares regression is used, an additional assumption is 
made that the independent variables are not correlated with one another. This Gauss-
Markov assumption states that there should not be perfect multicollinearity between the 
independent variables. The assumption is not really violated as long as there is no perfect 
correlation between any two variables. However, when there is imperfect multicollinearity, 
OLS may still work albeit with possible problems within the regression model. If the 
problem of multicollinearity between independent variables exists, then the regression 
model may show a high R
2 
value with individual variables failing to register significance 
(Brooks, 2008).  
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Solutions to multicollinearity can be ignoring it if the model is accurate, dropping one of 
the highly correlated variables, transforming one of the highly correlated variables or 
alternatively increasing the sample size. Multicollinearity can be measured by a correlation 
matrix or the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test. Studenmund (2014) explains that there 
is no formal table to determine the critical point for VIF results and that a rule of thumb 
states that greater than 5 βi is considered severe multicollinearity. When the number of 
independent variables increases, this value can increase (Studenmund, 2014). Since the 
number of independent variables is large in this research, the threshold used is only up to 
10 as an acceptable level of multicollinearity for the VIF test. Generally, the level of 
multicollinearity is expected to decrease as the sample size increases. Therefore, with 
larger sample data multicollinearity is of a significantly lower concern.  
4.3.7 Assumption 7: Independent Variables and Error Terms are 
Uncorrelated 
This assumption is particularly important in time series data. Independent variables and the 
error term must be uncorrelated for OLS to be BLUE. When independent variables and the 
error term are uncorrelated, independent variables are known to be strictly exogenous. In a 
regression equation, every change in the independent variable X causes a change in the 
dependent variable Y. If the independent variable X is correlated with the error term U, 
then every change in X will cause a change in U. In such case, the change in the dependent 
variable Y will be due to changes in both X and U. This is clearly misleading. In other 
words, when the independent variables are related to their error terms, known as the 
endogeneity problem, the results are biased making it very difficult to estimate the true 
value of the dependent variable. The Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimator is an 
extension to OLS in order to address the problem of endogeneity using an instrumental 
variable approach (Wooldridge, 2009). In this case, endogeneity is solved by adding 
150 
 
instruments to the independent endogenous variables. These instruments must be 
uncorrelated with the error term. According to Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) it is important to 
address endogeneity in cash holding regressions because random shocks affecting cash 
holdings are likely to affect its determinants as well. Two-stage least squares is discussed 
later in details in section 4.5. It is also important to note that since the error term is already 
related to the dependent variable, adding a lagged dependent variable to the model as an 
independent variable, increases the risk of the endogeneity problem. Therefore, if a lagged 
dependent variable is introduced to a regression model, it becomes inappropriate to use 
OLS. 
4.3.8 Other Assumptions 
There are additional assumptions to ensure that ordinary least squares regression is the best 
linear unbiased estimator. However, since the study is following a literature review and the 
determinants of corporate cash holdings have been analysed before in other contexts, these 
assumptions should not be problematic in the context of this study. These assumptions 
include that the regression model must be specified correctly and the model should be 
linear in parameters. Correct model specification include issues such as incorporating 
meaningful independent variables into the model, checking variable measurements and 
ensuring no omitted variable biases. The Ramsey (1969) RESET test is a test to ensure that 
there is no functional form misspecification (Brooks, 2008). It is also critical to ensure that 
the number of observations N is greater than the number of variables K.  
To sum up, ordinary least squares regression is the most commonly used estimator in the 
literature on corporate cash holdings. As mentioned in the previous sections, if the Gauss-
Markov assumptions hold, then OLS is the best linear unbiased estimator. There are many 
possible solutions to OLS such as robust standard errors and Newey-West standard errors 
in order to obtain heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. 
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However, it is important to analyse different regression estimators in order to construct the 
best possible and robust procedure to be used in this study. 
4.4 Panel Data 
Panel data is a set of data that contains information across time and space (Brooks, 2008). 
Panel data assumes that firms are heterogeneous. Time-series and cross-section data 
studies that do not control for heterogeneity run the risk of obtaining biased results. Also 
panel data give researchers a chance of relaxing and testing assumptions that are hidden in 
cross-sectional analysis (Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2008).  
The advantages of panel data can be summarized into the following: 
1- Panel data generates more accurate predictions, addresses more issues and tackles 
more complex problems than time-series and cross-sectional data (Brooks, 2008). 
Panel data also captures greater complexity of human behaviour (Hsiao, 2007). 
Panel data controls for individual heterogeneity that occur due to factors such as 
differences in individuals, firms or countries (Baltagi, 2005).   
2- In order to examine how variables change over time solely with time series data, a 
large number of observations is required to test hypotheses. However, panel data 
combines time series and cross sectional data and so increases the degrees of 
freedom and hence increases the accuracy of tests (Brooks, 2008). Panel data 
improves the efficiency of econometric estimates due to having more degrees of 
freedom and sample variability than cross sectional data (Hsiao, 2007).  
3- Panel data can decrease the problem of multicollinearity when compared to 
modelling time-series data individually (Brooks, 2008). 
4- Through good model estimation, panel data controls the impact of omitted variables 
and omitted variable bias can be reduced (Brooks, 2008; Hsiao, 2007). 
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5- Panel data reveals dynamic relationships (Hsiao, 2007). Baltagi (2005) specify that 
dynamic data are better to study the dynamics of adjustment.  
As mentioned before, if the assumptions of Gauss-Markov hold, then ordinary least 
squares regression is the best linear unbiased estimator. The challenge for panel data is to 
control for the unobservable heterogeneity that could be either random variables or fixed 
parameters (Hsiao, 2007). In order to consider these effects, there are two main approaches 
to panel data estimators which are fixed effect and random effect models (Brooks, 2008). 
A fixed group effect model examines group differences in intercepts, assuming the same 
slopes and constant variance across entities or subjects. However, a random effect 
estimates variance components for groups (or times) and error. In a random effect model 
the difference among groups (or time periods) lies in their variance of the error term, not in 
their intercepts (Park, 2009). 
There are two types to fixed effect models, firm specific effects and time effects. Ogundipe 
et al. (2012) highlight the importance of firm specific effects in cash holding analysis. 
They explain that firm specific effects occur when differences are evident across firms but 
not necessarily throughout time. In this case, it is assumed that firms in a sample are 
different from each other, but each firm is constant across time. However, time effects are 
differences that occur throughout time but are similar for all firms in a given year. Time-
effects usually occur due to macro-economic factors that affect all firms regardless of their 
business nature.   
Fixed effect and random effect models have been previously used in the cash holding 
literature. Dittmar et al. (2003) apply a random effect model to control for 
interdependencies of observations within an industry and a country alongside using OLS 
estimations. Drobetz and Grüninger (2007) use Hausman (1978) test statistic to determine 
whether to use fixed effect or random effect estimators. They highlight that fixed effect 
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emphasizes differences within firms (within dimension) whereas random effect focuses on 
differences between firms (between dimension). They include year dummies to control for 
variables that are constant across firms but change over time. They claim that the model 
with both time-fixed and firm-fixed effects removes omitted-variables bias. 
Bates et al. (2009) use four different model specifications to investigate why U.S. firms 
hold significantly more cash than they did in the past. The first model estimates the 
dependent variable as the cash to net assets ratio whereas the second model uses the natural 
logarithm of the cash to net assets ratio. They find that the first model better explains the 
variations in cash holdings as it shows a significantly higher R
2 
than the second model. 
They also estimate a third model using the changes in the variables rather than the levels. 
In this model, they include the lagged cash ratio to allow for partial adjustments to the 
equilibrium level. They finally estimate a forth model using fixed effects. Bates et al. 
(2009) conclude that the effect of firm characteristics on cash holdings over time vary 
across these different models. Bates et al. (2009) explain that the increase in cash ratio can 
be explained considerably by changes in firm characteristics over the sample period and 
less considerably by changes in the relationship between firm characteristics and cash 
holdings.  
Despite its common use in panel data analysis, fixed effect regression models have been 
widely criticized. Fixed effect adds a dummy variable for every firm, thus adds a 
considerable amount of variables to the model. This significantly decreases the degrees of 
freedom (n-k). Bell and Jones (2015) state that when using fixed effect models, it is 
impossible to measure the effects of time-invariant variables because all degrees of 
freedom have been consumed. Therefore, one of the main criticisms of fixed effect models 
is that they have significantly lower explanatory power due to lower degrees of freedom. 
More importantly, fixed effect is an unbiased estimator under the assumption of strict 
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exogeneity (Wooldridge, 2012). This means that when fixed effect is used, the independent 
variables and error term must be uncorrelated in order to generate unbiased estimates. 
However, in the analysis of corporate cash holdings it is inappropriate to assume strict 
exogeneity (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). This is because random shocks affecting cash 
holdings are likely to affect its financial determinants as well.      
Baltagi (2005) claims that fixed effect regression is only appropriate when the focus is on a 
set of N firms in which the inferences are solely the behaviour of these firms and not 
conditional on the particular N firms, countries or states that are observed. When N is very 
large, the regression may not be feasible because it includes N-1 dummies (Baltagi, 2005). 
Too many parameters in fixed effect models cause significant loss of degrees of freedom. 
Also, too many dummy variables may increase the problem of multicollinearity between 
the independent variables.  
Baltagi (2005) argues that the high number of parameters and loss of degrees of freedom in 
fixed effect models can be avoided if error terms are assumed to be random which implies 
using random effect models. Random effect models assume that differences between firms 
lie in the error term (Brooks, 2008). When using random effect models, there is no need to 
control for heterogeneity using dummy variables, instead this happens through the error 
terms. This shows that one of the major advantages of using random effect over fixed 
effect is that random effect does not waste degrees of freedom and so should produce 
relatively more efficient estimations (Brooks, 2008).  
Another advantage of using random effects is that it allows estimation of the effects of 
time-invariant variables. As mentioned earlier, fixed effects are not able to measure time-
invariant variables due to the loss in degrees of freedom. Bell and Jones (2015) state that 
even when time-invariant variables are not of interest to the researcher, random effect 
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models are preferred because when using random effect models, the rigid assumptions of 
fixed effect models are relaxed.  
Random effect models are modelled to correct for heterogeneity bias (Bell and Jones, 
2015). Nevertheless, the random effect estimator still has its drawbacks. In random effect 
models there is an exogeneity assumption (Bell and Jones, 2015). Random effect can only 
be used if this assumption is valid (Brooks, 2008). Brooks (2008) define a strictly 
exogenous variable as one that is independent of all errors in the model. In random effect 
models, errors must be independently and identically distributed (IID) and the parameters 
must be independent of the error terms in all observations. However, in many random 
effect models these assumptions do not hold (Bell and Jones, 2015). Bell and Jones (2015) 
explain that there has been little attention drawn to the reasons behind the causes of 
endogeneity. However, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) claim that in cash holding models, it is 
inappropriate to assume that independent variables are strictly exogenous. This is mainly 
because unobservable shocks affecting cash holdings are likely to affect it‟s determinants 
as well. Even though Shah (2011) uses fixed and random effects to analyse cash holdings 
in Pakistan, the author states that fixed effects are costly due to the lost degrees of freedom. 
Also, random effects may be inconsistent due to the correlation between individual effects 
and the independent variables (Shah, 2011).  
As far as this research is concerned, year and industry dummies are included to the 
research models in order to control for unobservable heterogeneity (see section 4.2.5). 
Yearly dummies are applied in order to control for differences that occur throughout time 
but are similar for all firms in a given year. They are mainly used to control for macro-
economic factors that affect all firms regardless of their business nature. Industry dummies 
are applied in order to control for differences in cash holding decisions between industries 
(see section 4.2.4). Industry dummies control for unobservable heterogeneity without 
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adding a considerable amount of dummy variables that consume degrees of freedom like 
fixed effect models, and/or having a strict exogeneity assumption like fixed and random 
effect models. 
In addition to applying OLS, fixed effect and random effect estimators, some papers in the 
cash holding literature such as Opler et al. (1999) and Ferreira and Vilela (2004) apply 
Fama-Macbeth. It has also been widely used in the analysis of the cross-section of stock 
returns (Skoulakis, 2008). This is because Fama-Macbeth addresses cross sectional 
correlation problems and is specifically designed for data that is cross-sectionally 
correlated like return. Cross-sectional correlation may not be the main concern in cash 
holding analysis, but serial autocorrelation is a more common problem in corporate finance 
research. 
Fama-Macbeth treats each year as an independent cross section (Tong, 2010). As a result 
of this, Fama-Macbeth assumes that explanatory variables do not vary with time which is a 
very restrictive and unrealistic assumption in application (Skoulakis, 2008). In the case of 
this study, the determinants of cash holdings do vary with time. Fama-Macbeth will yield 
inconsistent biased estimators if there is high serial autocorrelation. Chen (2008) confirms 
that cash holdings are serially related. 
To sum up, a number of studies use OLS estimator (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Harford et 
al., 2008; Al-Najjar, 2013), while others use fixed effect estimator (Bates et al., 2009), 
while a third group of academics use random effect estimator (Dittmar et al., 2003; 
Drobetz and Grüninger, 2006). Also some studies like Ferreira and Vilela (2004) apply 
Fama-Macbeth regression (see Appendix 2). All estimators have been considered through 
their different applications. The advantages and disadvantages of each estimator have been 
evaluated. OLS, fixed effect and random estimators have been critically analysed in 
previous sections with a detailed discussion of the reasons, assumptions and testing of each 
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estimator. One of the important assumptions of OLS is that the independent variables and 
the error term must be uncorrelated, known as the assumption of strict exogeneity. As 
mentioned before, fixed effect and random effect estimators also have a strict exogeneity 
assumption. If independent variables are correlated with the error term, then there is a 
problem of endogeneity. The problem of endogeneity is addressed using an extension of 
ordinary least squares regression, which is the two-stage least squares regression. 
4.5 Two-Stage Least Squares Regression (2SLS) 
Two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) is an extension to the ordinary least squares 
regression (OLS) to address problems related to endogeneity. Chen (2008) argues that 
many corporate decisions are endogenously determined. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) state 
that when analysing cash holdings it is not appropriate to assume that its determinants are 
strictly exogenous because random shocks affecting cash holdings are likely to affect its 
determinants as well. Endogeneity occurs when the independent variables are correlated 
with the error term. 2SLS is an instrumental variable approach to address the problem of 
endogeneity of the independent variables (Wooldridge, 2009). Instrumental variables are 
added to the endogenous independent variables. Wooldridge (2009) explains that an 
instrumental variable must be highly correlated with the independent variable but 
uncorrelated with the error term. When time series data is available, there is a natural 
source of instruments that will satisfy these conditions (Wooldridge, 2009). These 
instruments are the lagged values of the independent variables because they will be 
correlated with the current values of the independent variables but uncorrelated with the 
current error term. Second lags are preferred because they are not correlated with the 
current error term like first lags (Mileva, 2007). The 2SLS procedure is composed of two 
stages. The first stage is estimating the equation using OLS and saving the fitted values for 
the dependent variable (Brooks, 2008). The second stage is replacing any endogenous 
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variable with their stage 1 fitted values and estimating the structural equations using OLS 
(Brooks, 2008). 
It is important to note that any estimator that uses instrumental variables will have higher 
variance than OLS due to the increased uncertainty introduced by the instruments 
(Wooldridge, 2009). Also the R
2
 in an instrumental variable estimator has no interpretation 
(Wooldridge, 2009). It is not the percentage of explained variation of the dependent 
variable y because when there is endogeneity, it is not possible to divide the variation of y 
into two components (Wooldridge, 2009).  
Even though endogeneity is an important issue when analysing cash holdings, there still 
remains a gap in the literature in addressing this issue. D‟Mello et al. (2008) use OLS and 
also 2SLS to address the problem of endogeneity. Gao et al. (2013) use instrumental 
variable approach to measure the effect of a firm being public on cash holdings. However, 
only the public firm indicator variable is treated as endogenous. Al-Najjar (2013) uses the 
Hausman test to detect endogeneity and applies 2SLS instrumental variable analysis. Al-
Najjar (2013) controls for endogeneity of financial policies, namely endogeneity between 
capital structure, dividend policies and cash holdings. Al-Najjar (2013) uses only asset 
tangibility and free cash flows as instruments. It is also important to consider the studies 
that formulate more dynamic models than the ones previously mentioned.  
―Many economic relationships are dynamic in nature and one of the advantages of panel 
data is that they allow the researcher to better understand the dynamics of adjustment‖ 
(Baltagi, 2005, p.135).  
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Dittmar and Duchin (2011) and Ogundipe et al. (2012) use the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to construct dynamic models in order to 
investigate if firms are able to adjust to their target cash ratios. GMM also helps in solving 
endogeneity problems. Since some studies have also implemented the use of GMM when 
studying cash holdings, the next section presents an overview of these studies, further 
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explaining the motive of using a dynamic model. Additionally, the dynamic panel 
estimation is discussed in details in order to understand how the speed of adjustment of 
firms towards their target cash ratios can be determined from the dynamic panel model. 
4.6 Dynamic Panel and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
When analysing cash holdings, it is important to investigate whether firms set target cash 
levels and whether they seek to achieve those targets. This is done through investigating 
whether cash holdings revert back to the mean (Opler et al., 1999). Studies such as Opler 
et al. (1999), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Al-Najjar and Belghitar (2011) and Ogundipe et al. 
(2012) prove that firms have target cash levels and try to adjust to these targets. Opler et al. 
(1999) prove this by using a first order autoregressive model. However, Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004) criticize the simple target adjustment model used by Opler et al. (1999) because it 
only tests if changes in cash are explained by deviations of current cash levels from their 
targets without including other determinants in the model. In this case, the adjustment 
coefficient would be biased. In the empirical analysis of cash holdings, it is very important 
to consider the effect of endogeneity problems. This is because shocks affecting cash 
holdings will affect its firm-level determinants as well (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). 
Therefore, in order to measure if firms are able to adjust their current cash levels to their 
target cash levels a dynamic estimation model is required. For this reason, studies like 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and Ogundipe et al. (2012) address this issue by applying the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. 
4.6.1 Motive 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) claim that static cash holding models used in previous research 
assume that firms can instantly adjust to their target cash levels after changes in firm 
specific characteristics and/or random shocks. In order to prove that delays may occur in 
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the adjustment process towards the target cash level, a lag in adjusting to changes to the 
target cash level must be introduced to the model. For this reason, studies analysing the 
determinants of corporate cash holdings through constructing a dynamic model, add a 
lagged cash ratio variable as an independent variable. As mentioned in section 4.3.3.2 
Wilkins (2014) state that lagged dependent variables are used to create a dynamic model 
and to eliminate autocorrelation in the residuals. Studies such as Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), 
Drobetz and Grüninger (2007), Al-Najjar and Belghitar (2011), Dittmar and Duchin 
(2011), Shah (2011), Ogundipe et al. (2012), Gao et al. (2013), Guizani (2017), Martínez-
Sola et al. (2018) and Orlova and Rao (2018) all use dynamic panel estimation models in 
order to analyse the speed of adjustment of firms towards their target cash ratios (see 
chapter 2, section 2.7). 
In the case of this research, the dependent variable would be the cash holdings of the 
current year and the independent variables will include cash holdings of the previous year 
alongside other determinants. Adding a lagged dependent variable violates some of the 
Gauss-Markov assumptions. It violates assumption 4 which states that independent 
variables of a model must not be randomly chosen. As the lagged dependent variable is 
considered to be a random variable, this assumption is violated. The more important 
problem is that it violates assumption 7 which states that independent variables and error 
terms must be uncorrelated. Adding a lagged dependent variable increases the risk of 
having an independent variable that is correlated with the error term, known as the 
endogeneity problem. This means that the cash holdings of the previous year will be 
correlated with the current error term. Due to this reason, when adding a lagged dependent 
variable Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), fixed effect and random effect estimators will lead 
to biased results (Baltagi, 2005). In order to address this endogeneity problem when using 
lagged dependent variables it is not possible to use OLS, and a dynamic estimation model 
such as Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) must be used instead.  
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Chen (2008) use OLS estimation to analyse the effect of corporate governance on cash 
holdings but the study also implements GMM estimations. Kuan et al. (2011) suggest the 
use of GMM estimation because the determination of cash holdings and corporate 
governance are simultaneous and so endogeneity problems must be handled correctly. To 
avoid such endogeneity problems they also use Heckman two-stage estimation. Al-Najjar 
and Belghitar (2011) also use GMM to analyse the relationship between cash holdings and 
dividends and the simultaneity between them. When they carry out GMM to apply a 
dynamic approach, they find similar results to that of the static approach.  
Ogundipe et al. (2012) investigate the determinants of corporate cash holdings of a panel 
of 45 companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange from 1995-2009. They use a 
dynamic panel model in order to analyse if firms have a target cash ratio and adjust their 
current cash to be closer to that target cash. However, the adjustment is not immediate. 
Ogundipe et al. (2012) explains that when a lagged dependent variable is added to the 
model, OLS will not consistently estimate the coefficient parameters because there will be 
correlation between the lagged dependent variable and error terms. They also argue that 
shocks affecting cash holdings of firms are also likely to affect some of the independent 
variables and so the independent variables may be correlated with the past and present 
error terms. For these reasons, they explain that in dynamic panel estimation generalized 
least squares and fixed effect cannot be used and so they use the generalized method of 
moments. Ogundipe et al. (2012) find that the cash holdings of the previous year positively 
and significantly affect the cash holdings of the current year. Firms cannot adjust to target 
cash levels immediately which could be due to high costs associated with the adjustment 
process (Ogundipe et al., 2012). 
Dittmar and Duchin (2011) apply OLS regression while including lagged cash flows in the 
model following Bates et al. (2009). However, using a lagged dependent variable violates 
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the assumptions of OLS. They also estimate another model by adding fixed effects to 
control for omitted variables that may occur due to firm heterogeneity. However, Dittmar 
and Duchin (2011) criticize fixed effect estimators because they cause bias in small 
samples. Consequently, Dittmar and Duchin (2011) apply the GMM estimation procedure 
in Blundell and Bond (1998). They suggest that even though this estimator may be biased 
in some contexts, it should be unbiased when only a few firms have cash ratios equal to 
zero.  
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) apply a dynamic panel estimation model to investigate firm‟s 
behaviour as a partial adjustment to its target cash ratio. The model suggests that the 
change in a firm‟s cash ratio is influenced by the deviation of the current cash ratio from 
the target cash ratio. They use a partial adjustment model allowing for the possibility of 
delay of firms when adjusting to their target cash ratios. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) explain 
that this delay may be caused in imperfect markets because of adjustment and transaction 
costs that firms could face when adapting to new situations. In order to construct a 
dynamic panel, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) add the lagged cash ratio as an independent 
variable and use GMM which provides consistent parameter estimates. They find that there 
are significant dynamic effects in the determination of firms‟ cash holdings.  
Drobetz and Grüninger (2007) use dynamic panel models with the first lag of the 
dependent variable as an independent variable following Ozkan and Ozkan (2004). In this 
case, the independent cash ratio will be correlated with the error term and so the Arellano 
and Bond (1991) two-step GMM is used. Drobetz and Grüninger (2007) find that Swiss 
firms adjust to target cash ratios much slower than other countries and so they keep higher 
levels of cash to avoid cash shortages.  
Also following Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008) 
consider that there is an optimal cash level for each firm depending on firm specific 
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characteristics plus a random error. They construct a panel regression model through 
adding a lagged dependent variable as an independent variable. OLS estimation becomes 
inconsistent due to the problem of autocorrelation so Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM is 
applied on the equation in first differences. They conduct all estimations using the two-
stage GMM estimator, since the one-stage estimation can present problems of 
heteroscedasticity. Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008) confirm a dynamic 
behaviour of the cash decision by finding a significant positive relationship between the 
cash ratio and the lagged cash ratio. Chen and Chuang (2009) also use first-difference 
GMM estimations following Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) to decrease endogeneity problems 
caused by the adjustment delay of cash structure. 
4.6.2 Dynamic Panel Estimation 
In order to construct a dynamic panel estimation following Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), the 
lagged dependent variable CASH i,t-1 which represents the cash ratio of the previous year is 
added as an independent variable alongside to all the other firm specific independent 
variables in model 1: 
CASH i,t  =  γ1 CASH i,t-1 +  γ 2 DIV i,t  + γ 3 INVEST i,t  + γ 4 LIQ i,t  + γ 5 LEV i,t  + γ 6 SIZE i,t  
+ γ 7 CF i,t  + γ 8 VOL i,t  + γ 9 DEBTMAT i,t  + γ 10 CAPEX i,t + αt + μ i,t                          (4-3) 
The speed of adjustment for firms toward their target cash ratios is represented by the 
adjustment coefficient, thereafter denoted as λ. In order to understand the derivation of this 
model, it is important to start by understanding how the adjustment coefficient λ is 
obtained. Firstly, it is assumed that the target cash ratio of a firm CASH
*
 i,t is a function of 
the independent variables mentioned above. Hence, the equation to estimate the target cash 
ratio would be the summation of the independent variables K and the error term μ i,t , where 
i represents the firms and t represents the years. Additionally, α t represents yearly 
dummies to control for time effects. It is important to include time effects to capture 
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macro-economic factors that are beyond firm control. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Al-Najjar 
and Belghitar (2011), Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal (2012) and Ogundipe et al. (2012) include 
yearly dummies to control for time effects. Accordingly, the function to account for the 
target cash ratio CASH
*
 i,t of firm i at time t, can be represented as follows: 
CASH
*
 i,t = Ʃ βkxkit + αt +  μ i,t                                                                                          (4-4) 
                                   k 
If firms are able to adjust immediately to their target cash ratios with no adjustment costs, 
the cash ratio would be exactly equal to the target cash ratio, hence CASH i,t = CASH
*
 i,t . 
However, if firms take some time to adjust to their target cash ratios, then there would be a 
partial adjustment mechanism. In this case, the change in cash from one year to another 
would be affected by the adjustment coefficient λ.  
CASH i,t - CASH i,t-1 = λ(CASH
*
 i,t - CASH i,t-1)                                                               (4-5) 
The value of the adjustment coefficient λ lies between 0 and 1. If λ=1 it shows that firms 
are able to adjust immediately to their target cash ratios because the change in actual cash 
is exactly the same as the change in target cash. However, if λ=0 it shows that the 
adjustment costs are large and firms are not able to adjust their current cash ratios to reach 
their targets (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). It is important to note that the speed of adjustment 
is inversely related to adjustment costs (Ogundipe et al., 2012). According to Ozkan and 
Ozkan (2004), if the adjustment coefficient is higher than 0.6, then firms are able to adjust 
to their target cash ratios relatively quickly.  Rearranging the partial adjustment model in 
equation 4-5, will eventually lead to equation 4-10 as presented below: 
CASH i,t - CASH i,t-1 = λ(CASH
*
 i,t - CASH i,t-1)                                                               (4-6) 
CASH i,t  = CASH i,t-1 + λ(CASH
*
 i,t - CASH i,t-1)                                                              (4-7) 
CASH i,t  = CASH i,t-1 + λCASH
*
 i,t - λCASH i,t-1                                                                                               (4-8) 
CASH i,t  = CASH i,t-1 - λCASH i,t-1 + λCASH
*
 i,t                                                                                              (4-9) 
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CASH i,t  = CASH i,t-1 (1- λ) + λCASH
*
 i,t                                                                                                            (4-10) 
Substituting the target cash variable CASH
*
 i,t in equation 4-10 with the target cash 
function in equation 4-4, generates the final model as presented below: 
CASH i,t  = CASH i,t-1 (1- λ) +  Ʃ λ βkxkit + αt +  μ i,t                                                                                     (4-11) 
                                                                                        k                                                                
CASH i,t  = γ1 CASH i,t-1  +  Ʃ γkxkit +  αt + μ i,t                                                                                                (4-12) 
                                                                            K=1 
As seen in equation 4-11, the adjustment coefficient λ is given by 1 minus the coefficient 
of the lagged cash variable CASH i,t-1. Therefore, the coefficient (1- λ) in equation 4-11 is 
denoted as γ1 in equation 4-12. Additionally, In order to formulate a dynamic panel model, 
instrumental variables are used. Therefore, as represented in equation 4-11, βk is multiplied 
by λ and thus represented by γk in equation 4-12. Therefore, the first dynamic model in 
equation 4-3 can be summarized as equation 4-12. 
As mentioned before, when adding a lagged dependent variable, OLS becomes 
inconsistent because the lagged dependent variable will be correlated with the error term. 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) state that in dynamic specification of cash holdings there is 
another estimation problem, which is that other independent variables may also be 
correlated with error terms of current and past periods. This is because shocks affecting 
cash holdings are likely to affect some firm specific characteristics as well. They confirm 
this by finding that in dynamic cash holding models, independent variables are not strictly 
exogenous. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) explain that GMM solves this problem by adding 
instruments to the lagged dependent variable and the independent variables. Instruments 
must be highly correlated with the endogenous independent variable x it, but uncorrelated 
with the current error term u it (Wooldridge, 2009). Wooldridge (2009) state that in the case 
of time-series data availability, lagged values of the independent variables act as natural 
instruments because they will be highly correlated with the current independent variables 
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but uncorrelated with the current error term. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) use instruments 
dated t-2 for each independent variable following Blundell et al. (1992).  Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004) report two dynamic models. In the first model, all variables are treated as 
exogenous except lagged cash which is the only one treated as endogenous. In the second 
model, all independent variables including lagged cash are treated as endogenous. They 
find that both models give similar results. Nevertheless, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) claim 
that when all variables are treated as exogenous except lagged cash in the first model, there 
is misspecification. This confirms their view that in dynamic cash holding models, all 
variables should be treated as endogenous. For a detailed review on the speed of 
adjustment found in previous research see chapter 2, section 2.7. The following section 
presents the sampling and data collection procedures followed in this research. 
4.7 Sampling and Data Collection Procedures 
The data collected for this research is a sample of the firms listed on the Egyptian stock 
market. The data collected is divided into two main categories, namely financial data for 
model 1 and corporate governance data for model 2. All of the data gathered for this 
research is based on secondary data disclosed by companies listed on the Egyptian stock 
exchange. Based on the research models and the variables previously discussed in section 
4.2, the first part of data collection comprises of financial data based on actual figures 
extracted from official audited financial statements. However, the second part of data 
collection includes figures related to corporate governance structures. The following 
sections present the data collection procedures in details.   
4.7.1 Financial Data  
The population data are companies listed on the Egyptian stock market. Bloomberg is used 
to gather financial data originally extracted from official audited financial statements 
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published by listed companies. Based on the Egyptian stock market reports, the companies 
listed on the Egyptian stock market in 2015 are 221 companies. Firstly, the data for the 
whole population is extracted from Bloomberg from 2003-2015. Then the data is filtered, 
sorted and updated as follows: 
 Companies from the banking and financial services sectors are removed as they 
have different reasons behind holding cash. Banking and financial service 
companies also fall under certain regulations according to the central bank of 
Egypt. The companies listed on the Egyptian stock market are categorized under 17 
different sectors (see chapter 1, section 1.4.1). After removing companies from the 
banking and financial services sectors, the data in this study consists of listed 
companies from 15 different sectors. The sectors are classified according to the 
Egyptian exchange official website 
(http://www.egx.com.eg/English/ListedStocks.aspx).  
 Data for the years from 2003-2006 are removed due to significant missing data 
points during earlier years. This leaves data from 2007-2015. (The year 2007 is 
only used as a year to calculate change in fixed assets in order to calculate capital 
expenditure). 
 Companies that have significant missing data points or fields not applicable are 
removed. For a company to stay in the sample, it must have at least 3 out of 8 
observations and must exist on the Egyptian stock exchange official website. 
 After filtering the data, companies that still have missing data points for certain 
years are completed and cross referenced from Thomson Reuters EIKON.  
 Macro-economic variables are downloaded from World Bank data indicators 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator). 
 Finally, observations with remaining missing data are removed. 
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The 2 final panel data sets for model 1 over 8 years from 2008-2015 are: 
 A balanced Panel of 135 Companies which comprises 1080 observations 
 An unbalanced Panel of 157 companies which comprises 1191 observations 
The unbalanced panel is used throughout the analysis to ensure the largest possible sample 
and the balanced panel is used for comparing subsamples in order to ensure more adequate 
comparison.  
4.7.2 Corporate Governance Data 
Corporate governance data is related to ownership structure and board characteristics. 
Ownership structure data related to insider ownership and institutional ownership are both 
extracted from Bloomberg. Any missing data is completed and cross-referenced from 
Thomson Reuters EIKON. The data for the percentage of government ownership is 
extracted from Thomson Reuters EIKON. 
The latest code of corporate governance was published in 2011 (see chapter 1, section 
1.4.2.1). Board data is only published consistently for listed companies since 2012, 
following arrangement 18 in the listing requirements of the Egyptian stock market. 
Therefore, corporate governance data used in this research is only from 2012-2015. The 
report that includes board data is a yearly report filed by listed companies called a 
disclosure report which includes data regarding board of directors and ownership structure. 
Most research on corporate governance in Egypt that include samples before 2012 use the 
50 most active companies listed on the Egyptian stock market (Abdelsalam et al., 2008; 
Soliman et al., 2012; Wahba, 2014; Sakr et al., 2016). However, a major drawback of 
using the most active companies only is that it creates significant survivorship bias. 
Survivorship bias occurs when the data focuses only on entities that meet a certain 
selection process. In this case, focusing only on the most active companies significantly 
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increases the risk of generating biased results. Even though board data may be available for 
some companies through their websites for the current year, there is no database for 
historical board data. For this reason, studies such as Afify (2009), Aly, Simon and 
Hussainey (2010), Samaha, Dahawy, Hussainey and Stapleton (2012) and Shahwan (2015) 
use cross sectional data for a single year and obtain the most recent data from company 
websites. Using cross sectional data for a single year does not gain advantages of panel 
data (see section 4.4). A recent cross-country study by Al-Najjar and Clark (2017) on the 
MENA region was able to get corporate governance data for 13 companies only from 
Egypt. 
Board data is not available on Bloomberg or Thomson Reuters EIKON. Consequently, the 
disclosure reports are obtained from Egypt for Information Dissemination Company 
(EGID). Board size, non-executive directors, CEO-duality and percentage of women on the 
board are extracted manually from these disclosure reports. Most companies do not report 
independent directors. Since the data for independent directors is not consistently reported 
in Egypt, the data for non-executive directors is used as a proxy for board independence 
(see section 4.2.3).  
Some noticed facts regarding board reports include that CEO duality is very common in 
Egypt. Furthermore, a few companies do not have most of their board members as non-
executive directors which does not comply with the code of corporate governance of Egypt 
(European Corporate Governance Institute, 2011). Some companies have less than 5 board 
members which also violates the Egyptian code of corporate governance (European 
Corporate Governance Institute, 2011). Finally, data on company auditor is collected from 
Bloomberg. 
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The final panel data set for model 2 over 4 years from 2012-2015 is: 
 An unbalanced Panel of 157 companies which comprises 614 observations. 
4.7.3 Data Limitations 
This section presents the limitations regarding data collection in this study. The limitations 
can be summarized into the following: 
 There are a limited number of listed companies on the Egyptian stock market. The 
number of listed companies in Egypt is only 221 companies in 2015. 
 Corporate Governance data in Egypt is not available before 2012. This is due to the 
fact that the disclosure of board data and ownership structure is only a compulsory 
requirement for listed firms after 2011. 
 Data regarding research and development is not available in Egypt. 
 Data for independent directors is not reported in Egypt. 
4.7.4 Validity and Reliability  
Research findings must have certain evaluation criteria regarding validity and reliability. 
Validity is divided into internal validity and external validity. Internal validity is the 
criterion that evaluates if the identified cause truly creates the interpreted effects (Gill and 
Johnson, 2002). On the other hand, external validity evaluates the generalizability of the 
findings beyond the sample of the study. External validity is divided into population 
validity and ecological validity. Population validity deals with generalizing from the 
sample involved in the research to a larger population. However, ecological validity deals 
with generalizing from the actual social context in which the data of the research is 
gathered to other contexts (Gill and Johnson, 2002). This research aims for population 
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validity in which the findings of the sample can be generalized to all firms listed on the 
Egyptian stock market and large Egyptian corporations.  
Reliability is the criterion evaluating the consistency of the results of a research. If the 
research is recreated by another researcher under exactly the same design and conditions, it 
should generate the same results. If this is true, then the findings of the original research 
are consistent and the reliability criterion is met (Gill and Johnson, 2002). In the case of 
this research, all appropriate diagnostic tests are carried out in order to generate the highest 
robustness of the results and ensure reliability. As for the sampling procedure, the data is 
almost the population of listed companies. Additionally, data sources are reliable and cross 
referenced.  
After reviewing different regression estimators and presenting the research sample, the 
final procedure that best fits the research model is discussed in the following section in 
order to reach the most robust research design.  
4.8 Procedure 
According to the evaluation of different regression estimators in previous sections, a 
procedure is carried out in order to report the results of the regression analysis of model 1. 
Firstly, variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to avoid problems of outliers 
(Dittmar et al., 2003; Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2006; Bates et al., 2009; Tong, 2010; 
Kusnadi, 2011; Wu et al. 2012; Zeng and Wang, 2014; Locorotondo et al. 2014; Kusnadi 
et al., 2015; Boubaker and Derouiche, 2015; Cai et al., 2016). Outliers are observations 
that include extreme values and cause distortion of the data resulting in misleading 
outcomes. Winsorizing a variable is generating a new variable that is exactly similar to the 
original variable but assigning the outliers a lower weight. The values of the outliers are set 
equal to the defined percentile observation (Kennedy, Lakonishok and Shaw, 1992). In this 
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case, the defined percentile is the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile. Consequently, the extreme values 
are changed slightly so that they are closer to the data set. Winsorizing creates less bias 
than removing the observation all together. Kennedy et al. (1992) perform a research 
comparing between different ways to deal with outliers such as ignoring them, winsorizing 
and trimming observations. They find that winsorizing is the best adjustment procedure to 
deal with outliers. 
Before starting regression analysis, summary statistics are performed to show the nature of 
the data in general and specifically show the average cash ratio in the sample. Additionally, 
correlation analysis is performed in order to give a guideline about the relationships 
between all variables and check for multicollinearity problems. Shapiro-Wilk test of 
normality is used to determine if Pearson or Spearman correlation matrix should be used. 
Ordinary least squares regression is carried out for the models previously formulated (see 
section 4.2.5). Since the models used in this study are used to analyse the determinants of 
corporate cash holdings as measured in the literature, the models predominantly include a 
large set of independent variables. It is important to try to include the independent 
variables that can explain the maximum variation in cash holdings according to the trade-
off, pecking order and agency cost of free cash flow theories. These large models 
significantly increase the risk of multicollinearity which may lead to biased estimators. In 
order to decrease this problem of multicollinearity and achieve accurate estimators, the 
number of variables must be decreased. However, removing important variables increases 
the risk of omitted variable bias and may cause a regression model to be underspecified. 
For these reasons, stepwise regression is used. Stepwise regression keeps only important 
variables and removes less important ones, hence creating a more robust regression model 
decreasing the problem of multicollinearity and achieving more accurate estimators.  
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Stepwise regression is a procedure of building a regression model through adding or 
removing independent variables. There are two types of stepwise regression procedures, 
namely forward and backward. Forward stepwise regression starts with no variables in the 
model and then adds on variables in a step by step manner starting with the most important 
variable which is the one with the lowest p-value (Brooks, 2008). The variables are then 
included one by one until a specified threshold value after which no more variables are 
added to the model. This threshold value is a significance level of 0.10. On the other hand, 
backward stepwise regression starts with the complete model and then removes the 
unimportant variables in a stepwise manner. In both cases, the stepwise approach creates a 
more simplified model which attempts to explain the maximum variability in the 
dependent variable, using the minimum number of independent variables. Backward 
stepwise is preferred over forward stepwise because variables have a higher chance of 
being retained in the model. 
Diagnostic testing is performed on the model to ensure the most possible robust procedure. 
As shown in diagram 4.1, there are five diagnostic tests. Firstly, in order to check that the 
model is correctly specified, the Ramsey (1969) RESET test is performed which is a 
general test for functional form misspecification (Brooks, 2008). It is tested to check for 
omitted variable bias and data linearity. If the test gives significant results, then the model 
is misspecified and there could be omitted variables. However, if the test gives 
insignificant results, then there are no omitted variables and there are no nonlinear 
functions (squares and cubes) of the independent variables that will be significant to the 
model.  
Secondly, a regression model that includes a large set of independent variables will face 
the risk of multicollinearity. Therefore, multicollinearity is tested using the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) test in order to highlight the independent variables that are highly 
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correlated. A common critical point for the VIF test is 5, but can be extended in large 
models (Studenmund, 2014). Due to the large number of independent variables used in this 
research, the adopted threshold for the VIF test is 10. 
Thirdly, Autocorrelation is tested using the Breusch-Godfrey LM test which tests for 
multiple serial autocorrelation. If the test gives significant results indicating that 
autocorrelation is present, standard errors are corrected using Newey-West standard errors 
and Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. Subsequently, the results are to be reported and 
compared to the original results.  
Heteroscedasticity is tested using the White‟s test. If the test shows significant results, then 
there is a problem of heteroscedasticity. If heteroscedasticity is present in the sample, it is 
addressed by means of the White‟s robust corrected variance estimates. Diagram 4.1 
illustrates the procedure. 
175 
 
Diagram 4. 1 : The Procedure 
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The two-stage least squares are performed in order to increase robustness and to address 
problems of endogeneity. All firm specific variables are treated as endogenous according 
to Ozkan and Ozkan (2004). The Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests are conducted to confirm 
endogeneity of independent variables. Second lags of the independent variables are used as 
instruments. Robust standard errors are used to deal with heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. Similar to OLS, year and industry dummies are used to control for 
macroeconomic variables and differences across industries.  
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Finally, in order to estimate a dynamic panel model and analyse if firms revert back to 
their target cash ratios, a dynamic panel model is applied (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; 
Drobretz and Gruninger, 2007; Chen, 2008; Chen and Chuang, 2009; Al-Najjar and 
Belghitar, 2011; Shah, 2011; Ogundipe et al., 2012). More specifically, two-stage 
generalized method of moments is applied. Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal (2012) explain that 
according to Blundell and Bond (1998) two-stage is more efficient than the one stage in 
case of heteroscedastic disturbances of extensive samples. This is because the two-stage 
employs the residuals of the one-stage to create an optimum weighting matrix. Garcia-
Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008) confirm that two-stage GMM estimator is preferred 
because one-stage estimation can present problems of heteroscedasticity. 
Due to the relatively small sample size in this research, system GMM with orthogonal 
deviations is used. System GMM which was developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) is used instead of the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference 
GMM because system GMM has much smaller finite sample bias (Shah, 2011). Blundell 
and Bond (1998) find that system GMM has significantly smaller bias and generates more 
precise estimates compared to difference GMM. Shah (2011) and Al-Najjar and Belghitar 
(2011) use system GMM. Orthogonal deviations is an alternative to differencing that 
preserves sample size in panels with gaps (Roodman, 2006). 
Lagged values of all the independent variables are used as instruments (Ozkan and Ozkan, 
2004; Pal and Ferrando, 2010; Al-Najjar and Belghitar, 2011; Begelli and Sanchez-Vidal, 
2012; Ogundipe et al., 2012; Martinez-Sola, 2013). The instruments are lagged to period t-
2 similar to Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and Al-Najjar and Belghitar (2011). Second lags are 
required because they are not correlated with the current error term like the first lag, but 
further lags decrease the sample size (Mileva, 2007).  
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Arellano and Bond (1991) use robust standard errors and include time dummy variables in 
all equations. Therefore, standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are used similar to 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004). Additionally, yearly time dummies are included in order to 
control for time effects following Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Al-Najjar and Belghitar 
(2011), Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal (2012) and Ogundipe et al. (2012). 
When lags are used as instruments, if errors are serially correlated, estimators become 
inconsistent (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Therefore, Sargan Test of over-identified 
restrictions is implemented to indicate if the instruments and residuals are independent 
(Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Chen and Chuang, 2009; Al-Najjar and Belghitar, 2011; 
Ogundipe et al., 2012; Guizani, 2017). Additionally, the Arellano and Bond (1991) test of 
second order serial correlation AR (2) is applied to check that there is no second order 
autocorrelation (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Al-Najjar and Belghitar, 2011; Guizani, 2017). If 
the Sargan test and AR (2) show insignificant results, this suggests that the instruments 
used in the model are valid and that there is no second order serial correlation (Ullah and 
Kamal, 2017). 
Finally, an extended analysis is performed in order to measure the effect of political 
stability on cash holdings in Egypt. In doing so, a political stability variable is added to the 
financial determinants tested in model 1. The political stability variable is an index formed 
by World Bank to measure the perceptions of the probability that the government will be 
destabilized by unauthorized means such as violence or terrorism. The index ranges from   
-2.5 to +2.5 with -2.5 corresponding to weak political stability and +2.5 representing strong 
political stability. To ensure the highest robustness, the analysis is carried out using OLS 
and 2SLS with robust standard errors. For further analysis, a subsample regression is 
performed to analyse the difference in the determinants of corporate cash holdings before 
and after the Egyptian revolution of 2011. The first subsample is from 2008-2011 and the 
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second subsample is from 2012-2015. Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test is used to compare 
means of the variables between both subsamples.  
Conclusion 
This chapter presents the philosophical underpinning of this research. The philosophical 
underpinning of this research is informed by objectivism ontology, positivism 
epistemology and quantitative research methodology. The study aims to analyse the 
determinants of corporate cash holdings of firms listed on the Egyptian stock market. 
According to the trade-off, pecking order and agency cost of free cash flow theories and 
the detailed literature review in chapters 2 and 3, two multivariate regression models are 
formulated. In order to address the research questions, the first model incorporates firm 
specific determinants and the second model incorporates corporate governance and firm 
specific determinants. The detailed calculations of all the determinants are presented with 
support of previous literature. After a thorough analysis of different regression estimators, 
the fourth research objective is met through building a procedure to ensure the most robust 
research design. Ordinary least squares regression is used along with diagnostic testing and 
possible solutions for model specification, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. Two-stage least squares regression is used for endogeneity. Finally, 
generalized method of moments is used for dynamic panel estimation.  
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Chapter 5: Findings and Discussion 
Introduction 
The aim of this research is to analyse the determinants of corporate cash holdings of firms 
listed on the Egyptian stock market. The analysis is carried out in accordance with the 
procedure described in the research methodology chapter (see chapter 4, section 4.8). This 
chapter starts with descriptive statistics so that the reader becomes familiar with the data 
set and has an opportunity to relate average cash holdings in Egypt to previous research in 
other contexts. Then correlation analysis is presented in order to describe the relationships 
among all variables and expose any multicollinearity problems. Subsequently, the 
regression results are presented and analysed along with all the appropriate diagnostic 
tests. This chapter discusses the findings of the research and compares the results with the 
relevant literature. The aim of the research is met by analysing the factors that affect the 
cash holding decisions of Egyptian listed firms and test the established cash holding 
theories in the Egyptian context.  
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The average cash ratio for the full sample, reported in table 5.1, shows that firms in Egypt 
keep relatively high levels of cash on their balance sheets. The cash ratio is measured as 
cash and equivalents over the book value of assets less cash and equivalents. The average 
cash ratio for the full sample is 18.54%. As mentioned before, in the study carried out by 
Dittmar et al. (2003) Egypt had the highest average cash ratio out of 45 countries. The 
average cash ratio is compared with the average cash ratios of major studies that use 
exactly the same calculation. Opler et al. (1999) find an average cash ratio of 17% in the 
U.S. and Kusnadi (2011) find 17% in Singapore. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) and Drobetz 
and Gruninger (2007) report 14.8% in Europe and Switzerland, respectively. All of these 
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studies show average cash ratios that are lower than the average cash ratio reported in this 
study. Regarding recent studies in developing economies, Wu et al. (2012) and Chen et al. 
(2014) find the average cash ratio as 21.1% and 19.9%, respectively in China. These 
figures are only slightly higher than the average cash ratio of the sample in this study. 
Rezaei and Saadati (2015) find the average cash ratio in Iran 13.5%. Guizani (2017) report 
the average cash ratio 14% when analysing a sample of firms in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. Masood and Shah (2014) and Ullah and Kamal (2017) find the average cash ratio 
in Pakistan only 4.93% and 5.2%, respectively. These figures are significantly lower than 
most studies, including the sample in this study. Compared to studies in other contexts, the 
average cash ratio in Egypt is considered relatively high. Overall, the results confirm the 
fact that firms in Egypt keep significant portions of their assets in cash.  
Table 5. 1 : Average Cash Ratios over Time 
The sample consists of 157 companies listed on the Egyptian stock market from 2008-2015. The mean and 
median cash ratios are presented for the full sample and then for each year individually. The cash ratio is 
calculated as cash and equivalents over the book value of assets less cash and equivalents.  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Year Mean Median 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Full Sample 0.1854365 0.082208 
2008 0.203519 0.1247565 
2009 0.223311 0.117894 
2010 0.218411 0.092996 
2011 0.188735 0.0740965 
2012 0.159628 0.065592 
2013 0.157418 0.08008 
2014 0.169197 0.069215 
2015 0.169563 0.072131 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Even though firms in Egypt hoard significant cash balances, an interesting finding is that 
the average cash ratio of Egyptian listed firms has been decreasing throughout the period 
under analysis. The mean of the cash ratio started with 20.35% in 2008 and dropped to 
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16.96% in 2015. The decrease in cash holdings throughout the years is demonstrated in 
figure 5.1. Dittmar et al. (2003) found the median cash ratio of Egypt in 1998 to be 
29.57%. However, the overall median cash ratio in this sample is significantly lower than 
this figure. The median cash ratio started with almost 12.48% in 2008 and has been 
declining throughout the years until reaching 7.21% in 2015. Even though corporate cash 
holdings have always been high in Egypt, this is evidence that cash holdings have been 
declining in Egypt throughout the years.  
Figure 5. 1 : Average Cash Ratios over Time 
 
Source: Author 
The findings of the decrease in cash holdings through time are contradictory to studies in 
developed economies that find that cash holdings increase over the years. Bates et al. 
(2009) find that cash holdings in the U.S. more than doubles over the years from 1980 to 
2006. Similarly, Gao et al. (2013) find that the average cash ratio of U.S. firms increased 
from 13.53% in 1995 to 20.54% in 2011 in public firms and from 7.18% to 11.85% in 
private firms. The reason for the increase in cash holdings throughout time in the U.S. 
could be that corporate governance is already strong and investors do not discount the 
value of cash, even if firms keep significant cash balances (Kalcheva and Lins, 2007). 
Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) also find that cash holdings increase though time in the U.S., 
U.K., Canada, Australia, Germany and France from 1991 to 2008. The only country that 
had a decrease in cash holdings is Japan. Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) justify that this is 
due to Japan‟s strong banking sector which provides effective monitoring. However, 
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Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) state that banks in Japan encourage firms to keep high 
levels of cash so that the banks benefit from the cash reserves. The decrease in cash 
holdings in Egypt in the recent years could be a sign of strength of the banking sector 
which provides more effective monitoring functions. However, this explanation cannot be 
confirmed unless regression analysis is performed. Alternatively, the decrease in cash 
holdings could be an indication of lower agency problems, brought about by higher 
monitoring and stronger corporate governance structures enforced by the latest code of 
corporate governance, which was released in 2011.  
Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics for all other variables used in this study. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to avoid problems of 
outliers (see chapter 4, section 4.8). The sample consists of 157 companies listed on the 
Egyptian stock market from 2008-2015. All firm specific variables comprise of 1191 
observations while corporate governance variables comprise of 614 observations.  
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Table 5. 2 : Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the study. The sample consists of 157 
companies listed on the Egyptian stock market from 2008-2015. Div is a dummy variable that is set to one if 
the firm paid dividends and zero otherwise. Invest is the market-to-book ratio calculated as the book value of 
assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of assets. Liq 
is the net working capital to assets ratio calculated as current assets minus total cash and equivalents minus 
current liabilities over the total book value of assets minus cash and equivalents. Lev is total debt over total 
assets less cash and equivalents. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Cashflow is cash flow to assets 
ratio calculated as net income plus depreciation over total assets. Vol is the standard deviation of the cash 
flow ratio.  Debtmat is the total debt less debt repayable in less than one year over total debt. Capex is capital 
expenditure to assets calculated as the change in fixed assets plus depreciation over total assets. Insider is the 
percentage of outstanding shares held by insiders. Inst is the ratio of shares that institutions own in the firm 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Boardsize is the number of directors on the board over the 
natural logarithm of total assets. Boardindep is the ratio of non-executive directors to total directors.  Duality 
is a dummy variable set to one if the chairman of the board is also the CEO and zero otherwise. Gov is the 
percentage of outstanding shares held by the government of Egypt. Women is the percentage of women 
directors on the board to total directors. Audit is a dummy variable set to one if the company auditor is one of 
the big four audit firms and zero otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Observations Mean Median       Minimum Maximum 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Div 1191 0.5584299 1 0 1 
Invest 1191 1.423406 1.16288 0.451624 6.01201 
Liq 1191 0.0839628 0.058674 -0.749091 0.756863 
Lev 1191 0.5104803 0.480598 0.021029 1.83963 
Size 1191 20.19576 20.0711 15.17123 24.94605 
Cashflow 1191 0.0610957 0.052975 -0.270013 0.329664 
Vol 1191 0.0472727 0.032911 0.005444 0.195243 
Debtmat 1191 0.1963004 0.105146 0 0.814638 
Capex 1191 0.0241441 0.004132 -0.152226 0.316099 
Insider 614 0.0648763 0 0 0.792 
Inst 614 0.3216755 0.265945 0 0.95885 
Boardsize 614 0.3853968 0.385369 0.165193 0.741383 
Boardindep 614 0.7032858 0.777778 0 1 
Duality 614 0.6530945 1 0 1 
Gov 614 0.239803 0.058871 0 0.965929 
Women 614 0.0933095 0 0 0.428571 
Audit 614 0.3355049 0 0 1 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In order to understand the data set and the nature of the companies in the sample, an 
overview of the mean, median, minimum and maximum values is presented for firm 
184 
 
characteristics and corporate governance variables. Dividend dummy shows a mean 
percentage of 55.84%, indicating that just above half the companies in the sample pay-out 
dividends. Investment opportunity indicates that companies do have investment activities 
ahead, showing an average market to book ratio of 142.34%. Liquid asset substitutes 
(calculated as the percentage of net working capital to assets) shows an average percentage 
of almost 8.4%. Since the average is a positive number, this indicates that mostly 
companies keep sufficient current assets to cover their current liabilities. Nevertheless, the 
percentage is still relatively low, indicating that on average companies do not prefer to 
keep high levels of current assets (excluding cash). The percentage of net working capital 
to assets ranges from -74.91% to 75.69%. This indicates that some companies follow a 
very aggressive working capital strategy without having sufficient current assets to cover 
current liabilities. Whereas, other companies follow a very conservative working capital 
strategy, keeping high levels of current assets. 
The average debt to assets ratio is 51.05%, indicating on average companies finance half of 
their assets from debt. The cash flow to assets ratio ranges from -27% to 32.97%. Since 
cash flow is calculated as net income plus depreciation over total assets, statistics indicate 
that some companies are making profits, whereas others are making losses. On average, the 
cash flow to assets ratio is only 6.11%. Debt maturity shows that the reliance on long term 
financing in Egyptian listed companies is on average 19.63%. Capital expenditure 
indicates that some companies have increased their spending on fixed assets, while other 
companies have decreased their spending on fixed assets. The findings show that the 
average of capital expenditure to assets is only 2.41%, indicating that firms are not very 
keen on investing in fixed assets or creating company expansions. These companies may 
be keeping a large portion of their assets in current assets. 
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Regarding corporate governance variables, the average insider ownership in Egyptian 
listed firms is only 6.49%. Studies such as Abdelsalam et al. (2008) and Wahba (2014) 
also find low managerial ownership percentages in Egypt of 6.51% and 8.52%, 
respectively. According to the agency theory, insider ownership is a strong governance 
mechanism that aligns the goals of managers with the goals of shareholders (Jensen, 1986). 
The low percentage of insider ownership shows that this governance mechanism is not 
widely implemented, and that the awareness of stock based incentives is still under-
developed in Egypt. The average institutional ownership in Egyptian listed firms is around 
32.17%. This is in line with previous research in Egypt that find high percentages of 
institutional ownership such as Abdelsalam et al. (2008) 19.43%, Soliman et al. (2012) 
52.43% and Wahba (2014) 24.497%. 
The average board independence reported in table 5.2 is 70.33% indicating that a large 
portion of the board of directors of Egyptian listed firms are non-executive directors. This 
indicates good corporate governance practices because non-executive directors bring 
higher monitoring powers (Ullah and Kamal, 2017). Research has found that more 
independent boards exert higher monitoring and cause lower managerial opportunism 
(Kusnadi, 2011; Boubaker and Derouiche, 2015). Nevertheless, the percentage of non-
executive directors ranges from 0 to 100%, which indicates that some companies do not 
have any non-executive directors on the board. This does not comply with the code of 
corporate governance of Egypt (European Corporate Governance Institute, 2011).  
Duality shows that the majority of companies listed on the Egyptian stock market, have the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chairman of the Board (COB) as the same person. 
This indicates that duality is a major issue in Egyptian corporate governance because when 
CEO-duality exists, the board‟s monitoring effectiveness decreases (Drobetz and 
Grüninger, 2007; Kuan et al., 2011; Kusnadi, 2011; Boubaker and Derouiche, 2015). The 
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percentage of government ownership in the sample ranges from 0 to 96.59%. This shows 
that some companies in the sample have no government ownership at all, whereas others 
are almost completely controlled by the government of Egypt. Most companies are 
privately owned, because the mean government ownership is only 23.98% and the median 
is as low as 5.89%. Nevertheless, there remains to be a significant portion of listed 
companies owned by the government of Egypt. This is in line with previous research such 
as Omran et al. (2008), Abdelsalam et al. (2008) and Wahba (2014) that find that the 
average government ownership in Egyptian listed firms to be 34%, 29.97% and 10.937%, 
respectively. 
The variable „Women‟ shows that on average only 9.3% of company boards are female 
directors. The median indicates that most companies do not have women directors on the 
board at all. An obvious finding is that the maximum percentage of women on the board is 
only 42.86%. This shows that absolutely no company in the sample has more than half of 
its directors as women. This is indication of poor corporate governance practices, because 
previous research has shown that women increase board monitoring effectiveness (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009). Finally, the audit dummy variable shows that the majority of 
companies do not have one of the big four audit firms as their auditors. This is evidence of 
relatively poor audit quality. This is contrary to expectations that the companies listed on 
the Egyptian stock market would mostly hire one of the big four audit firms as their 
auditors. Overall, the descriptive statistics exposes some major deficiencies in corporate 
governance practices in Egypt. 
5.2 Model 1: The Financial Determinants of Corporate Cash Holdings 
The trade-off, pecking order and agency cost of free cash flow theories are the three main 
theories that attempt to explain corporate cash holdings (see chapter 2). According to the 
trade-off theory, cash holdings are determined by weighing the benefits and costs of 
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holding cash (Drobetz and Grüninger, 2007). The pecking order theory explains cash 
holdings from the view that firms keep cash because they prefer internal finance over 
external finance (Myers, 1984). Finally, the agency cost of free cash flow theory attempts 
to explain cash holding decisions from an agency perspective, predominantly that 
managers build up cash reserves for their own private benefits and to increase resources 
under their control (Jensen, 1986). Under each of these theories, there is a set of financial 
determinants that attempt to explain cash holding decisions which formulate model 1 (see 
chapter 4, section 4.2.5). The following sections present the findings and the discussion of 
the results for model 1. First, correlation analysis is tested to provide an indication about 
the relationships of all variables and expose any multicollinearity problems. Then 
diagnostic tests are preformed to address any issues related to multivariate regression. 
Finally, the results of the multivariate regression results are presented.  
5.2.1 Correlation Analysis for Model 1  
One of the important assumptions of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is that there 
should not be perfect multicollinearity between the independent variables (Brooks, 2008). 
Multicollinearity is measured using two methods, namely a correlation matrix and the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test. Firstly, to differentiate between using Pearson and 
Spearman correlation, the Shapiro-Wilk normality test is conducted in table 5.3. 
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Table 5. 3 : Shapiro-Wilk Test of Normality 
 ______________________________________ 
Variable Prob>z 
 _______________________________________ 
  
Lncash 0 
Div 0.98671 
Invest 0 
Liq 0 
Lev 0 
Size 0 
Cashflow 0 
Vol 0 
Debtmat 0 
Capex 0 
_______________________________________ 
 
According to the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality, all variables are not normal except 
dividend dummy. Therefore, spearman correlation is used because it is a non-parametric 
test (Artusi, Verderio and Marubini, 2002). The spearman correlation matrix is presented 
in table 5.4. According to spearman correlation, there is no obvious problem of 
multicollinearity between any variables in model 1. 
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Table 5. 4 : Spearman Correlation Matrix for Model 1 
This table presents spearman correlation matrix for all variables used in model 1. Lncash is the natural logarithm of the 
cash ratio calculated as cash and equivalents over the book value of assets less cash and equivalents. Div is a dummy 
variable that is set to one if the firm paid dividends and zero otherwise. Invest is the market-to-book ratio calculated as 
the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of 
assets. Liq is the net working capital to assets ratio calculated as current assets minus total cash and equivalents minus 
current liabilities over the total book value of assets minus cash and equivalents. Lev is total debt over total assets less 
cash and equivalents. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. CF is cash flow to assets ratio calculated as net income 
plus depreciation over total assets. Vol is the standard deviation of the cash flow ratio.  Debtmat is the total debt less debt 
repayable in less than one year over total debt. Capex is capital expenditure to assets calculated as the change in fixed 
assets plus depreciation over total assets. 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Lncash Div Invest Liq Lev Size CF Vol Debtmat Capex 
 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Lncash 1                   
Div 0.3581 1                 
Invest 0.2539 -0.0198 1               
Liq 0.0219 0.0379 -0.1156 1             
Lev 0.0216 -0.0944 0.1908 -0.5036 1           
Size -0.0301 0.1838 -0.182 -0.243 0.2078 1         
CF 0.4341 0.5382 0.2894 0.1559 -0.2043 0.0929 1       
Vol 0.1142 -0.1479 0.2802 -0.1649 0.0283 -0.1882 -0.0437 1     
Debtmat -0.1557 -0.1123 -0.1009 -0.157 0.076 0.3103 -0.1613 -0.0201 1   
Capex -0.0108 -0.0402 0.0434 -0.0424 -0.0297 0.0036 0.0843 0.0036 0.1215 1 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
With regard to cash, the highest correlation is with cash flow and the lowest correlation is 
with capital expenditure. According to all other variables, the highest correlation is 
between dividends and cash flow of 0.5382. However, the correlation is not considered 
strong, because it is less than 0.7. Therefore, no problem of multicollinearity is evident 
between the variables of model 1.   
5.2.2 Diagnostic Testing for Model 1 
In order to carry out regression analysis, five diagnostic tests for the Gauss-Markov 
assumptions are performed for model 1. The Gauss-Markov assumptions are discussed in 
details in chapter 4, section 4.3. According to the set procedure (see chapter 4, section 4.8), 
firstly the Ramsey Reset test is conducted in order to test for functional form 
misspecification. The Ramsey Reset test in table 5.5 shows an insignificant result 
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indicating that the model is correctly specified. This test ensures the data is in linear form 
and that there is no omitted variable bias.  
The second assumption is that there should not be perfect collinearity between the 
independent variables. Even though the spearman correlation matrix shows no obvious 
problem of multicollinearity, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test is conducted as a 
more formal method to test for multicollinearity. The VIF test in table 5.5 shows that there 
is no problem of multicollinearity. Even through there is no formal table for the VIF test 
results, a rule of thumb states that the common critical point for the VIF test is 5 
(Studenmund, 2014). In table 5.5, all variables show values significantly lower than 5. The 
highest VIF level is leverage with a value of only 1.72. 
The third Gauss-Markov assumption is that the variance of the error term must be 
homoscedastic. If the error terms are not constant and not random around the line of best 
fit, then the errors are heteroscedastic. Heteroscedasticity is expected to be evident in 
scalar variables. The Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test and the White's test reported in 
table 5.5, show evidence of heteroscedasticity. In order to address the problem of 
heteroscedasticity, White‟s robust standard errors are used (see chapter 4, section 4.3.2.2).  
The fourth assumption is the assumption that the error terms should not be correlated. If 
error terms are serially correlated then there is a problem of autocorrelation. The Breusch-
Godfrey LM test reported in table 5.5 shows that the model has a problem of 
autocorrelation. Autocorrelation is addressed using Newey-West and Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors (see chapter 4, section 4.3.3.2).   
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Table 5. 5 : Diagnostic Testing for Model 1 
This table presents the diagnostic testing for model 1. Model specification is tested using the Ramsey Reset 
Test. Multicollinearity is tested using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test.  Heteroscedasticity is tested 
using Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg and White's test. Autocorrelation is tested using the Breusch-
Godfrey LM test. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Model 
Specification Multicollinearity     Heteroscedasticity 
 
                
Autocorrelation  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Test P-value Variable VIF Test P-value     Test p-value  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Ramsey 
Reset 
Test 
  
0.07600 
Lev 1.72 
Breusch-
Pagan / 
Cook-
Weisberg  
0.0000 
Breusch-
Godfrey 
LM test 0.0000 
  
Liq 1.67 
     
    
Cashflow 1.65 
White's test  0.0000     
    
Div 1.41 
        
    
Size 1.31 
        
    
Invest 1.23 
        
    
Debtmat 1.17 
        
  
Vol 1.14 
    
  
capex 1.09 
    
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Finally, in order for ordinary least squares regression to be the Best Linear Unbiased 
Estimator (BLUE), the independent variables must be uncorrelated with the error terms. 
This is known as the assumption of strict exogeneity. If this assumption is not valid, then 
there is a problem of endogeneity. In this case, endogeneity is addressed using the Two-
Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimator, which is an extension to OLS. According to Ozkan 
and Ozkan (2004), the determinants of corporate cash holdings should be treated as 
endogenous, because shocks affecting cash holdings will affect its determinants as well. 
2SLS is an instrumental variable approach (Wooldridge, 2009). In 2SLS endogeneity is 
solved by using instruments that are uncorrelated with the error term but highly correlated 
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with the independent variables. The second lags of the independent variables are used as 
instruments (see chapter 4, section 4.5).  
5.2.3 Regression Results for Model 1  
Table 5.6 presents the regression results for model 1. According to the set procedure and 
the diagnostic tests performed, the first column shows results for the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression for the full model. The second column shows the results of the 
OLS backward stepwise regression, which is used to create a more simplified model, 
attempting to explain the maximum variability in the dependent variable using the 
minimum number of independent variables. The backward stepwise regression starts with 
the complete model and then removes the insignificant variables in a stepwise manner. For 
column 1 and 2, White‟s robust standard errors are used to correct for heteroscedasticity. 
Newey-west and Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are reported in column 3 and 4, 
respectively to control autocorrelation. Finally, column 5 presents results of the Two-Stage 
Least Squares (2SLS) instrumental variable approach to address endogeneity, along with 
robust standard errors to solve heteroscedasticity problems. The Durbin and Wu-Hausman 
Tests at the bottom of column 5 confirm that the firm specific variables are endogenous 
and that 2SLS must be used to address this issue. The main results do not change under all 
estimators in column 1 through 5.  
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Table 5. 6 : Regression Results for Model 1 
This table presents regression results for model 1. The sample consists of 157 companies listed on the 
Egyptian stock market from 2008-2015. The dependent variable is Lncash. Lncash is the natural logarithm 
of the cash ratio calculated as cash and equivalents over the book value of assets less cash and equivalents. 
Div is a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm paid dividends and zero otherwise. Invest is the 
market-to-book ratio calculated as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market 
value of equity divided by the book value of assets. Liq is the net working capital to assets ratio calculated 
as current assets minus total cash and equivalents minus current liabilities over the total book value of assets 
minus cash and equivalents. Lev is total debt over total assets less cash and equivalents. Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. Cashflow is cash flow to assets ratio calculated as net income plus depreciation 
over total assets. Vol is the standard deviation of the cash flow ratio.  Debtmat is the total debt less debt 
repayable in less than one year over total debt. Capex is capital expenditure to assets calculated as the 
change in fixed assets plus depreciation over total assets. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentile. All models include year and industry dummies. 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Lncash 
OLS full 
model 
White's 
Robust 
standard 
errors 
Stepwise 
White's 
Robust 
standard 
errors 
Newey-West 
standard 
errors 
Stepwise 
Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors 
2 SLS 
Robust 
standard 
errors 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Div 0.83559
*** 
0.82411
***
 0.82411
***
 0.81333
***
 1.87134
***
 
  (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Invest 0.15983
***
 0.16179
***
 0.16179
**
 0.16035
***
 0.73790
***
 
  (0.00300) (0.00200) (0.02500) (0.00100) (0.00200) 
Liq 0.77639
***
 0.76897
***
 0.76897
*
 0.75940
***
 1.45883
***
 
  (0.00200) (0.00300) (0.07500) (0.00100) (0.00100) 
Lev 1.61697
***
 1.61262
***
 1.61262
***
 1.64745
***
 1.51946
***
 
  (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00100) 
Size -0.06410
**
 -0.06190
**
 -0.0619 -0.06203
*
 -0.10890
**
 
  (0.04700) (0.04200) (0.24100) (0.07400) (0.01600) 
Cashflow 5.33592
***
 5.34371
***
 5.34371
***
 5.41994
***
 1.55172 
  (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.55800) 
Vol 5.42040
***
 5.40906
***
 5.40906
***
 5.68091
***
 - 
  (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00900) (0.00100)   
Debtmat 0.06958 - - - - 
  (0.77200)        
Capex 0.42955 - - - - 
  (0.55000)         
Constant -3.548058
***
 -3.55722
***
 -3.55722
***
 -3.676536
***
 -2.901589
***
 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.006) (0.0000) (0.0100) 
Observations 1191 1191 1191 1191 877 
Adjusted R
2 
0.29340 0.29310 - 0.29230 0.18870 
Model Significance (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Ramsey Reset Test 0.07600 0.49190 - - - 
Durbin and Wu-
Hausman Tests - - - - 0.00000 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes:  
- The p-values are reported in brackets. 
- Significance levels: 
 * Significant at 10% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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There are many important findings from the regressions reported in table 5.6. The results 
show a significant positive relationship between cash holdings and dividend payments. 
This is contradictory to the traditional trade-off theory which states that firms that pay 
dividends hold low levels of cash because they can easily cancel dividends and raise cash 
when needed (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). In fact, the results show that firms that pay-out 
dividends refuse to cut-off these dividends, therefore accumulate cash in order to avoid 
future liquidity problems. The results support the signalling theory which proposes that 
information asymmetry between managers and investors can signal the firm‟s financial 
position (see chapter 2, section 2.2.1). Since managers have more information about the 
firm‟s future, when firms keep paying dividends, a positive signal regarding the firm‟s 
future financial position is sent to investors (Al-Najjar and Belghitar, 2011). Firms that pay 
dividends keep high levels of cash in order to keep paying dividends regularly and sustain 
a good corporate image and a strong reputation. Firms keep high levels of cash in order to 
continue paying dividends regularly improving the company‟s reputation, while possibly 
still trying to improve the firm‟s financial positions.  
The results are contradictory to studies in the U.S. which find a negative relationship 
between dividends and cash holdings (Jensen, 1986; Guney et al., 2007; Harford et al., 
2008; Bates et al., 2009; Iskandar-Datta and Jia, 2012; Gao et al., 2013). Companies in the 
U.S. do not need to send strong future signals or improve their reputation by constant 
dividend payments. In fact, U.S. companies that pay dividends keep low levels of cash 
because they can raise cash from dividends when needed, without losing their reputations. 
However, in developing economies, companies try to gain investors‟ trust by paying 
constant dividends and also keeping enough cash in order to try to improve the firm‟s 
financial position. The results here support the findings of Shah (2011) and Masood and 
Shah (2014) in Pakistan. Also, the results support the findings of Wu et al. (2012) and 
Chen et al. (2014) in China and Al-Najjar (2013) in Brazil. Song and Lee (2012) also find 
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a positive relationship between cash holdings and dividends in East Asia. Drobetz and 
Gruninger (2007), Guney et al. (2007), Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal (2012) and Iskandar-
Datta and Jia (2012) all provide evidence of a positive relationship between cash holdings 
and dividends in different countries in Europe. 
The findings show a significant positive relationship between investment opportunity and 
cash holdings. This is in line with the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory but 
contradictory to the agency theory. In accordance with the trade-off theory, results show 
that firms with good investment opportunities ahead, keep high levels of cash in order to 
meet these opportunities and avoid the opportunity cost of forgone return (Ozkan and 
Ozkan, 2004). Moreover, these firms keep excess cash levels in order to avoid the risks of 
financial distress, once the investments have been made (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). 
Similarly, the results are in line with the pecking order theory. The positive relationship 
between cash holdings and investment opportunity indicates that firms keep cash in order 
to invest in these opportunities and try to avoid financing from expensive external sources 
(Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). This indicates that raising external funds in Egypt is relatively 
difficult or costly. This is confirmed with the relatively high interest rates in Egypt. The 
results support the findings of most studies such as Dittmar et al. (2003), Ozkan and 
Ozkan, (2004), Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Kusnadi (2005), Guney et al. (2007), Harford et 
al. (2008), Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012), Ogundipe et al. (2012), Song and Lee (2012), 
Chen et al. (2014) and Kusnadi et al. (2015). The results do not support the agency theory 
perspective that managers do not identify positive net present value projects and thus just 
waste corporate resources (Jensen, 1986). In fact, the results show the motives of Egyptian 
managers to accumulate cash for precautionary motives when they have upcoming 
investment opportunities. Managers keep cash in order to meet these opportunities and 
avoid facing opportunity costs of forgone return. This finding also shows an indication of 
transaction motives of Egyptian managers. This is evident by the fact that they keep 
196 
 
sufficient cash reserves in order to invest in upcoming investment opportunities without 
having to resort to expensive external financing and pay significant transaction costs. 
Most previous studies support the trade-off theory by finding a negative relationship 
between cash holdings and liquid asset substitutes (net working capital). According to the 
trade-off theory, liquid assets are regarded as a substitute to cash, therefore firms with high 
levels of liquid assets have a lower need to keep significant cash balances (Opler et al., 
1999; Dittmar et al., 2003; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; D‟Mello et 
al., 2008; Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2008; Bates et al., 2009; Bigelli and 
Sánchez-Vidal, 2012; Iskandar-Datta and Jia, 2012; Ogundipe et al., 2012; Song and Lee, 
2012; Wu et al., 2012; Al-Najjar, 2013; Orens and Reheul, 2013; Chen et al., 2014; 
Locorotondo et al., 2014; Masood and Shah, 2014; Guizani, 2017). Contrary to 
expectations, results show evidence of a positive relationship between cash holdings and 
liquid asset substitutes, supporting the findings of Guney et al. (2007). The positive 
relationship between net working capital and cash holdings indicates that liquid assets do 
not act as a substitute to cash in Egypt. This shows that access to external finance is 
difficult in Egypt and so firms hoard cash, even if they have high account receivable and 
inventory balances. Accounts receivables is a stronger substitute for cash, when firms have 
easy access to external finance (Wu et al., 2012). This indicates that firms cannot rely on 
accounts receivables as a liquidity tool, which could be an indication of risks of bad debts. 
Ogundipe et al. (2012) explain that firms keep high cash reserves in order to cover possible 
losses that could occur due to bad debts or late payments. The positive relationship 
between cash holdings and liquid assets could also indicate that firms in Egypt are not able 
to sell inventory quickly and thus need to have cash surplus for precautionary motives to 
decrease risks of financial distress. This could also be an indication of high risk of 
obsolescence of inventory (Ogundipe et al., 2012).  
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According to the trade-off theory, there are two different views regarding the relationship 
between leverage and cash holdings (see chapter 2, section 2.2.4). The first view proposes 
a positive relationship between leverage and cash holdings. According to this view, firms 
that have high leverage keep high cash balances to avoid risks of financial distress and to 
be able to pay obligations on time (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). The second view proposes a 
negative relationship between leverage and cash holdings, because high leverage indicates 
the ability of firms to issue debt suggesting that leverage and cash are considered to be 
substitutes (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004).   
Results show a positive relationship between leverage and cash holdings. This supports the 
first view of the trade-off theory which proposes that firms in Egypt that have high 
leverage, keep high levels of cash in order to be able to pay off obligations as they come 
due and decrease risks of financial distress in the future. The results indicate high 
precautionary motives by managers of Egyptian firms. The results support the findings of 
Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008), Al-Najjar and Belghitar (2011), Ogundipe et 
al. (2012) and Locorotondo et al. (2014). However, the results contradict the second view 
to the trade-off theory that leverage and cash are substitutes and that leverage acts as a 
proxy for a firm‟s ability to issue debt. This justification is not evident in the Egyptian 
context because financial markets are considered weak and Egypt has a bank-oriented 
financial system (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999). In a bank-oriented system, firms rely 
more on bank loans as a source of long term finance, rather than relying on issuing debt 
securities. Therefore, the argument that cash acts as a proxy for the firm‟s ability to issue 
debt securities is not evident here. 
The results are also contradictory to the pecking order and agency theories found by Opler 
et al. (1999), Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Drobetz and Grüninger 
(2007), D‟Mello et al. (2008), Harford et al. (2008), Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012), Song 
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and Lee (2012), Wu et al. (2012), Belghitar and Khan (2013), Gao et al. (2013), Orens and 
Reheul (2013), Chen et al. (2014), Masood and Shah (2014), Kusnadi et al. (2015), 
Guizani (2017) and Al-Najjar and Clark (2017). There is no evidence that leverage leads to 
higher monitoring for Egyptian firms and forces managers to invest excess cash. Even 
though Egypt has a bank-oriented financial system, it is clear that banks do not perform a 
strong monitoring function. The perspective explained by Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) 
that banks perform strong monitoring functions and so force managers to decrease cash 
holdings is not evident. In fact, this could be an indication that banks encourage firms to 
accumulate cash, so that the banks themselves benefit from large deposits (Pinkowitz and 
Williamson, 2001). 
All estimators show a significant negative relationship between cash holdings and firm 
size, except under the Newey-west standard errors which shows a negative but 
insignificant result. The negative relationship between cash holdings and firm size is 
supportive of the trade-off theory but contradictory to the pecking order and agency 
theories. The results support the findings of major researches including Opler et al. (1999), 
Dittmar et al. (2003), Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Drobetz and 
Grüninger (2007), D‟Mello et al. (2008), Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal (2012), Ogundipe et 
al. (2012), Wu et al. (2012), Gao et al. (2013) and Locorotondo et al. (2014).  Again, the 
results confirm trade-off considerations of Egyptian managers. The trade-off theory 
proposes that managers of large firms do not need to keep cash for precautionary or 
transaction motives. Large firms are expected to be more diversified and have lower 
probability of financial distress and thus managers of large firms do not need to accumulate 
cash for precautionary motives (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Furthermore, large firms are 
expected to have easy access to external finance, therefore they do not need to hoard cash 
for transaction motives either (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) support 
this view by reporting that large firms are subject to lower information asymmetry, face 
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fewer borrowing constraints and enjoy lower costs of external financing. The pecking 
order theory which states that larger firms are more successful and so accumulate more 
cash in order to avoid external financing is not supported here. Also, the agency 
perspective that managers of large firms are able to accumulate cash due to shareholder 
dispersion is not supported.  
Regression results show a significant positive relationship between cash holdings and cash 
flows. Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Drobetz and Grüninge (2007), Garcia-Teruel and 
Martinez-Solano (2008), Harford et al. (2008), Song and Lee (2012), Wu et al. (2012), 
Gao et al. (2013), Orens and Reheul (2013), Chen et al. (2014), Masood and Shah (2014) 
and Kusnadi et al. (2015) all find a positive relationship between cash holdings and cash 
flows. The finding is in support of the pecking order theory. The results indicate that firms 
with higher cash flows keep more cash to decrease the reliance on expensive external 
financing. The trade-off view that firms with high cash flows have low cash holdings 
because they are regarded as substitutes is not supported here. Even though all regression 
estimators in column 1 to 5 in table 5.6 show similar results, the positive relationship 
between cash holdings and cash flows is significant when using OLS but becomes 
insignificant when using 2SLS. Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) and Ogundipe et al. (2012) 
also find an insignificant relationship between cash holdings and cash flows.  
Results indicate that cash flow volatility impacts cash holdings positively. According to 
Opler et al. (1999), firms with riskier cash flows keep more cash for precautionary 
motives. The result is supportive of almost all previous research (Opler et al., 1999; 
Saddour, 2006; Guney et al., 2007; Harford et al., 2008; Bates et al., 2009; Bigelli and 
Sánchez-Vidal, 2012; Gao et al., 2013; Iskandar-Datta and Jia, 2012; Belghitar and Khan, 
2013; Chen et al., 2014; Locorotondo et al., 2014; Guizani, 2017). When firms have higher 
cash flow volatility, they are subject to higher risks of financial distress and thus managers 
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keep cash for precautionary motives. This supports the trade-off theory. Under the 2SLS 
approach, cash flow volatility is removed due to collinearity with the instruments.  Debt 
maturity and capital expenditure show insignificant impacts on cash holdings under all 
estimators. D‟Mello et al. (2008) also finds an insignificant relationship between capital 
expenditure and cash holdings. Overall, most findings support the trade-off theory 
indicating that Egyptian managers hoard cash for precautionary and transaction motives. 
Referring back to the diagram from the hypotheses development in chapter 2 (section 2.8), 
the same diagram is presented but with the findings of the regression model highlighted in 
bold and italic. 
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Diagram 5. 1: The Financial Determinants of Corporate Cash Holdings Findings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Determinant Expected Relationship Expected Relationship Expected Relationship 
Dividend Payments Negative - - 
Investment Opportunity Positive Positive Negative 
Liquid Assets Substitutes Negative - - 
Leverage Positive/ Negative Negative Negative 
Firm Size Negative Positive Positive 
Cash Flow Negative Positive - 
Volatility Positive - - 
Debt Maturity Negative - - 
Capital Expenditure Positive Negative - 
Source: Author 
The results present mostly evidence of the trade-off theory and partial evidence of the 
pecking order theory. The financial determinants show that managers of Egyptian listed 
firms mainly keep cash for precautionary and transaction motives. This indicates that the 
market risks and instability of the Egyptian economy cause managers to hoard cash in 
order to decrease future risks of financial distress. Furthermore, the difficulty and high 
costs associated with external finance in Egypt lead managers to accumulate cash in order 
Cash Holdings 
Precautionary Motive 
 
Trade-off Theory 
Transaction Motive 
 
Agency Motive 
 
Pecking Order Theory Agency Theory 
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to have sufficient funding for daily operations and investing requirements. The agency 
view that managers keep cash for their own private benefits at the expense of shareholders 
is not evident by the firm characteristics. However, in order to confirm if the agency cost 
of free cash flow theory influences cash holding decisions in Egypt, corporate governance 
determinants must be analysed.     
5.3 Model 2: The Corporate Governance Determinants of Corporate Cash Holdings 
The agency cost of free cash flow hypothesis states that managers prefer to build cash 
reserves to increase their discretionary powers and gain control over the firm‟s investment 
decisions (Jensen, 1986). Previous studies have proposed that managers keep high levels of 
cash for their own private benefits and at the expense of the shareholders‟ benefits (Dittmar 
et al., 2003; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). According to the agency theory, when there are 
strong corporate governance mechanisms, agency problems decrease and so managers are 
forced to invest excess cash in positive net present value projects or distribute cash to 
shareholders as dividends. In order to test the agency theory, corporate governance 
variables are added to the firm specific variables in model 1 to formulate model 2 (see 
chapter 4, section 4.2.5). There is specifically significant importance regarding the impact 
of corporate governance on cash holdings in developing economies, where investor 
protection is predominantly weak. This is supported by previous research suggesting that 
firms in countries with weak shareholder protection hold more cash due to higher 
discretionary powers exercised by top management (Dittmar et al., 2003; Pinkowitz et al., 
2006; Al-Najjar, 2013). Al-Najjar (2013) specifically highlights the importance of 
investigating the impact of board and CEO characteristics as well as audit features on cash 
holdings in developing economies. Similarly, Rezaei and Saadati (2015) recommend the 
investigation of ownership structure and board parameters. The following sections present 
the results for model 2, using the same procedure for model 1. First, correlation analysis is 
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presented, followed by diagnostic testing and finally the results of the regression analysis 
are discussed. 
5.3.1 Correlation Analysis for Model 2  
The same procedure as for model 1 is applied to model 2. The Shapiro-Wilk test for data 
normality shows that all variables are not normal except for the dummy variables. 
Therefore, spearman correlation is used.  
Table 5. 7 : Shapiro-Wilk test for Normal Data 
 ___________________________________________ 
Variable Prob>z 
____________________________________________ 
Lncash 0 
Div 0.95734 
Invest 0 
Liq 0 
Lev 0 
Size 0 
Cashflow 0 
Vol 0 
Debtmat 0 
Capex 0 
Insider 0 
Inst 0 
Boardsize 0 
Boardindep 0 
Duality 0.92784 
Gov 0 
Women 0 
Audit 0.36336 
_____________________________________________ 
The correlation matrix in table 5.8, shows that there is no obvious problem of 
multicollinearity. The highest correlation shown is between leverage and liquid assets 
substitutes with value of 0.5633, indicating only moderate correlation.  
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Table 5. 8 : Spearman Correlation Matrix for Model 2 
This table presents spearman correlation for model 2. The sample consists of 157 companies listed on the Egyptian stock market from 2012-2015. Lncash is the natural logarithm of the cash ratio calculated as cash and 
equivalents over the book value of assets less cash and equivalents. Div is a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm paid dividends and zero otherwise. Invest is the market-to-book ratio calculated as the book value of 
assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of assets. Liq is the net working capital to assets ratio calculated as current assets minus total cash and equivalents minus current 
liabilities over the total book value of assets minus cash and equivalents. Lev is total debt over total assets less cash and equivalents. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. CF is cash flow to assets ratio calculated as net 
income plus depreciation over total assets. Vol is the standard deviation of the cash flow ratio.  Debtmat is the total debt less debt repayable in less than one year over total debt. Capex is capital expenditure to assets calculated 
as the change in fixed assets plus depreciation over total assets. Insider is the percentage of outstanding shares held by insiders. Inst is the ratio of shares that institutions own in the firm divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding. Bsize is the number of directors on the board over the natural logarithm of total assets. Bindep is the ratio of non-executive directors to total directors.  Duality is a dummy variable set to one if the chairman of the 
board is also the CEO and zero otherwise. Gov is the percentage of outstanding shares held by the government of Egypt. Women is the percentage of women directors on the board to total directors. Audit is a dummy variable 
set to one if the company auditor is one of the big four audit firms and zero otherwise 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Lncash Div Invest Liq Lev Size CF Vol Debtmat capex Insider Inst Bsize Bindep Duality Gov Women Audit 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Lncash 1                                   
Div 0.3623 1                                 
Invest 0.2138 -0.0464 1                               
Liq 0.019 0.0622 -0.1312 1                             
Lev 0.0372 -0.0605 0.2129 -0.5633 1                           
Size 0.0338 0.1934 -0.1204 -0.2466 0.2565 1                         
CF 0.4228 0.5204 0.2342 0.2615 -0.1932 0.1043 1                       
Vol 0.1538 -0.096 0.3629 -0.1215 0.1325 -0.179 -0.0364 1                     
Debtmat -0.1436 -0.1274 -0.0594 -0.1868 0.0381 0.227 -0.1537 -0.0779 1                   
Capex 0.0396 -0.0763 -0.0073 0.0096 -0.0032 0.003 0.0365 -0.1056 0.1191 1                 
Insider -0.147 -0.0928 -0.0945 0.117 -0.0979 -0.0818 0.0248 -0.017 0.0744 0.0251 1               
Inst 0.0899 0.2013 -0.1052 -0.1498 0.06 0.3195 -0.0026 -0.0591 0.0728 0.0446 -0.2898 1             
Bsize 0.0879 0.1975 0.0716 0.0185 -0.1138 0.1437 0.1698 0.088 0.0859 -0.015 0.035 0.0884 1           
Bindep -0.0643 0.0202 -0.0401 -0.0168 -0.0951 0.0836 0.0124 0.0409 0.1127 0.0097 -0.076 0.1083 0.5085 1         
Duality 0.1221 0.071 -0.0393 0.0668 0.0332 0.0205 0.0662 -0.1761 -0.0704 0.0029 -0.0984 0.1356 -0.0197 -0.147 1       
Gov 0.255 0.3107 0.0311 -0.0126 0.0172 0.2203 0.1248 -0.0318 -0.107 -0.0802 -0.3032 0.4331 0.154 0.1273 0.2799 1     
Women 0.0076 0.0262 0.0982 0.0263 -0.096 -0.1066 0.0463 0.043 0.1053 0.0827 0.0558 0.0049 0.208 0.0787 0.065 0.0055 1   
Audit 0.037 0.0425 0.0409 -0.0912 0.191 0.3394 0.105 0.026 0.0801 0.0681 -0.0123 0.0612 0.1617 0.1786 -0.1706 -0.1657 -0.0481 1 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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5.3.2 Diagnostic Testing for Model 2  
Similar to the procedure for model 1, diagnostic tests are performed for model 2. The 
Ramsey Reset Test in table 5.9 shows an insignificant result indicating that the model is 
correctly specified. This test ensures the data is in linear form and that there is no omitted 
variable bias. The VIF test in table 5.9 shows that there is no problem of multicollinearity. 
A common critical point for the VIF test is 5 (Studenmund, 2014). If a model includes a 
large number of independent variables, this value can increase (Studenmund, 2014). Even 
though model 2 includes many independent variables, all variables show values 
significantly lower than 5. The highest VIF level is leverage with a value of 2.15. 
Regarding heteroscedasticity, the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg and White's tests 
reported in table 5.9 show presence of heteroscedasticity. For Autocorrelation, the 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test shows that there is evidence of serial correlation.  
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Table 5. 9 : Diagnostic Testing for Model 2 
This table presents the diagnostic testing for model 2. Model specification is tested using the Ramsey Reset 
Test. Multicollinearity is tested using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test.  Heteroscedasticity is tested 
using Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg and White's test. Autocorrelation is tested using the Breusch-
Godfrey LM test. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Model 
Specification Multicollinearity 
         
Heteroscedasticity 
                
Autocorrelation 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Test P-value Variable VIF Test P-value     Test  P-value    
________________________________________________________________________ 
Ramsey  
Reset 
Test 
0.0604 
  
Lev 2.15 
Breusch-
Pagan / 
Cook-
Weisberg  
0.0000 
Breusch-
Godfrey 
LM test  0.0000 
Liq 2.02     
    Cashflow 1.76       
    Gov 1.63 White's test  0.0000     
    Size 1.58         
    Div 1.56         
    Boardsize 1.48         
  Inst 1.48     
  Audit 1.42     
  Boardindep 1.4     
  Vol 1.3     
  Invest 1.27     
  Insider 1.21     
  Duality 1.2     
  Women 1.11     
________________________________________________________________________ 
Since model 2 includes many independent variables, and the diagnostic tests show 
evidence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, backward stepwise ordinary least 
squares regression is performed with robust standard errors. Autocorrelation is addressed 
using Newey-West and Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. Subsequently, for more robustness 
and to address problems of endogeneity, two-stage least squares regression is performed 
with robust standard errors (see chapter 4, section 4.8).  
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5.3.3 Regression Results for Model 2 
Table 5.10 presents the regression results for model 2. Model 2 includes the firm specific 
variables in model 1, in addition to corporate governance variables. Since model 2 includes 
a large set of variables, stepwise approach is used in order to formulate a more simplified 
and efficient model. Therefore, stepwise OLS with robust standard errors are reported, 
along with Newey-west and Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. The main results of the firm 
specific variables do not change.   
208 
 
Table 5. 10 : Regression Results for Model 2 
This table presents OLS regression results for model 2. The sample consists of 157 companies listed on the 
Egyptian stock market from 2012-2015. The dependent variable is Lncash. lncash is the natural logarithm of the 
cash ratio calculated as cash and equivalents over the book value of assets less cash and equivalents. Div is a 
dummy variable that is set to one if the firm paid dividends and zero otherwise. Invest is the market-to-book ratio 
calculated as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by 
the book value of assets. Liq is the net working capital to assets ratio calculated as current assets minus total cash 
and equivalents minus current liabilities over the total book value of assets minus cash and equivalents. Lev is 
total debt over total assets less cash and equivalents. Cashflow is cash flow to assets ratio calculated as net 
income plus depreciation over total assets. Vol is the standard deviation of the cash flow ratio. Duality is a 
dummy variable set to one if the chairman of the board is also the CEO and zero otherwise. Insider is the 
percentage of outstanding shares held by insiders. Gov is the percentage of outstanding shares held by the 
government of Egypt. Boardsize is the number of directors on the board over the natural logarithm of total assets. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Year and industry dummies are included. 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Lncash OLS Stepwise Robust 
Standard errors 
Newey-West 
Standard errors 
Stepwise Driscoll-Kraay 
Standard errors 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Div 0.444254
***
 0.45173
***
 0.454511
*
 
  (0.00200) (0.00400) (0.05400) 
Invest 0.146892
*
 - - 
  (0.07000) - - 
Liq -
 
- - 
  - - - 
Lev 1.058354
***
 1.080126
***
 1.295939
***
 
  (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00300) 
Size - - -0.0582
***
 
 - - (0.00400) 
Cashflow 5.427356
***
 5.676479
***
 5.942181
***
 
  (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Vol 6.169005
***
 7.137136
***
 5.868185
**
 
  (0.00100)
 
 (0.00200) (0.04800) 
Duality 0.284224
**
 0.299646
**
 - 
  (0.01900)
 
 (0.04500) - 
Insider -0.88977
**
 - -0.90362
**
 
  (0.04800)
 
 - (0.01200) 
Gov 0.719796
***
 0.860526
***
 0.857571
***
 
  (0.00000)
 
 (0.00000) (0.00200) 
Boardsize 0.891359
*
 0.963854
*
 0.508019
*
 
 (0.05500) (0.09600) (0.08100) 
Constant -4.81835
***
 -4.86648
***
 -3.5031
***
 
  (0.00000) (0.0000) (0.00000) 
Observations 614 614 614 
Adjusted R
2 
0.3299 - 0.3112 
Model Significance (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0211) 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes:  
- The p-values are reported in brackets. 
- Significance levels: 
 * Significant at 10% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
For corporate governance variables, the four significant variables shown by the stepwise 
regression are CEO duality, insider ownership, government ownership and board size. 
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CEO duality shows a significant positive impact on cash holdings. CEO duality occurs 
when the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman of the Board (COB) are the same 
person. The findings are consistent with the view that companies with high CEO duality 
keep more cash than companies with CEO and COB separation (Drobetz and Grüninger, 
2007). Results indicate presence of the agency theory, showing that when there is CEO 
duality, boards become less effective in monitoring and so managers have higher discretion 
to hoard cash. The positive relationship between CEO duality and cash holdings is an 
indication that CEOs allow high cash reserves in order to enable insider expropriation 
(Boubaker and Derouiche, 2015). The results support the findings of recent research 
including Kuan et al. (2011), Kusnadi (2011) and Boubaker and Derouiche (2015). The 
descriptive statistics show that CEO duality is high in the sample. The suggestion here is 
that CEO duality should decrease in Egyptian companies, because in the presence of 
duality the monitoring effectiveness of the board decreases. In this case, CEOs have higher 
managerial discretion and keep high levels of cash for their own private benefits. These 
benefits could include job protection through showing better performance, or even insider 
expropriation. However, keeping significant amounts of cash could decrease shareholder 
wealth, due to the idle investment and opportunity cost of lost returns that could have been 
generated if the cash was invested in positive net present value projects.  
The findings show a significant negative relationship between insider ownership and cash 
holdings. The results support the agency theory, indicating that managerial ownership 
decreases agency problems (Jensen, 1986). This supports the interest alignment hypothesis. 
When managers hold more shares in the company, the interests of managers and 
shareholders are aligned, thus managers keep low levels of cash. Since goal congruence 
occurs with managerial ownership, managers could invest excess cash in positive net 
present value projects or distribute cash as dividends. The findings support those reported 
by Drobetz and Grüninger (2007). They prove that when managers have a higher 
210 
 
percentage of ownership in the firm, the incentives of managers and shareholders are 
aligned and thus managers are encouraged to keep lower levels of cash. According to 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) managerial ownership decreases the manager‟s incentive to 
take actions that are value destroying to shareholders. The result is in line with findings of 
Masood and Shah (2014) in Pakistan. The result here contradicts the findings of Harford et 
al. (2008) and Chen and Chuang (2009) in the U.S. and Belghitar and Khan (2013) in the 
U.K. who support the entrenchment hypothesis. The entrenchment hypothesis states that 
managerial ownership increases the motive for managers to hoard cash for their own 
private benefits. The negative relationship between managerial ownership and cash 
holdings shows that managerial ownership is an effective tool in Egypt to decrease agency 
problems. Aligning the interests of managers and shareholders motivates managers to 
invest the cash in projects that will increase shareholder wealth.  
The results show a significant positive relationship between cash holdings and government 
ownership. Contrary to expectations, the fact that government ownership increases 
monitoring, hence forcing managers to decrease cash holdings is not supported here. 
Interestingly, the results are totally contradictory to the view explained by Wu et al. (2012) 
and Megginson et al. (2014) in China. The authors argue that government controlled firms 
keep low levels of cash because they have easy access to external finance from state-
owned banks. In fact, results indicate that when government ownership increases, 
managers keep higher levels of cash. The finding shows that the government of Egypt does 
not play a strong monitoring function for listed firms. The government is unable to force 
managers to invest cash in positive net present value projects. It is evident that managers of 
firms with high government ownership seek to increase their job security and show that 
they are performing well, by keeping large cash balances on the balance sheet. Managers 
could be hoarding cash for precautionary motives in order to meet future obligations as 
they come due and decrease risks of financial distress. Nevertheless, the high cash balances 
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have an opportunity cost of lost returns that could have been generated if the cash was 
invested in positive net present value projects. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
state owned firms are typically inefficient. Executive remuneration schemes in government 
owned companies could be linked to firm size, hence encouraging managers to accumulate 
cash regardless of future profitability prospects. The government of Egypt should perform 
a higher monitoring function and force managers to invest cash in projects that will benefit 
the firm by generating higher future returns. This will only happen when there is increased 
awareness regarding the effect of the agency theory on corporate cash holdings.  
Board size shows a significant positive relationship with corporate cash holdings. The 
significance level is at 10%. According to Harford et al. (2008), previous studies have 
found contradicting evidence regarding the effectiveness of board size. Some studies like 
Kuan et al. (2012), Masood and Shah (2014) and Al-Najjar and Clark (2017) find that 
larger boards are more effective and provide better monitoring. Consequently, these studies 
provide evidence of a negative relationship between board size and cash holdings. On the 
other hand, studies such as Kusnadi (2005) and Ullah and Kamal (2017) argue that larger 
boards are actually less effective causing weaker corporate governance practices and less 
effective monitoring. Their findings are supported through a positive relationship between 
board size and cash holdings. 
The evidence provided here show that when board size increases, cash holdings also 
increase. The findings support the traditional view that larger boards are less effective 
because the large number of members slows down the decision process (Jensen, 1993). 
Larger boards provide less effective monitoring and so are unable to force managers to 
invest the excess cash in positive net present value projects or distribute dividends to 
shareholders. Additionally, larger boards could be less effective due to high costs of 
coordination and free riding problems (Chen and Chuang, 2009). The results are supportive 
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to the findings of Ullah and Kamal (2017) who also find a significant positive relationship 
between board size and cash holdings in Pakistan. However, the results are contradictory to 
the findings of Al-Najjar and Clark (2017) who find a negative relationship between board 
size and cash holdings in the MENA region. 
In order to address endogeneity problems, two-stage least squares is used for model 2. All 
the firm specific variables are treated as endogenous variables like model 1, and the second 
lags of independent variables are used as instruments. Separate tests for endogeneity are 
implemented for corporate governance variables. Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests of 
endogeneity reported in table 5.11 show that corporate governance variables are 
exogenous. Therefore, firm specific variables are treated as endogenous whereas corporate 
governance variables are treated as exogenous. The model is tested from 2012-2015 and 
the instrumental variables used for the endogenous firm-specific variables are lagged for 
two years up to 2010. 
Table 5. 11 : Tests of Endogeneity for Corporate Governance Variables 
____________________________________________________ 
Test P-value 
____________________________________________________ 
Durbin 0.1991 
Wu-Hausman 0.2533 
____________________________________________________ 
 
Table 5.12 shows results of the two-stage least squares regression for model 2. The model 
includes robust standard errors to deal with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
problems. The model includes year and industry dummies to control for macro-economic 
events and industry effects, respectively. The main results for the firm specific variables 
are similar to those reported using 2SLS in model 1. The three corporate governance 
variables that show significant results under 2SLS are board independence, government 
ownership and percentage of women on the board.  
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Table 5. 12 : Two-Stage Least Squares Regression (2SLS) for Model 2 
This table presents 2SLS regression results for model 2. The sample consists of 157 companies listed on the Egyptian 
stock market from 2012-2015. The dependent variable is Lncash. Lncash is the natural logarithm of the cash ratio 
calculated as cash and equivalents over the book value of assets less cash and equivalents. Div is a dummy variable that 
is set to one if the firm paid dividends and zero otherwise. Invest is the market-to-book ratio calculated as the book 
value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of assets. Liq is 
the net working capital to assets ratio calculated as current assets minus total cash and equivalents minus current 
liabilities over the total book value of assets minus cash and equivalents. Lev is total debt over total assets less cash and 
equivalents. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Cashflow is cash flow to assets ratio calculated as net income 
plus depreciation over total assets. Insider is the percentage of outstanding shares held by insiders. Inst is the ratio of 
shares that institutions own in the firm divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Boardsize is the number of 
directors on the board over the natural logarithm of total assets. Boardindep is the ratio of non-executive directors to 
total directors. Duality is a dummy variable set to one if the chairman of the board is also the CEO and zero otherwise. 
Gov is the percentage of outstanding shares held by the government of Egypt. Women is the percentage of women 
directors on the board to total directors. Audit is a dummy variable set to one if the company auditor is one of the big 
four audit firms and zero otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Year and 
industry dummies are included. 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Lncash 2SLS 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Div 0.9511706
* 
  (0.085) 
Invest 0.627906
*** 
  (0.007) 
Liq 1.198702
** 
  (0.021) 
Lev 1.141754
** 
  (0.019) 
Size -0.0926916
* 
  (0.055) 
Cashflow 2.752031 
  (0.29) 
Insider -0.7429144 
  (0.149) 
Inst 0.0418492 
  (0.871) 
Boardsize 0.9446415 
  (0.11) 
Boardindep -0.5564625
* 
 (0.058) 
Duality 0.2058014 
  (0.143) 
Gov 0.4699997
* 
 (0.086) 
Women -0.9681864
* 
 (0.074) 
Audit 0.1482593 
  (0.318) 
Constant  -2.674874
** 
  (0.015) 
Observations 594 
R
2 
0.2898 
Model Significance (0.0000) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes:  
- The p-values are reported in brackets. 
- Significance levels: 
 * Significant at 10% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Results show a significant negative relationship between board independence and cash 
holdings.  The result totally supports the agency theory. The findings indicate that when 
board independence increases, there is higher board monitoring effectiveness and 
managers are forced to decrease cash holdings. Higher board independence improves 
monitoring effectiveness because independent directors are not closely involved in setting 
firm strategies and policies and thus are able to assess managers more objectively than 
executive directors (Jizi et al., 2014). Moreover, firms that have more independent boards, 
face lower information asymmetry and have easier access to external financing (Chen, 
2008). Thus, these firms have a lower need to hoard cash. The results are consistent with 
the findings of Kusnadi (2011) and Boubaker and Derouiche (2015) who agree than when 
board independence increases, monitoring effectiveness increases and managers invest the 
excess cash or pay-out dividends. However, the results are contradictory to the findings of 
Kuan et al. (2011), Kuan et al. (2012) and Ullah and Kamal (2017). Egyptian listed firms 
should continue to increase the percentage of non-executive and independent board 
members in order to increase the monitoring effectiveness of company boards and decrease 
agency problems. Results also show a significant positive relationship between 
government ownership and cash holdings, similar to the findings reported and discussed by 
the OLS model. 
The negative relationship between women on the board and cash holdings indicates that 
when the percentage of women on the board increases, cash holdings decrease. Again, the 
results are supportive of the agency theory. Results indicate that when there are more 
women on the board, monitoring effectiveness increases and so managers decrease cash 
holdings. The results prove the view that women perform better monitoring than men 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009). This is because women have been found to attend more board 
meetings and are assigned more monitoring roles. The results support the recent findings of 
Ullah and Kamal (2017) in Pakistan. The view that women are more risk averse and so 
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encourage managers to keep more cash for precautionary motives is not supported here. 
Even though Loukil and Yousfi (2016) find that the percentage of women on the board 
increases cash holdings for precautionary motives in Tunisia, the results are different for 
Egyptian firms. The percentages of women on the boards of Egyptian listed firms are still 
considered relatively low. Increasing the percentage of women on company boards, will 
create higher monitoring and decrease agency problems. This will in turn result in 
managers investing the excess cash in positive net present value projects that will generate 
returns, increasing shareholder wealth and reflecting improvements on the Egyptian 
economy in general.  
5.4 Dynamic Panel Estimation 
Investigating whether firms have target cash ratios is done through investigating if cash 
holdings revert back to the mean (Opler et al., 1999). Studies such as Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004) and Ogundipe et al. (2012) find that firms have target cash ratios and try to adjust 
back to their targets through a partial adjustment mechanism. Following Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004), a dynamic panel GMM model is applied to show if firms adjust to their target cash 
levels. Delays in the adjustment process may be due to transaction costs and other 
adjustment costs. A dynamic panel model requires a lagged dependent variable to be added 
with the other independent variables. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) use the lagged cash ratio as 
an independent variable, whereas Drobretz and Gruninger (2007) use the lagged natural 
logarithm of the cash ratio when applying GMM. When a lagged dependent variable is 
used, it becomes correlated with the error term causing OLS to be inconsistent. For this 
reason, a dynamic panel GMM model is required to analyse firm‟s target cash ratios and 
address endogeneity problems. 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) state that in dynamic cash holding models it is inappropriate to 
assume that independent variables are strictly exogenous. This is because shocks affecting 
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cash holdings are likely to affect its firm-level determinants as well. Following this 
recommendation, all firm specific variables in this study are treated as endogenous. Also, 
independent variables may be correlated with current and past errors (Ozkan and Ozkan, 
2004). 
The Sargan test of over-identified restrictions, reported in table 5.13, shows an 
insignificant result which indicates that the instruments and residuals are independent. The 
Arellano and Bond (1991) test of second order serial correlation AR (2) shows 
insignificant results indicating that the instruments used in the model are valid and that 
there is no second order serial correlation. 
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Table 5. 13 : Dynamic Panel Model 
This table presents dynamic panel GMM regression results. The sample consists of 157 companies listed on 
the Egyptian stock market from 2008-2015. The dependent variable is Lncash. Lncash is the natural 
logarithm of the cash ratio calculated as cash and equivalents over the book value of assets less cash and 
equivalents. Casht-1 is the natural logarithm of the cash ratio lagged to one period. Div is a dummy variable 
that is set to one if the firm paid dividends and zero otherwise. Invest is the market-to-book ratio calculated 
as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the 
book value of assets. Liq is the net working capital to assets ratio calculated as current assets minus total 
cash and equivalents minus current liabilities over the total book value of assets minus cash and 
equivalents. Lev is total debt over total assets less cash and equivalents. Size is the natural logarithm of 
total assets. Cashflow is cash flow to assets ratio calculated as net income plus depreciation over total 
assets. Vol is the standard deviation of the cash flow ratio. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentile. The model includes yearly dummies. The second lags of all independent variables 
are used as instruments. AR(1) and AR(2) are test statistics for first and second order serial correlation, 
respectively. Sargan and Hansen tests are tests of over identifying restrictions.  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Lncash GMM 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Casht-1 0.4932489
*** 
 
(0.0000) 
Div 1.139309
** 
 
(0.0230) 
Invest 0.188668 
 
(0.3260) 
Liq 0.7359767 
 
(0.3800) 
Lev 0.5359751 
 
(0.5020) 
Size -0.1728914
*** 
 
(0.000) 
Cashflow 1.704979 
 
(0.3600) 
Vol 12.85218 
 
(0.1530) 
Observations 1033 
Model Significance (0.00000) 
AR (1) 0.00000 
AR(2) 0.5990 
Sargan Test 0.47900 
Hansen Test 0.56500 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes:  
- The p-values are reported in brackets. 
- Significance levels: 
 * Significant at 10% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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The findings of the dynamic panel model reported in table 5.13, indicate that firms have a 
target cash ratio which they try to reach. Firms try to adjust their current cash ratios to 
reach their target levels. This is evident by the significant relationship between the lagged 
cash and current cash levels. The adjustment coefficient is 0.5067511 (1-0.4932489) (see 
chapter 4, section 4.6.2). This indicates that firms are unable to adjust to their target cash 
ratios immediately. If the adjustment coefficient is close to 1, then it means firms adjust 
quickly to their target cash ratios with low cost, because the target cash is close to the 
actual cash. However, if the adjustment coefficient is close to zero, this indicates that 
adjustment costs are high and firms are unable to adjust quickly to their targets. It is 
important for managers to adjust relatively quickly to their target cash ratios in order to 
have sufficient funds for day to day operations and undertake profitable investment 
opportunities without having to bear significant adjustment costs (Martínez-Sola et al., 
2018).  Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) find the adjustment coefficient above 0.6, concluding that 
U.K. firms adjust relatively quickly to their target cash ratios. They suggest that firms keep 
their cash holdings relatively close to the target in order to avoid adjustment costs. Here the 
adjustment coefficient is only 0.5, similar to the findings of Al-Najjar and Belghitar (2011) 
and Shah (2011), indicating that firms do not adjust immediately to their target cash ratios. 
This implies that firms face adjustment costs for deviating from their target cash ratios. 
Firms in Egypt are expected to hold relatively large cash balances in order to avoid costs of 
adjusting to target cash levels such as transaction costs. Similarly, a recent study by Orlova 
and Rao (2018) shows an adjustment coefficient of 0.54 in the U.S. The adjustment 
coefficient in this sample is significantly lower than the adjustment coefficient of 0.85 
reported by Guizani (2017) in Saudi Arabia. This shows that the speed of adjustment to the 
target cash ratio in Egypt is slower than Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, the adjustment 
coefficient in this sample is still higher than that reported by Dittmar and Duchin (2011) of 
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only 0.38 in the U.S. It is also higher than the adjustment coefficient between 0.35 and 0.5 
reported by Drobetz and Grüninger (2007) in Switzerland.  
The main findings of other determinants do not change when GMM is used. All 
independent variable show the same results as the OLS and 2SLS models previously 
reported, in terms of signs. However, when using GMM only dividend payments and firm 
size show significant results. This is because GMM uses many instrumental variables. 
Instrumental variable estimators have larger asymptotic variance than OLS due to the 
additional uncertainty caused by the instruments, which are imperfectly correlated with the 
independent variables (Wooldridge, 2009). 
5.5 Political Stability 
This section presents further analysis by investigating the effect of political stability on 
corporate cash holdings in Egypt. This study is the first to investigate the effect of political 
stability on corporate cash holdings. Additionally, a subsample analysis is performed in 
order to compare the determinants of corporate cash holdings before and after the Egyptian 
revolution of 2011. For this part of the analysis the balanced panel data set is used. 
5.5.1 Political Stability and Cash Holdings  
At times of low political stability, managers may be reluctant to undertake risky 
investments and choose to accumulate cash in order to hedge against risks of future cash 
shortages and financial distress. In order to determine if Egyptian firms increase cash 
holdings at times of low political stability, a political stability variable is added to the 
regression model. The World Bank indicator for political stability is used as a measure for 
political stability and is extracted from 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-indicators. 
The political stability variable is defined by World Bank as an index that is an average of 
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several other indices, in order to measure the perceptions of the probability that the 
government will be destabilized by unauthorized means such as violence or terrorism. The 
index ranges from -2.5 to +2.5, with -2.5 being weak political stability and +2.5 being 
strong political stability. It is important to note that out of 194 countries, Egypt is ranked 
number 177 on the political stability index (Source: World Bank, 2018, 
http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/wb_political_stability/). Figure 5.2 shows 
political stability in Egypt throughout the years.  
Figure 5. 2 : Political Stability in Egypt 
 
 
Political stability is important in emerging market economies because it directly affects 
investor and consumer confidence (Euromonitor International, 2014). Overall, political 
stability has an impact on investment, consumption and economic growth. Out of 25 major 
emerging market economies, Egypt has experienced the highest deterioration in political 
stability since the revolution in 2011 (Euromonitor International, 2014). In order to analyse 
the effect of political stability on corporate cash holdings in Egypt, the political stability 
variable is regressed against cash holdings. This is to test if political instability affects the 
tendency for Egyptian firms to hoard cash balances. The firm specific variables previously 
analysed in model 1 are used to control for the financial determinants of corporate cash 
holdings.  
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Table 5. 14 : The Effect of Political Stability on Cash Holdings 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
This table presents OLS and 2SLS regression results to show the effect of political stability on cash holdings. 
The sample consists of 135 companies listed on the Egyptian stock market from 2008-2015. The dependent 
variable is Lncash. Lncash is the natural logarithm of the cash ratio calculated as cash and equivalents over 
the book value of assets less cash and equivalents. Div is a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm paid 
dividends and zero otherwise. Invest is the market-to-book ratio calculated as the book value of assets minus 
the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of assets. Liq is the net 
working capital to assets ratio calculated as current assets minus total cash and equivalents minus current 
liabilities over the total book value of assets minus cash and equivalents. Lev is total debt over total assets 
less cash and equivalents. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Cashflow is cash flow to assets ratio 
calculated as net income plus depreciation over total assets. Vol is the standard deviation of the cash flow 
ratio. Political Stability is an index measuring political stability by world bank. Robust standard errors are 
used. 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Lncash OLS 2SLS 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Div 0.839408
*** 
1.683698
***
 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Invest 0.190769
***
 0.733999
***
 
 (0.00200) (0.00800) 
Liq 0.911882
***
 1.504728
***
 
 (0.00000) (0.00100) 
Lev 1.764306
***
 1.638244
***
 
 (0.00000) (0.00100) 
Size -0.09439
***
 -0.11253
**
 
 (0.00100) (0.02900) 
Cashflow 5.492701
***
 2.023255 
 (0.00000) (0.42100) 
Vol 5.345983
***
 - 
 (0.00000) - 
Politicalstability -0.18813
*
 -0.64932
**
 
 (0.08500) (0.03300) 
Constant -3.30304
***
 -3.91623
***
 
 (0.00000) (0.00500) 
Observations 1080 810 
Adjusted R
2
  0.2594 0.2096 
Model Significance (0.00000) (0.00000) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes:  
- The p-values are reported in brackets. 
- Significance levels: 
 * Significant at 10% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
The results of the regression model show a significant negative relationship between 
political stability and corporate cash holdings in Egypt. For robustness, the results are 
carried out using OLS and 2SLS, with robust standard errors. The results could be 
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explained through the trade-off perspective. When political stability increases, cash 
holdings decrease because firms do not need to keep high cash holdings for precautionary 
motives. This means that at times of political instability, firms hoard cash because 
managers are fearful of the uncertainty caused by political instability. Managers keep high 
cash balances at these times, in order to decrease the risks of financial distress and avoid 
cash shortages. Furthermore, transaction motives may be evident here. Firms increase cash 
holdings at times of political instability due to the difficult access to external financing at 
these times. Additionally, managers may hoard cash at times of political instability due to 
agency motives. Managers may be facing job insecurities at times of political instability. 
At these difficult times, managers may keep high cash levels to show that they are well-
performing without having to bear significant risks which could be job threatening. 
Furthermore, the regression analysis for the financial determinants of corporate cash 
holdings is conducted using subsamples.   
5.5.2 Subsample Analysis 
Subsample analysis is tested for model 1 to analyse if the determinants of corporate cash 
holdings in Egypt have changed before and after the Egyptian revolution of 2011. There 
are no corporate governance data available before 2012 to perform this test on model 2. 
Therefore, the subsample analysis is performed for model 1 only. The first thing to be 
tested is whether the cash ratios of firms in the sample differ before and after 2011. In 
order to do so, first normality of the dependent variable is tested using the Shapiro-Wilk 
test. The normality test shows significant results of 0.000 indicating that the data is not 
normal and accordingly the Wilcoxon test which is a non-parametric test is used. The 
Wilcoxon test compares the means of cash holdings under the two subsamples. The first 
subsample is from 2008-2011 and the second subsample is from 2012-2015. 
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Table 5. 15 : Wilcoxon (Mann-Whitney) 
________________________________________________________________ 
Sample Observations Ranksum Expected Prob > |z|  
_______________________________________________________________ 
2008-2011 540 302406 291870 
0.0398 
2012-2015 540 281334 291870 
________________________________________________________________ 
The p-value of the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests reported in table 5.15, shows significant 
results which indicates that cash holdings are different before and after the Egyptian 
revolution of 2011. Therefore, the regression analysis is conducted under 2 separate sub-
samples to show if the results of the original regression models are different. The first sub-
sample is from 2008-2011 and the second from 2012-2015. In order to test if the 
coefficients of the independent variables are different between sub samples, the Wilcoxon 
Mann-Whitney test is reported in table 5.16 for all non-normal variables and the Analysis 
of Variance (ANOVA) is reported for dividends, which is the only normal variable. 
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Table 5. 16 : Sub-Sample Analysis 
This table presents regression results for sub-sample analysis. The full sample includes 135 companies 
listed on the Egyptian stock market. The first sub-sample is from 2008-2011 and the second from 2012-
2015. The dependent variable is Lncash. Lncash is the natural logarithm of the cash ratio calculated as cash 
and equivalents over the book value of assets less cash and equivalents. Div is a dummy variable that is set 
to one if the firm paid dividends and zero otherwise. Invest is the market-to-book ratio calculated as the 
book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the book 
value of assets. Liq is the net working capital to assets ratio calculated as current assets minus total cash 
and equivalents minus current liabilities over the total book value of assets minus cash and equivalents. Lev 
is total debt over total assets less cash and equivalents. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Cashflow is cash flow to assets ratio calculated as net income plus depreciation over total assets. Vol is the 
standard deviation of the cash flow ratio.   
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Lncash 2008-2011   2012-2015   
Wilcoxon 
Mann-
Whitney / 
ANOVA 
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
            
Div 0.90141
*** 
  0.58242
***   0.49500 
  (0.00000)   (0.00000)     
Invest 0.18865
** 
  0.22214
**   0.00000*** 
  (0.01700)   (0.02900)     
Liq 0.87033
** 
  0.99085
**   0.25510 
  (0.01900)   (0.01100)     
Lev 1.65699
*** 
  1.62861
***   0.21250 
  (0.00000)   (0.00000)     
Size -0.13906
*** 
  -0.03800   0.01460** 
 (0.00400)  (0.41400)   
Cashflow 5.28534
*** 
  5.44576
***   0.00000*** 
  (0.00000)   (0.00000)     
Vol 3.37650
* 
  7.39940
***   1.00000 
  (0.08200)   (0.00000)     
Constant -1.88139   -4.01502
***     
  0.11100   0.00000     
Observations 540   540     
R
2 
0.30270   0.32580     
________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes:  
- The p-values are reported in brackets. 
- Significance levels: 
 * Significant at 10% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
According to the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test reported in table 5.16, the variables that 
show significant differences under the 2 subsamples are investment opportunity, firm size 
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and cash flows. The positive relationship between cash holdings and investment 
opportunity increases after the Egyptian revolution. This indicates that after the revolution, 
firms hold more cash for precautionary motives and to be able to have sufficient cash 
reserves for upcoming investment opportunities. Moreover, the fact that companies keep 
more cash for investment indicates that companies prefer not to resort to external 
financing. This translates into more difficult access to external finance after the revolution. 
Even though the relationship between cash holdings and firm size is negative in both 
subsamples, it becomes insignificant after the revolution. The trade-off view that larger 
firms do not need to hoard cash because they are more diversified and less subject to 
financial distress is not evident after the revolution. Finally, the positive relationship 
between cash flows and cash holdings becomes stronger after the revolution. This indicates 
that the motivation of managers to keep more cash in order to decrease reliance on 
expensive external financing increased after the revolution. Again, this is an indication of 
more difficult access to external financing in the recent years.  
Conclusion 
This chapter addresses the fifth research objective by analysing the empirical findings in 
comparison with previous literature in order to provide a basis for recommendations for 
companies, managers, investors and policy makers. The financial determinants of 
corporate cash holdings show that dividend payments, investment opportunity, liquid asset 
substitute, leverage, cash flow and cash flow volatility impact cash holdings positively, 
whereas firm size impacts cash holdings negatively. The financial determinants show 
evidence of the trade-off and pecking order theories. As for the corporate governance 
determinants, CEO-duality, government ownership and board size impact cash holdings 
positively. This is contrary to insider ownership, board independence and percentage of 
women on the boards, all affecting cash holdings negatively. The results show evidence of 
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the agency cost of free cash flow theory. The hypotheses previously formulated (see 
chapter 2, section 2.8 and chapter 3, section 3.8) help answer the research questions 
through investigating the financial and corporate governance determinants of corporate 
cash holdings of firms listed on the Egyptian stock market. The findings contribute to the 
existing literature by analysing the determinants of corporate cash holdings and revealing 
which cash holding theories are best applicable to the Egyptian context. The following 
table summarizes the findings, clarifying which finding is supportive of which cash 
holdings theory. The table also shows the research hypotheses that are accepted and 
rejected. 
Table 5. 17: Summary of Findings 
Determinants Findings Supporting Theory Hypotheses 
Financial Determinants 
Dividend Payments Positive - Reject H1 
Investment Opportunity Positive Trade-off/Pecking order Accept H2 
Liquid Asset Substitutes Positive - Reject H3 
Leverage Positive Trade-off Accept H4 
Firm Size Negative Trade-off Accept H5 
Cash Flow Ratio Positive Pecking order Accept H6 
Cash Flow Volatility Positive Trade-off Accept H7 
Debt Maturity Insignificant - Reject H8 
Capital Expenditure Insignificant - Reject H9 
Political Stability Negative - Accept H10 
 
Corporate Governance Determinants 
Insider Ownership Negative Agency Accept H11 
Institutional Ownership Insignificant - Reject H12 
Government Ownership Positive  Agency Reject H13 
Board Size  Positive Agency Accept H14 
Board Independence Negative  Agency Accept H15 
CEO-Chairman Duality Positive Agency Accept H16 
Percentage of Women on 
the Board 
Negative  Agency Accept H17 
Audit Quality Insignificant - Reject H18 
 
The dynamic panel model shows that Egyptian firms are unable to adjust immediately to 
their target cash ratios. Finally, the relationship between political stability and cash 
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holdings is negative indicating that at times of low political stability managers hoard cash 
due to precautionary motives.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Introduction 
Holding cash has many benefits such as decreasing the risk of financial distress and 
decreasing the reliance on expensive external sources of finance or the fire sale of assets 
(Opler et al., 1999). However, holding cash has an opportunity cost of forfeited returns that 
could be generated from more profitable investments (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). 
Therefore, it is important to analyse cash holdings because of the associated opportunity 
costs of not investing in positive net present value projects (Al-Najjar, 2013). The three 
theories that attempt to explain corporate cash holdings are the trade-off, pecking order and 
agency cost of free cash flow theories.  
This chapter provides a revision of the research aims and objectives. The chapter proceeds 
by explanation of how the research findings contribute to the existing literature and 
practice, along with providing recommendations for companies listed on the Egyptian 
stock market. Finally, the limitations of the study are presented, followed by 
recommendations for further research.   
6.1 Revisiting Research Aims and Objectives 
This thesis aims to analyse the determinants of corporate cash holdings of firms listed on 
the Egyptian stock market. Most research on corporate cash holdings have been conducted 
in developed economies such as Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Ferreira and Vilela (2004), 
Drobetz and Gruninger (2007), Harford et al. (2008) and Bates et al. (2009). Even though 
some recent studies such as Al-Najjar (2013), Chen et al. (2014) and Kusnadi et al. (2015) 
have started to focus on emerging market economies, there still remains a gap in the 
literature relating to developing economies, and in particularly Egypt. It is important to 
investigate Egypt because previously studies have reported that Egyptian companies hoard 
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significantly larger cash balances compared to other countries (Dittmar et al., 2003). 
Additionally, the high political and economic instability in Egypt in the recent years 
provides an ideal context for testing well-established cash holding theories.  
From an agency perspective, analysing the effect of the agency theory on cash holdings is 
more important in developing economies because research has found that firms in 
countries with weak shareholder protection hold significantly more cash than firms in 
countries with strong shareholder protection (Dittmar et al., 2003; Pinkowitz et al., 2006; 
Al-Najjar, 2013). This is due to higher discretionary powers exercised by top management 
and inability of investors to rely on appropriate market mechanisms to force adequate 
dividend pay-outs. More specifically, studies such as Al-Najjar (2013) and Rezaei and 
Saadati (2015) recommend further academic enquiry into investigating the effect of firm-
level corporate governance variables such as ownership structure and board characteristics 
in developing economies. This thesis fills the gap in the literature by combining firm 
characteristics with firm-level governance variables and measuring their effect on the level 
of cash holdings of Egyptian listed firms.  
The research objectives are met through providing a detailed literature review on studies 
analysing corporate cash holdings in different contexts and through different theoretical 
perspectives. An overview of the Egyptian economy and stock market is also presented in 
order to introduce the Egyptian context in light of the major political and economic events 
of the recent years. More specifically, prominent corporate governance issues in Egypt are 
discussed in order to establish theoretical links to corporate cash holdings. The theories are 
subsequently tested with the analysis of the obtained data set by means of a variety of 
regression estimators. This is done in accordance with the detailed research procedure 
which is described in the methodology chapter of this thesis. The research findings are then 
thoroughly analysed and compared to previous studies. A detailed analysis is carried out on 
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how the research findings contribute to theoretical research and practical implications in 
order to provide recommendations for companies, boards of directors, managers, investors 
and policy makers. Finally, the limitations of the study and recommendations for future 
research are presented. 
6.2 Contribution of Findings 
This thesis contributes to existing research by combining firm characteristics and corporate 
governance variables to investigate the factors that affect managerial decisions regarding 
cash holdings of Egyptian listed firms. Findings confirm that Egyptian listed firms keep 
relatively significant cash balances on their balance sheets. This thesis fills the gap in the 
literature by explaining the reasons causing managers to hoard such significant cash 
balances. Therefore, financial and corporate governance determinants are analysed to test 
the trade-off, pecking order and agency cost of free cash flow theories. This research is the 
first to examine the determinants of corporate cash holdings in Egypt from the stated 
perspective. This section explains how the research findings contribute to theoretical 
research and practical implications. 
6.2.1 Financial Determinants  
Regarding financial determinants, findings show evidence of the trade-off theory and 
partial evidence of the pecking order theory. Results prove that dividend payments, 
investment opportunities, liquid asset substitutes, leverage, firm size, cash flows and cash 
flow volatility are all important financial determinants of corporate cash holdings for firms 
listed on the Egyptian stock market.  
According to the trade-off theory, cash holding decisions are identified through weighing 
the benefits and costs of holding cash (Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; 
Drobetz and Grüninger, 2007). Holding cash has many benefits such as avoiding cash 
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shortages, decreasing risks of financial distress and decreasing dependence on expensive 
external financing or fire sale of assets (Opler et al., 1999). The research findings provide 
strong evidence of the trade-off theory. More specifically, the findings show that 
investment opportunity, leverage and cash flow volatility impact cash holdings positively, 
whereas firm size impacts cash holdings negatively. 
The research findings suggest that firms with upcoming investment opportunities keep 
sufficient cash reserves in order to invest in them. Moreover, firms with higher leverage 
keep cash in order to be in the position to pay back outstanding debt. The findings show 
that firms with high cash flow volatility keep cash to decrease risks of financial distress. 
Similarly, smaller firms keep cash because they have higher risks of financial distress and 
less reliable access to external financing. Accordingly, the research findings support the 
trade-off theory suggesting that Egyptian managers keep high cash balances for 
precautionary motives. Managers accumulate cash in order to provide sufficient funding 
for day to day operations, decrease risks of financial distress and avoid cash shortages. 
However, it is important to reiterate that holding cash has an opportunity cost of lost 
returns that could have been earned, had the company invested in positive net present value 
projects (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). If managers invest the excess cash in positive net 
present value projects and generate returns, this will increase shareholder wealth and thus 
attract more investors.  
Interestingly, findings show that firms in Egypt hoard cash in order to keep paying 
dividends and maintain a strong corporate image. Firms try to send strong positive signals 
to the market through paying dividends. Furthermore, findings show that liquid assets are 
not a substitute to cash which indicates problems with accounts receivables and inventory 
management. This is evidenced by the positive relationship between liquid asset substitutes 
(net working capital) and cash holdings. According to Wu et al. (2012), accounts 
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receivables are a stronger substitute for cash when firms have easy access to external 
finance. Therefore, the inability of companies to rely on liquid assets indicates difficulty of 
access to external finance in Egypt. Consequently, the difficulty of access to external 
finance causes managers to hoard cash even if they have high account receivable and 
inventory balances. Therefore, if interest rates decrease, firms will have access to cheaper 
external finance when needed and will not choose to hoard significant cash balances that 
result in idle funds.  
According to the pecking order theory, firms hoard cash to finance projects internally and 
avoid expensive external financing (Myers, 1984). Findings show that firms with greater 
cash flows keep higher cash balances in support of the pecking order theory. If there is 
easier access to external finance facilitated by liquid capital markets or the efficient 
banking sector at low costs in Egypt, managers would not hoard such significant cash 
balances to avoid external financing and would rather benefit from investing cash in 
positive net present value projects.  
Finally, the speed of adjustment of firms in Egypt towards their target cash ratio is 
relatively slow. This indicates high adjustment costs. A significant portion of adjustment 
costs comes from transaction costs of having to raise capital from external sources or 
distribute cash as dividends to bring the current cash level to the target cash level (Orlova 
and Rao, 2018). If adjustment costs decrease, firms would be able to reach their optimal 
cash levels relatively quickly. 
6.2.2 Corporate Governance Determinants  
According to the agency cost of free cash flow theory, managers keep cash for their own 
private benefits such as increasing their discretionary powers and providing higher job 
security (Jensen, 1986). The research findings show that the improvement of corporate 
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governance practices has a significant impact on corporate cash holding decisions of 
managers in Egyptian listed firms. If firms improve corporate governance practices, there 
will be higher monitoring and less managerial discretion. Consequently, managers will be 
forced to invest the excess cash to generate higher profits or distribute the excess cash as 
dividends to shareholders. In both cases, shareholder wealth will increase, attracting more 
investors to the market and hence improving the Egyptian stock market and the economy 
as a whole. Increased awareness of corporate governance by managers, boards of directors, 
investors and policy makers is necessary in order to improve corporate governance 
practices in Egypt. According to the findings, recommendations for improvement of 
corporate governance practices can be in several ways:  
1- If managerial ownership increases, agency problems will decrease due to interest 
alignment between managers and shareholders (Jensen, 1986). Research findings 
provide evidence that managerial ownership is a strong corporate governance 
mechanism which creates a reduction in cash holdings. When there is goal 
congruence between managers and shareholders, managers will be encouraged to 
invest cash in positive net present value projects in order to generate higher future 
returns. It is recommended that companies increase managerial ownership to create 
higher goal congruence and thus decrease agency problems. Goal congruence can 
be achieved through performance related remuneration schemes. 
2- Findings show that government ownership does not provide a strong monitoring 
function. In fact, the managers of companies with high government ownership 
hoard more cash. This indicates that managers of government controlled firms are 
more concerned about decreasing risks of financial distress and increasing their 
own job security. If government ownership provides a stronger monitoring 
function, managers would be forced to invest the excess cash in order to generate 
higher returns. Compensation of managers in government owned firms could be 
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improved through performance related incentives or stock option compensation 
plans. Consequently, managers will have a higher incentive to improve 
performance and corporate wealth. 
3- Findings show that larger boards are less effective and thus enable managers to 
hoard cash. Larger boards are less effective due to high costs of coordination and 
free riding problems (Chen and Chuang, 2009). Moreover, in the presence of large 
boards, the decision process becomes slower (Jensen, 1993). Therefore, companies 
listed on the Egyptian stock market are advised to decrease board size in order to 
provide more effective monitoring over managerial decisions regarding cash.   
4- Results prove that non-executive directors provide higher board monitoring 
effectiveness and thus decrease cash holdings. Even though many companies in the 
sample have non-executive directors on their boards, some companies have all of 
their board members as executives. Understanding the importance of the existence 
of non-executive directors on company boards will improve corporate governance 
practices and force managers to invest idle cash in positive net present value 
projects.  
5- When CEO-chairman duality exists, managers keep high cash balances which in 
turn increase risks of insider expropriation. This is evident by the positive 
relationship between CEO duality and cash holdings. It is important to understand 
that the separation of the CEO and the chairman of the board is an important issue 
that relates to monitoring effectiveness and addresses the agency conflict. The 
suggestion here is for companies to decrease CEO duality in order to enhance 
monitoring effectiveness and decrease agency problems. 
6- The findings suggest that women on company boards provide higher monitoring 
effectiveness and are able to force managers to invest excess cash. The percentages 
of women on company boards are relatively low in Egypt. When boards of 
235 
 
directors, managers and investors realise that women encourage stronger 
monitoring, women will have higher chances of being appointed to the board 
positions and thus agency problems will decrease. If policy makers re-enforce a 
place for women on company boards, monitoring effectiveness will increase and 
thus managers will be forced to invest excess cash.  
6.2.3 Political Stability 
The findings provide evidence that firms in Egypt keep higher cash balances at times of 
low political stability. Understanding how political stability affects cash holdings will have 
an impact on investment and economic growth. Investors should be able to rely on 
appropriate market mechanisms in order to force investments of excess cash or divided 
payments, especially at times of low political stability. Times of low political stability are 
the times in which the economy is at greatest need to gain investor confidence and improve 
the market to enhance economic growth. The comparison between the determinants of 
corporate cash holdings before and after the Egyptian revolution of 2011 shows more 
difficult access to external finance after the revolution. In order to regain economic 
stability, access to external finance should be facilitated. Decreasing interest rates could be 
an effective way to facilitate external finance for Egyptian companies. This will discourage 
companies from hoarding unnecessary cash balances.  
6.3 Limitations of the Study 
This study has a number of limitations. Firstly, the research is limited to companies listed 
on the Egyptian stock market only. In Egypt, the number of companies listed on the stock 
market is relatively small. Only 221 companies were listed on the Egyptian stock market in 
2015. Secondly, corporate governance data is not available before 2012 because companies 
were not obligated to disclose this information. The Egyptian Financial Regulatory 
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Authority issued article 18 in 2011 stating that companies must disclose ownership 
structure and board of directors in details in a separate disclosure report. The disclosure 
report includes the names of the directors, their job titles and whether they are executives 
or non-executives. Finally, some variables such as independent directors and research and 
development expenditure are not available in Egypt. 
6.4 Recommendations for Further Research 
There are a few lines of further enquiry to extend the research on corporate cash holdings 
in Egypt. The first line of enquiry is evaluating the impact of excess cash holdings on firm 
value. This will allow the understanding of how investors perceive the value of excess 
cash. There are different strands of research in this area including measuring the effect of 
corporate governance, shareholder protection, diversification and financial constraints on 
the value of cash. The second line of enquiry is analysing the cash flow sensitivity of cash 
and how financial constraints may affect this sensitivity. Cash flow sensitivity is the firm‟s 
intention to save cash from cash inflows (Almeida et al., 2004). 
For the determinants of corporate cash holdings in Egypt, other factors concerning firm 
structure can be analysed. These factors may include firm diversification, corporate life 
cycle or the multinationality of firms.  
Regarding corporate governance, findings show that managerial ownership is an important 
determinant of corporate cash holdings in Egypt due to goal congruence between managers 
and shareholders. It could be beneficial to analyse how different CEO characteristics such 
as age, gender and compensation can affect managerial decisions regarding cash. More 
specifically, CEO incentives can be analysed to determine if long term incentive plans 
cause managers to focus on long term shareholder value maximization.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary of Literature Review Findings 
Appendix 1a: Summary of Literature Review on Financial Determinants  
Trade-off Pecking Order Agency No Evidence 
Dividend Payments  
Negative: 
Jensen (1986)-U.S 
Guney et al. (2007)- 
U.S 
 Harford et al. (2008)-
U.S.  
Bates et al. (2009)-U.S.  
Iskandar-Datta and Jia 
(2012)- U.S., U.K., 
Canada and Australia 
Al-Najjar (2013) –
Russia 
Belghitar and Khan 
(2013)-U.K. SMEs 
Gao et al. (2013)-U.S. 
Al-Najjar and Clark 
(2017)-MENA 
Contradict (positive):  
Drobetz and Gruninger 
(2007)- Switzerland 
Guney et al. (2007)-
Germany 
Shah(2011)-Pakistan 
Bigelli and Sánchez-
Vidal (2012)-Italy 
Iskandar-Datta and Jia 
(2012)-Germany, 
France and Japan 
  Dividend Payments  
Insignificant:  
Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004)- U.K 
Guney et al. (2007)-
France, Japan and U.K. 
Guizani (2017)-Saudi 
Arabia 
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Trade-off Pecking Order Agency No Evidence 
Song and Lee (2012)- 
East Asia 
Wu et al. (2012)-China 
Al-Najjar (2013)- 
Brazil 
Chen et al. (2014)- 
China 
Masood and Shah 
(2014)-Pakistan 
Investment 
Opportunity 
Positive: 
Dittmar et al. (2003)- 
cross-country 
Ozkan and Ozkan, 
(2004) –U.K. 
Kusnadi (2005)- 
Singapore 
Guney et al. (2007)- 
Cross Country 
Harford et al. (2008) - 
U.S. 
Iskandar-Datta and Jia 
(2012)- Cross Country 
Ogundipe et al. (2012)-  
Nigeria 
Chen et al. (2014)- 
China 
Kusnadi et al. (2015) – 
China 
Investment 
Opportunity 
Positive:  
Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004)- 
EMU 
Song and Lee 
(2012)- East 
Asia 
Kusnadi et al. 
(2015) – China 
 
 
Investment 
Opportunity 
Negative: 
Jensen (1986)-
U.S. 
Rezaei and 
Saadati (2015)- 
Iran 
Investment 
Opportunity 
Insignificant:  
Drobetz and Gruninger 
(2007)- Switzerland 
D‟Mello et al. (2008)-
U.S. 
Shah (2011)-Pakistan 
Guizani (2017)-Saudi 
Arabia 
 
Liquid Assets 
Substitutes 
Negative:  
Opler et al. (1999)-U.S.  
 
  Liquid Assets 
Substitutes 
Insignificant:  
Al-Najjar (2013)-Brazil 
and Russia 
A3 
 
Trade-off Pecking Order Agency No Evidence 
Dittmar et al. (2003)-  
Cross-country 
Ferreira and Vilela 
(2004)-EMU 
Ozkan and Ozkan, 
(2004)- U.K. 
D‟Mello et al. (2008)-
U.S. 
Garcia-Teruel and 
Martinez-Solano, 
(2008)- Spain 
Bates et al. (2009)- 
U.S.- Inventory 
Bigelli and Sánchez-
Vidal (2012) –Italy 
Iskandar-Datta and Jia 
(2012)- Cross Country 
Ogundipe et al. (2012)-  
Nigeria 
Song and Lee, (2012)- 
East Asia 
Wu et al. (2012)- China 
Al-Najjar, (2013)- India 
Orens and Reheul 
(2013) -Belgium-SMEs 
Chen et al. (2014)- 
China 
Locorotondo et al. 
(2014) -Belgium 
Masood and Shah 
(2014)-Pakistan 
Guizani (2017)- Saudi 
Arabia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A4 
 
Trade-off Pecking Order Agency No Evidence 
Cotradict 
(Positive): 
Guney et al. (2007)- 
Cross Country 
Leverage 
Positive:  
Garcia-Teruel and 
Martinez-Solano 
(2008)- Spain SMEs 
Al-Najjar and 
Belghitar, (2011)-U.K. 
Ogundipe et al. (2012)- 
Nigeria 
Locorotondo et al. 
(2014)- -Belgium 
Negative:  
Ferreira and Vilela 
(2004)- EMU 
Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004)- U.K. 
D‟Mello et al. (2008)-
U.S. 
Harford et al. (2008)-
U.S. 
Iskandar-Datta and Jia 
(2012)- Cross Country 
Wu et al. (2012)-China 
Belghitar and Khan 
(2013)-U.K. SMEs 
Chen et al. (2014)- 
China 
Guizani (2017)- Saudi 
Arabia 
Al-Najjar and Clark 
(2017)-MENA 
Leverage 
Negative: 
Opler et al. 
(1999)- U.S. 
Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004)- 
EMU 
Ozkan and 
Ozkan (2004)- 
U.K. 
Drobetz and 
Grüninge (2007)-
Switzerland 
Harford et al. 
(2008)- U.S. 
Song and Lee 
(2012)- East 
Asia 
Wu et al. (2012)-
China 
Gao et al. 
(2013)-U.S. 
Orens and 
Reheul (2013) -
Belgium-SMEs 
Chen et al. 
(2014)- China 
Masood and 
Shah (2014)-
Pakistan 
Kusnadi et al. 
(2015)- China 
 
Leverage 
Negative:  
Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004)-
EMU  
Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004)-U.K. 
Drobetz and 
Grüninger 
(2007)-
Switzerland 
Harford et al. 
(2008)-U.S. 
Song and Lee 
(2012)-East Asia 
Chen et al. 
(2014)-China 
Masood and Shah 
(2014)-Pakistan 
Kusnadi et al. 
(2015)-China 
 
Leverage 
Insignificant:  
Al-Najjar (2013)-Brazil 
 
 
A5 
 
Trade-off Pecking Order Agency No Evidence 
 
Al-Najjar and 
Clark (2017)-
MENA 
Firm Size 
Negative:  
Opler et al. (1999)- 
U.S. 
Dittmar et al. (2003) – 
Cross Country 
Ferreira and Vilela, 
(2004)- EMU 
Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004)- U.K. 
Drobetz and Grüninger 
(2007)-Switzerland 
D‟Mello et al. (2008)-
U.S. 
Bigelli and Sánchez-
Vidal (2012) -Italy 
Ogundipe et al. (2012)- 
Nigeria 
Wu et al. (2012)-China 
Al-Najjar (2013)- India 
Gao et al. (2013)-U.S. 
Locorotondo et al. 
(2014)- -Belgium 
Firm Size 
Positive: 
Al-Najjar and 
Belghitar (2011)-
U.K 
Shah(2011)-
Pakistan 
Song and Lee 
(2012)- East 
Asia 
Al-Najjar 
(2013)- China 
Al-Najjar and 
Clark (2017)-
MENA 
 
 
Firm Size 
Positive:  
Al-Najjar and 
Belghitar (2011)-
U.K. 
Song and Lee 
(2012)-East Asia 
Al-Najjar (2013)- 
China 
Firm Size 
Insignificant:  
Guney et al. (2007)- 
Cross Country 
Garcia-Teruel and 
Martinez-Solano 
(2008)- Spain SMEs 
Al-Najjar (2013)- 
Russia and Brazil 
Orens and Reheul 
(2013) -Belgium-SMEs 
Masood and Shah 
(2014)-Pakistan 
 
Cash Flow 
Negative: 
Iskandar-Datta and Jia 
(2012)- U.K. and 
Germany 
 
 
Cash Flow 
Positive:  
Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004) 
Drobetz and 
Grüninge (2007)- 
Switzerland 
 
 Cash Flow 
Insignificant:  
Iskandar-Datta and Jia 
(2012)- U.S., Canada, 
Australia, France and 
Japan 
Ogundipe et al. (2012)- 
Nigeria 
A6 
 
Trade-off Pecking Order Agency No Evidence 
Garcia-Teruel 
and Martinez-
Solano (2008) - 
Spain 
Harford et al. 
(2008)- U.S. 
Song and Lee 
(2012) –East 
Asia 
Wu et al. (2012)-
China 
Gao et al. 
(2013)-U.S. 
Orens and 
Reheul (2013) -
Belgium-SMEs 
Chen et al. 
(2014)- China 
Masood and 
Shah (2014)-
Pakistan 
Kusnadi et al. 
(2015)- China 
 
Volatility 
Positive:  
Opler et al. (1999)- 
U.S. 
Saddour (2006)- France 
Guney et al. (2007)- 
U.S. 
Harford et al. (2008) – 
U.S. 
Bates et al. (2009)- 
U.S. 
Bigelli and Sánchez-
Vidal (2012)-Italy 
Gao et al. (2013)-U.S. 
  Volatility 
Insignificant:  
Shah (2011)-Pakistan 
A7 
 
Trade-off Pecking Order Agency No Evidence 
Iskandar-Datta and Jia 
(2012)- Cross Country 
Belghitar and Khan 
(2013)-U.K. SMEs 
Chen et al. (2014)- 
China 
Locorotondo et al. 
(2014)-Belgium 
Guizani (2017)-Saudi 
Arabia 
Debt Maturity 
Negative: 
Ferreira and Vilela 
(2004)- EMU 
Saddour (2006)- France 
Garcia-Teruel and 
Martinez-Solano 
(2008)- Spain 
Shah (2011)-Pakistan 
Contradict 
(Positive): 
Wu et al. (2012)-China 
 
 
  
Capital Expenditure 
Positive: 
Kusnadi (2005)- 
Singapore 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Negative: 
Guney et al. 
(2007)- Cross 
Country 
Harford et al. 
(2008)- U.S. 
Bates et al. 
(2009)- U.S. 
Iskandar-Datta 
and Jia (2012)- 
Cross Country 
 
 Capital Expenditure 
Insignificant: 
D‟Mello et al. (2008)-
U.S. 
 
A8 
 
Trade-off Pecking Order Agency No Evidence 
Wu et al. (2012)-
China  
Gao et al. 
(2013)-U.S. 
Chen et al. 
(2014)- China 
Locorotondo et 
al. (2014) -
Belgium 
Masood and 
Shah (2014)-
Pakistan 
Guizani (2017)- 
Saudi Arabia 
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Appendix 1b: Summary of Literature Review on Corporate Governance 
Determinants 
 Negative  Positive No Evidence 
Ownership Structure 
Managerial 
Ownership 
Negative (interest 
alignment)  
Drobetz and 
Grüninge (2007)- 
Switzerland 
Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) 
Chen (2008)- U..S. 
(old economy firms) 
Masood and Shah 
(2014)-Pakistan 
Positive 
(Entrenchment) 
Harford et al. (2008)-
U.S. 
Chen and Chuang 
(2009)- U.S.  
(interest alignment 
because high tech 
firms) 
Belghitar and Khan 
(2013)-U.K.- SMEs 
Insignificant:  
Chen (2008)- U..S.  
(new economy firms) 
Kalcheva and Lins 
(2007)- cross country 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Negative: 
Kusnadi (2005)- 
Singapore 
Kusnadi et al. 
(2015)- China 
Kuan et al. (2011)- 
Taiwan 
Kuan et al. (2012)-
Taiwan 
Guney et al. (2007)- 
Cross Country 
Positive: 
Harford et al. (2008)- 
U.S. 
Masood and Shah 
(2014)-Pakistan 
Belghitar and Khan 
(2013)-U.K.-SMEs 
AL-Najjar and Clark 
(2017)-MENA 
 
Government 
Ownership 
Negative 
Megginson et al. 
(2014)-China 
Wu et al. (2012)-
China 
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Board Characteristics 
Board Size Negative: 
Masood and Shah 
(2014)-Pakistan 
Kuan et al. (2012)-
Taiwan 
Al-Najjar and Clark 
(2017)-MENA 
Positive: 
Kusnadi (2005)- 
Singapore 
Chen and 
Chuang(2009)- U.S.  
Ullah and Kamal 
(2017)-Pakistan 
 
Insignificant:  
Harford et al. (2008)- 
U.S. 
Kusnadi (2011)- 
Singapore and 
Malaysia  
Boubaker and 
Derouiche (2015)-
France 
Board 
Independence 
Negative: 
Kusnadi (2005)- 
Singapore 
Kusnadi (2011)- 
Singapore and 
Malaysia  
Boubaker and 
Derouiche (2015)-
France 
Positive: 
Kuan et al. (2011)- 
Taiwan 
Ullah and Kamal 
(2017)-Pakistan 
Kuan et al. (2012)-
Taiwan 
 
Insignificant:  
Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004)- U.K. 
Chen (2008)- U..S.  
(old economy firms) 
Al-Najjar and Clark 
(2017)-MENA 
Belghitar and Khan 
(2013)-U.K. SMEs 
CEO-Duality  Positive: 
Drobetz and Grüninge 
(2007)- Switzerland 
Kusnadi (2011)- 
Singapore and Malaysia  
Boubaker and 
Derouiche (2015)-
France 
Kuan et al. (2011)- 
Taiwan 
 
Women on the 
Board 
Negative: 
Ullah and Kamal 
(2017)-Pakistan 
Positive: 
Loukil and Yousfi 
(2016)-Tunisia 
 
Auditor   Insignificant:  
Kusnadi (2005)-
Singapore 
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Appendix 2: Summary of Regression Estimators used in Previous Research 
Regression Estimator  References 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) Opler et al. (1999) 
Dittmar et al. (2003) 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) 
Saddour (2006) 
Guney et al. (2007) 
Harford et al. (2008) 
Chen (2008) 
Tong (2010) 
Shah (2011) 
Filpse (2012) 
Wu et al. (2012) 
Al-Najjar (2013) 
Gao et al. (2013) 
Orens and Reheul (2013) 
Masood and Shah (2014) 
Megginson et al. (2014) 
Kusnadi et al. (2015) 
Al-Najjar and Clark (2017) 
Guizani (2017) 
Orlova and Roa (2018) 
Fixed Effect Opler et al. (1999) 
Drobetz and Grüninger (2006) 
Chen (2008) 
Bates et al. (2009) 
Tong (2010) 
Shah (2011) 
Filpse (2012) 
Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) 
Masood and Shah (2014) 
Megginson et al. (2014) 
Boubaker and Derouiche (2015) 
Guizani (2017) 
Orlova and Roa (2018) 
Random Effect Dittmar et al. (2003) 
Drobetz and Grüninger (2006) 
Shah (2011) 
Masood and Shah (2014) 
Guizani (2017) 
Fama- Macbeth Opler et al. (1999) 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) 
Tong (2010) 
Filpse (2012) 
Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) 
Instrumental Variable Approach Gao et al. (2013) 
Al-Najjar (2013) 
Al-Najjar and Clark (2017) 
Martinez-Sola et al. (2018) 
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Regression Estimator  References 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) 
Drobetz and Grüninger (2006) 
Chen (2008) 
Dittmar and Duchin (2011) 
Shah (2011) 
Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal (2012) 
Ogundipe et al. (2012) 
Megginson et al. (2014) 
Ullah and Kamal (2017) 
Guizani (2017) 
Orlova and Roa (2018) 
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Appendix 3: List of Companies in the Sample 
NUMBER CODE COMPANY NAME INDUSTRY  
1 OCIC EY 
Equity 
Orascom Construction Industries 
(OCI) 
Construction and 
Materials 
2 TMGH 
EY Equity 
T M G Holding Real Estate 
3 GTHE EY 
Equity 
Global Telecom Holding Telecommunications 
4 ETEL EY 
Equity 
Telecom Egypt Telecommunications 
5 ABUK 
EY Equity 
Abou Kir Fertilizers Chemicals 
6 EMOB 
EY Equity 
Egyptian Company for Mobile 
Services (MobiNil) 
Telecommunications 
7 EAST EY 
Equity 
Eastern Tobacco Personal and 
Household Products 
8 SWDY 
EY Equity 
ELSWEDY ELECTRIC Industrial Goods and 
Services and 
Automobiles 
9 EFID EY 
Equity 
Edita Food Industries S.A.E Food and Beverage 
10 JUFO EY 
Equity 
Juhayna Food Industries Food and Beverage 
11 MNHD 
EY Equity 
Medinet Nasr Housing Real Estate 
12 SKPC EY 
Equity 
Sidi Kerir Petrochemicals Chemicals 
13 HELI EY 
Equity 
Heliopolis Housing Real Estate 
14 PHDC EY 
Equity 
Palm Hills Development 
Company 
Real Estate 
15 SUCE EY 
Equity 
Suez Cement Construction and 
Materials 
16 PHAR EY 
Equity 
Egyptian International 
Pharmaceuticals (EIPICO) 
Healthcare and 
Pharmaceuticals 
17 ESRS EY 
Equity 
Ezz Steel Basic Resources 
18 IRAX EY 
Equity 
EL Ezz Aldekhela Steel - 
Alexandria 
Basic Resources 
19 AUTO 
EY Equity 
GB AUTO Industrial Goods and 
Services and 
Automobiles 
20 ALCN EY 
Equity 
Alexandria Containers and 
goods 
Industrial Goods and 
Services and 
Automobiles 
21 ORWE 
EY Equity 
Oriental Weavers Personal and 
Household Products 
22 OCDI EY 
Equity 
Six of October Development and 
Investment (SODIC) 
Real Estate 
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NUMBER CODE COMPANY NAME INDUSTRY  
23 AMOC 
EY Equity 
Alexandria Mineral Oils 
Company 
Oil and Gas 
24 MBSC 
EY Equity 
Misr Beni Suef Cement Construction and 
Materials 
25 IRON EY 
Equity 
Egyptian Iron and Steel Basic Resources 
26 SVCE EY 
Equity 
South Valley Cement Construction and 
Materials 
27 ORHD 
EY Equity 
Orascom Hotels And 
Development 
Travel and Leisure 
28 MCQE 
EY Equity 
Misr Cement (Qena) Construction and 
Materials 
29 EITP EY 
Equity 
Egyptian International Tourism 
Projects 
Travel and Leisure 
30 ALEX EY 
Equity 
Alexandria Cement Construction and 
Materials 
31 POUL EY 
Equity 
Cairo Poultry Food and Beverage 
32 SCEM EY 
Equity 
Sinai Cement Construction and 
Materials 
33 EGAL EY 
Equity 
Egypt Aluminum Basic Resources 
34 CSAG EY 
Equity 
Canal Shipping Agencies Industrial Goods and 
Services and 
Automobiles 
35 EGCH EY 
Equity 
Egyptian Chemical Industries 
(Kima) 
Chemicals 
36 SUGR EY 
Equity 
Delta Sugar Food and Beverage 
37 UNIT EY 
Equity 
United Housing and 
Development 
Real Estate 
38 SCTS EY 
Equity 
Sues Canal Company For 
Technology Settling 
Technology 
39 TORA EY 
Equity 
Torah Cement Construction and 
Materials 
40 EGTS EY 
Equity 
Egyptian for Tourism Resorts Travel and Leisure 
41 NCEM 
EY Equity 
National Cement Construction and 
Materials 
42 ELKA EY 
Equity 
El Kahera Housing Real Estate 
43 ZMID EY 
Equity 
Zahraa Maadi Investment and 
Development 
Real Estate 
44 MRCO 
EY Equity 
Misr Conditioning (Miraco) Construction and 
Materials 
45 BIOC EY 
Equity 
Glaxo Smith Kline Healthcare and 
Pharmaceuticals 
46 PACH EY 
Equity 
Paint and Chemicals Industries 
(Pachin) 
Construction and 
Materials 
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NUMBER CODE COMPANY NAME INDUSTRY  
47 BISM EY 
Equity 
Bisco Misr Food and Beverage 
48 ACGC 
EY Equity 
Arab Cotton Ginning Personal and 
Household Products 
49 GPPL EY 
Equity 
Golden Pyramids Plaza Travel and Leisure 
50 MEGM 
EY Equity 
Middle East Glass 
Manufacturing 
Industrial Goods and 
Services and 
Automobiles 
51 CERA EY 
Equity 
Arab Ceramics (Aracemco) Construction and 
Materials 
52 MPRC 
EY Equity 
Egyptian Media Production City Media 
53 UEGC EY 
Equity 
Elsaeed Contracting and Real 
Estate Investment Company 
SCCD 
Construction and 
Materials 
54 RTVC EY 
Equity 
Remco for Touristic Villages 
Construction 
Travel and Leisure 
55 EHDR EY 
Equity 
Egyptians Housing Development 
and Reconstruction 
Real Estate 
56 EFIC EY 
Equity 
Egyptian Financial and 
Industrial 
Chemicals 
57 ELEC EY 
Equity 
Electro Cable Egypt Industrial Goods and 
Services and 
Automobiles 
58 PHTV EY 
Equity 
Pyramisa Hotels Travel and Leisure 
59 LCSW 
EY Equity 
Lecico Egypt Construction and 
Materials 
60 EGSA EY 
Equity 
Egyptian Satellites (NileSat) Technology 
61 NCMP 
EY Equity 
National company for maize 
products 
Food and Beverage 
62 ADPC EY 
Equity 
The Arab Dairy Products Co. 
ARAB DAIRY 
Food and Beverage 
63 UEFM 
EY Equity 
Upper Egypt Flour Mills Food and Beverage 
64 MIPH EY 
Equity 
Minapharm Pharmaceuticals Healthcare and 
Pharmaceuticals 
65 RAYA 
EY Equity 
Raya Holding For Technology 
And Communications 
Technology 
66 EGAS EY 
Equity 
Natural Gas and Mining Project 
(Egypt Gas) 
Utilities 
67 ESGI EY 
Equity 
Egyptian Starch and Glucose Food and Beverage 
68 SBAG EY 
Equity 
Suez Bags Industrial Goods and 
Services and 
Automobiles 
69 ELSH EY 
Equity 
El Shams Housing and 
Urbanization 
Real Estate 
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NUMBER CODE COMPANY NAME INDUSTRY  
70 MFSC EY 
Equity 
Misr Duty Free Shops Retail 
71 ASCM 
EY Equity 
Asek Company for Mining - 
Ascom 
Basic Resources 
72 GGCC 
EY Equity 
Giza General Contracting Construction and 
Materials 
73 NCGC 
EY Equity 
Nile Cotton Ginning Personal and 
Household Products 
74 WCDF 
EY Equity 
Middle and West Delta Flour 
Mills 
Food and Beverage 
75 CIRF EY 
Equity 
Cairo Development and 
Investment 
Real Estate 
76 MICH EY 
Equity 
Misr Chemical Industries Chemicals 
77 SDTI EY 
Equity 
Sharm Dreams Co. for Tourism 
Investment 
Travel and Leisure 
78 ACRO 
EY Equity 
Acrow Misr Construction and 
Materials 
79 ATQA 
EY Equity 
Misr National Steel - Ataqa Basic Resources 
80 SPIN EY 
Equity 
Alexandria Spinning and 
Weaving (SPINALEX) 
Personal and 
Household Products 
81 ECAP EY 
Equity 
El Ezz Porcelain (Gemma) Construction and 
Materials 
82 AJWA 
EY Equity 
AJWA for Food Industries 
company Egypt 
Food and Beverage 
83 GSSC EY 
Equity 
General Silos and Storage Retail 
84 KABO 
EY Equity 
El Nasr Clothes and Textiles 
(Kabo) 
Personal and 
Household Products 
85 CEFM EY 
Equity 
Middle Egypt Flour Mills Food and Beverage 
86 MHOT 
EY Equity 
Misr Hotels Travel and Leisure 
87 CPCI EY 
Equity 
Cairo Pharmaceuticals Healthcare and 
Pharmaceuticals 
88 NASR EY 
Equity 
El Nasr Transformers (El Maco) Industrial Goods and 
Services and 
Automobiles 
89 EDFM 
EY Equity 
East Delta Flour Mills Food and Beverage 
90 AXPH EY 
Equity 
Alexandria Pharmaceuticals Healthcare and 
Pharmaceuticals 
91 APSW 
EY Equity 
ARAB POLVARA SPINNING 
and WEAVING CO. 
Personal and 
Household Products 
92 UASG EY 
Equity 
United Arab Shipping Industrial Goods and 
Services and 
Automobiles 
93 MILS EY 
Equity 
North Cairo Mills Food and Beverage 
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NUMBER CODE COMPANY NAME INDUSTRY  
94 MOIL EY 
Equity 
Maridive and oil services Industrial Goods and 
Services and 
Automobiles 
95 DAPH EY 
Equity 
Development and Engineering 
Consultants 
Real Estate 
96 PRCL EY 
Equity 
Ceramic and Porcelain Personal and 
Household Products 
97 NHPS EY 
Equity 
National Housing for 
Professional Syndicates 
Real Estate 
98 ISMA EY 
Equity 
Ismailia Misr Poultry Food and Beverage 
99 RREI EY 
Equity 
Arab Real Estate Investment 
CO.-ALICO 
Real Estate 
100 IFAP EY 
Equity 
International Agricultural 
Products 
Food and Beverage 
101 DSCW 
EY Equity 
Dice Sport and Casual Wear Personal and 
Household Products 
102 IDRE EY 
Equity 
Ismailia Development and Real 
Estate Co 
Real Estate 
103 ELWA 
EY Equity 
El Wadi Co. For Touristic 
Investement 
Travel and Leisure 
104 DCRC EY 
Equity 
Delta Construction and 
Rebuilding 
Construction and 
Materials 
105 ENGC EY 
Equity 
Engineering Industries (ICON) Industrial Goods and 
Services and 
Automobiles 
106 NDRL EY 
Equity 
National Drilling Oil and Gas 
107 ETRS EY 
Equity 
Egyptian Transport 
(EGYTRANS) 
Industrial Goods and 
Services and 
Automobiles 
108 KZPC EY 
Equity 
Kafr El Zayat Pesticides Chemicals 
109 AFMC 
EY Equity 
Alexandria Flour Mills Food and Beverage 
110 SPHT EY 
Equity 
El Shams Pyramids For Hotels 
and Touristic Projects 
Travel and Leisure 
111 NINH EY 
Equity 
Nozha International Hospital Healthcare and 
Pharmaceuticals 
112 COSG EY 
Equity 
Cairo Oils and Soap Food and Beverage 
113 ZEOT EY 
Equity 
Extracted Oils Food and Beverage 
114 SMPP EY 
Equity 
Modern Shorouk Printing and 
Packaging 
Industrial Goods and 
Services and 
Automobiles 
115 RAKT EY 
Equity 
Rakta Paper Manufacturing Basic Resources 
116 AMES 
EY Equity 
Alexandria New Medical Center Healthcare and 
Pharmaceuticals 
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NUMBER CODE COMPANY NAME INDUSTRY  
117 AALR EY 
Equity 
General Company For Land 
Reclamation, Development and 
Reconstruction 
Real Estate 
118 ROTO EY 
Equity 
Rowad Tourism (Al Rowad) Travel and Leisure 
119 NCCW 
EY Equity 
Nasr Company for Civil Works Construction and 
Materials 
120 MMAT 
EY Equity 
Marsa Alam For Tourism 
Development 
Travel and Leisure 
121 MENA 
EY Equity 
Mena Touristic and Real Estate 
Investment 
Real Estate 
122 EPCO EY 
Equity 
Egypt for Poultry Food and Beverage 
123 NIPH EY 
Equity 
El-Nile Co. For Pharmaceuticals 
And Chemical Industries 
Healthcare and 
Pharmaceuticals 
124 WATP 
EY Equity 
Modern Company for water 
proofing (Bitumode) 
Construction and 
Materials 
125 MPCO 
EY Equity 
Mansourah Poultry Food and Beverage 
126 EIUD EY 
Equity 
Egyptians For Investment and 
Urban Development 
Real Estate 
127 ELNA EY 
Equity 
El Nasr For Manufacturing 
Agricultural Crops 
Food and Beverage 
128 ALUM 
EY Equity 
Arab Aluminum Basic Resources 
129 SCFM EY 
Equity 
South Cairo and Giza Mills and 
Bakeries 
Food and Beverage 
130 GMCI EY 
Equity 
GMC Group for Industrial 
Commercial and Financial 
Investments 
Oil and Gas 
131 ALRA EY 
Equity 
Atlas For Land Reclamation and 
Agricultural Proccessing 
Food and Beverage 
132 SNFC EY 
Equity 
Sharkia National Food Food and Beverage 
133 NRPD EY 
Equity 
National Real Estate Bank for 
Development 
Real Estate 
134 GTWL 
EY Equity 
Golden Textiles and Clothes 
Wool 
Personal and 
Household Products 
135 TOUR EY 
Equity 
Tourism Urbanization Travel and Leisure 
136 EPPK EY 
Equity 
El Ahram Co. For Printing And 
Packing 
Industrial Goods and 
Services and 
Automobiles 
137 MPCI EY 
Equity 
Memphis Pharmaceuticals Healthcare and 
Pharmaceuticals 
138 MOSC 
EY Equity 
Misr Oils and Soap Food and Beverage 
139 UNIP EY 
Equity 
Universal For Paper and 
Packaging Materials (Unipack 
Industrial Goods and 
Services and 
Automobiles 
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NUMBER CODE COMPANY NAME INDUSTRY  
140 INFI EY 
Equity 
Ismailia National Food 
Industries 
Food and Beverage 
141 AREH EY 
Equity 
Egyptian Real Estate Group Real Estate 
142 CCRS EY 
Equity 
Gulf Canadian Real Estate 
Investment Co. 
Real Estate 
143 ADCI EY 
Equity 
Arab Pharmaceuticals Healthcare and 
Pharmaceuticals 
144 EDBM 
EY Equity 
Egyptian for Developing 
Building Materials 
Construction and 
Materials 
145 RUBX 
EY Equity 
Rubex Plastics Construction and 
Materials 
146 MEPA 
EY Equity 
Medical Packaging Company Healthcare and 
Pharmaceuticals 
147 SIMO EY 
Equity 
Paper Middle East (Simo) Basic Resources 
148 EALR EY 
Equity 
El Arabia for Land Reclamation Real Estate 
149 WKOL 
EY Equity 
Wadi Kom Ombo Land 
Reclamation 
Real Estate 
150 EEII EY 
Equity 
El Arabia Engineering Industries Industrial Goods and 
Services and 
Automobiles 
151 OBRI EY 
Equity 
El Obour Real Estate Investment Real Estate 
152 SMFR EY 
Equity 
Samad Misr -EGYFERT Chemicals 
153 AITG EY 
Equity 
Assiut Islamic Trading Retail 
154 GIHD EY 
Equity 
Gharbia Islamic Housing 
Development 
Real Estate 
155 NEDA 
EY Equity 
Northern Upper Egypt 
Development and Agricultural 
Production 
Food and Beverage 
156 OCPH EY 
Equity 
October Pharma Healthcare and 
Pharmaceuticals 
157 TRTO EY 
Equity 
TransOceans Tours Travel and Leisure 
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Appendix 4: List of Data Sources 
Data Source 
Financial variables  
Ownership structure 
Company auditor 
Bloomberg 
Financial variables Thomson Reuters EIKON 
Board of directors Egypt for Information Dissemination 
Political stability World Bank 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
Industry classifications Egyptian Exchange Website 
http://www.egx.com.eg/English/ListedStocks.aspx 
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